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In 1972, the United States Supreme Court introduced
for the first time the concept of the "public forum" into first
amendment jurisprudence. The concept enjoyed immediate
success, and within twelve years had assumed the status of
"a fundamental principle of First Amendment doctrine."'
In the process the concept evolved into an elaborate, even
1. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
280 (1984). The increasing prominence of public forum doctrine is documented
in Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1221-22 (1984).
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byzantine scheme of constitutional rules2 designed to ascer-
tain when members of the general public can use govern-
ment property for communicative purposes. In general
outline, these rules focus tightly "on the character of the
property at issue ' '3 in order to determine whether it is a
"public or nonpublic" forum.4 If the property is a public
forum, the government's ability to regulate the public's ex-
pressive use of the property is subject to strict constitutional
limitations;5 if it is a nonpublic forum, the government is
given great latitude in the property's regulation. 6
Although public forum doctrine has developed with ex-
traordinary speed, it has done so in a manner heedless of its
constitutional foundations. The Court has yet to articulate a
defensible constitutional justification for its basic project of
dividing government property into distinct categories, much
less for the myriad of formal rules governing the regulation
of speech within these categories. These rules have prolifer-
ated to such an extent as to render the doctrine virtually im-
permeable to common sense. The doctrine has in fact
become a serious obstacle not only to sensitive first amend-
ment analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the gov-
ernment's requirements in controlling its own property. It
has received nearly universal condemnation from commen-
2. On the complex nature of contemporary public forum doctrine, see, e.g.,
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.09 [D], at 4-70-4-73 (2d ed. 1984); Leedes, Pigeonholes in the
Public Forum, 20 U. RIcH. L. REV. 499, 500-01 & n.13 (1986).
3. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
4. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985).
5. In a public forum:
[T]he government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct
is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations as long as the restrictions "are content-neu-
tral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Ad-
ditional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular
type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accom-
plish a compelling governmental interest.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citations omitted).
6. As a general matter, "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint-neu-
tral." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
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tators 7 and is in such a state of disrepair as to require a fun-
damental reappraisal of its origins and purposes. This
Article is intended as a modest step in that direction.
The first section of the Article will trace the history of
public forum doctrine with an eye toward uncovering the
underlying values which have led the Court to back itself
into its present uncomfortable position. The second section
of the Article will assess the present condition of what Mel-
ville Nimmer, shortly before his untimely death, called the
"complex maze of categories and subcategories" 8 which
constitute modern public forum doctrine. Almost none of
the special rules characteristic of the doctrine can withstand
analytic scrutiny.
The third section of the Article will propose a constitu-
tional theory that is responsive to the values which the his-
tory of public forum doctrine reveals have animated the
Court, and the theory will in turn lead to a reformulation of
7. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 92-93 & n.182
(1987). In a world of disputatious academic criticism, the unrelenting and unani-
mous condemnation of contemporary public forum doctrine is truly remarkable.
The critics' reasons for rejecting the doctrine are nearly always the same. Public
forum doctrine is said to depend upon a "myopic focus on formalistic labels" that
"serves only to distract attention from the real stakes" at issue in disputes over
public use of government resources for communicative purposes. Id. at 93. The
doctrine is said to exemplify the kind of formalism that "produces incoherent re-
sults untouched by the interplay of considerations that should inform . . .deci-
sionmaking under the first amendment." Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum
Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 341 (1986). The doc-
trine is condemned as "simply ... an inadequate jurisprudence of labels," Dienes,
The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 109, 110 (1986), and indicted because it distracts "attention away from
the first amendment values at stake in a given case." Farber & Nowak, supra note
1, at 1224. It is attacked because it is without underlying "coherent principles,"
Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned
Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 548 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Public Forum Anal-
ysis] and imposes a "categorization" that fails "to reflect accurately the conflicting
interests affected by restrictions on expression." Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims
of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121-22
(1982) [hereinafter Note, A Unitary Approach]. For a sampling of the negative com-
mentary attracted over the years by the doctrine, see also Cass, First Amendment
Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1308-09, 1317-37 (1979); Gold-
berger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public
Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 175, 183 (1983); Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public
Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J.
247 (1976); Schmedemann, Of Meetings and Mailboxes: The First Amendment and Exclu-
sive Representation in Public Sector Labor Relations, 72 VA. L. REV. 91, 112-15 (1986).
8. M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D], at 4-71.
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the doctrine that is consistent with contemporary constitu-
tional principles. To summarize this reformulation in a brief
and somewhat Delphic manner, public and nonpublic fo-
rums should not be distinguished because of the character of
the government property at issue, but rather because of the
nature of the government authority in question. There are
two kinds of government authority, corresponding to two
distinct regimes of first amendment regulation., The first is
what I call "managerial" authority, with which the state is
characteristically invested when it acts to administer organi-
zational domains dedicated to instrumental conduct. In
such contexts the government may constitutionally regulate
speech as necessary to achieve instrumental objectives. The
second kind of authority can be termed that of "govern-
ance." It is characteristic of the authority which the state ex-
ercises over what Hannah Arendt has called the "public
realm," 9: the arena in which members of the general public
meet to accommodate competing values and expectations,
and hence in which all goals or objectives are open to discus-
sion and modification. The government's ability to restrict
speech in the public realm is limited by ordinary and gener-
ally applicable principles of first amendment adjudication. If
the government exercises the authority of governance over a
resource which a member of the general public wishes to use
for communicative purposes, the resource is a public forum.
The resource is a nonpublic forum if it is subject to the man-
agerial authority of government. The fourth section of the
Article will discuss in detail the constitutional criteria that
distinguish management from governance, and hence public
from nonpublic forums.
A number of constitutional consequences flow from this
reformulation of public forum doctrine, one of the most im-
portant of which is that public forums do not, as the Court
has sometimes remarked, occupy "a special position in
terms of first amendment protection,"' 0 but are instead re-
sources governed by the most generally applicable first
amendment standards. These standards do not ordinarily
apply, however, in nonpublic forums, in which the state is
instead permitted to regulate speech as necessary to achieve
9. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1959); see R. BEiNER, POUT-
ICALJUDGMENT 152 (1983).
10. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
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certain specified objectives. When a court reviews govern-
ment action in a nonpublic forum, it must decide whether it
should independently evaluate the state's instrumental justi-
fication for the regulation of speech, or whether it should
defer on this question to the judgment of government offi-
cials. The question of deference accounts for some of the
most controversial aspects of contemporary public forum
doctrine, and will be discussed in the fifth section of the Arti-
cle. In its sixth and final section, the Article will address the
difficult issue of the constitutional role of viewpoint discrimi-
nation within a nonpublic forum.
The result of all this analysis, it is to be hoped, will be a
theory of public forum doctrine that is both practical and
constitutionally sound.
I. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The phrase "public forum" is traditionally attributed to
Harry Kalven's classic 1965 article, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana." In Cox, l2 the Court addressed the
troublesome issue of street demonstrations in the vicinity of
a courthouse. Kalven used the occasion to attempt a major
reconsideration of "the problems of speech in public
places."' 3 Kalven's basic point was:
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks,
and other public places are an important facility for pub-
lic discussion and political process. They are in brief a
public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the gen-
erosity and empathy with which such facilities are made
available is an index of freedom.
14
The concept of the "public forum" was not for Kalven
primarily a tool for categorizing different kinds of govern-
ment property; his central concern was rather with the pro-
11. 1965 Sup. CT. REV. i; see, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D], at 4-69
n. 163; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
20, 35 (1975). The United States Supreme Court had occasionally used the
phrase "public forum" prior to 1965, although not in the context of a recogniza-
ble first amendment theory. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740, 796 (1961)(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 806 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court of California, however, had used the phrase in a sur-
prisingly contemporary sense as early as 1946. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545-48, 171 P.2d 885, 890-91 (1946).
12. 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965).
13. Kalven, supra note 11, at 3.
14. Id. at 11-12.
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tection of that "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" speech
"on public issues" which New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 15 had
recently placed at the center of first amendment concerns. 16
Streets and parks were constitutionally important because
they were peculiarly fitted to foster such speech. But
Kalven's use of the phrase "public forum" to express this
importance was in the long run to prove unfortunate, for it
tended to focus attention on categories of public property,
rather than on the relationship between such categories and
the underlying constitutional value of public discussion.
A. Kalven's Reconstruction of the Early Precedents: Of Streets
and Private Homes
Kalven cannot be entirely exonerated from contributing
to this misunderstanding, however, for his claim that the
"concept of the public forum" is "implicit in the earlier
cases" 17 appeared to imply that Supreme Court precedents
of the 1930s and 1940s had given special constitutional pro-
tection to a specific category of public property. This impli-
cation, however, was quite mistaken. The precedents relied
upon by Kalven did indeed restrict the government's ability
to regulate speech within public forums, but they also im-
posed exactly the same kind of restrictions on the govern-
ment's ability to regulate speech in circumstances that did
not involve public forums.
An important holding relied upon by Kalven for his in-
terpretation of "the earlier cases" was Schneider v. State, 8 in
which the Court had considered the constitutionality of mu-
nicipal ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills
in streets and other public places. The ordinances were de-
fended on the grounds that they were necessary in order to
prevent littering. The Court balanced this justification
against the ordinance's impact on the exercise of first
amendment rights, 19 and concluded that "the purpose to
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Vote on "the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
16. Kalven, supra note 11, at 3.
17. Id.
18. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
19. The Court stated:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise
1987] 1719
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keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient
to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on
a public street from handing literature to one willing to re-
ceive it. '"20
Kalven was undoubtedly right in reading Schneider as
having "an impressive bite" in protecting first amendment
concerns, 2' but it is somewhat more doubtful whether this
bite came, as Kalven seemed to claim, from a specific con-
cern for speech in public places. Only four years after Schnei-
der, the Court in Martin v. City of Struthers22 struck down a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door distribu-
tion of handbills. As in Schneider, the Court weighed the first
amendment right to distribute and receive information
against the state's interest in preventing a "minor nui-
sance," 23 and, as in Schneider, the Court concluded that the
first amendment right must prevail. In Martin, however,
there was no question of protecting speech in public places,
there was only the question of protecting speech.
Martin and Schneider, when taken together, suggest that a
specific concern for speech in what Kalven later called a
"public forum" was not a major component of the Court's
analysis. This conclusion is reinforced by a review of the
Court's first amendment decisions in the 1930s and 1940s,
when virtually every protection extended to speech occur-
ring in public forums was also extended to speech that did
not occur in such forums. If the Court held that street dem-
onstrations could not be subject to the whim of official dis-
cretion,24 it also held that the distribution of pamphlets in
private homes could not be subject to such discretion. 25 If
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And
so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment
of the rights.
308 U.S. at 161.
20. Id. at 162.
21. Kalven, supra note 11, at 18.
22. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
23. Id. at 143.
24. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951).
25. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-65 (1939). During this
period many of the Court's cases invalidating official discretion to regulate speech
simply did not distinguish between speech that occurred in public places like
1720 [Vol. 34:1713
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the Court protected provocative speech in the streets, 26 it
also protected such speech in private halls.
27
In short, the precedents indicate that the Court's pri-
mary concern was to protect communication, and that the
geographical location of the communication played a rela-
tively minor role in that concern. There was, however, one
major exception to this generalization, an exception that
formed the basis of Kalven's historical reconstruction. That
exception was Justice Roberts' famous dictum in his plurality
opinion in Hague v. CIO :2
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all;
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.
Because of its apparent emphasis on the special impor-
tance of speech in streets and other public places, the pas-
sage has been cited as the origin of the concept of the
"public forum."29 But the passage is deceptive, for the hold-
ing of Justice Roberts' opinion is simply that official discre-
tion to suppress speech in public places is constitutionally
invalid, and Roberts was equally willing to reach this conclu-
sion with respect to speech in private places. 30 Moreover the
passage appears to distinguish streets and other public
streets, and speech that occurred in private places like homes. See, e.g., Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
26. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
27. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
28. 307 U.S. at 515-16.
29. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981); M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D], at 4-68. The pas-
sage has been frequently cited in recent public forum decisions. See, e.g., City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-14 (1984);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-36 (1976).
30. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-65 (1939).
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places on the basis of "common law notions of adverse pos-
session and public trust," notions that have no logical con-
nection to first amendment values.31 The transition from
"immemorial" usage to constitutional judgment is so abrupt
as to appear to be simply a non sequitur.
The transition, however, makes a great deal more sense
once it is understood that its purpose is to distinguish an
early precedent, Davis v. Massachusetts,32 in which the Court
had upheld a conviction for making a public address on the
Boston Common without first having obtained a permit
from the mayor. 3 The defendant in Davis had argued that
the Common was "the property of the inhabitants of the city
of Boston, and dedicated to the use of the people of that city
and the public in many ways," including the making of pub-
lic addresses. 34 The Court rejected this claim, stating that
"the common was absolutely under the control of the legis-
lature," and that "[f]or the legislature absolutely or condi-
tionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park
is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the
public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in
his house. '"3
5
If the reasoning of Davis were spelled out, it would take
the form of a syllogism. The major premise of the argument
is that when the government acts in a proprietary capacity,
like "the owner of a private house," it can abridge or pro-
hibit speech. The minor premise of the argument is that the
government in fact acted in a proprietary capacity with re-
spect to the Boston Common. The conclusion of the syllo-
gism is that the ordinance requiring a citizen to obtain a
permit prior to speaking on the Boston Common is
constitutional.
The Court in Davis defended the minor premise of this
syllogism on the basis of state property law. It defended the
major premise on the basis of what today would be called
the "rights-privilege" distinction. The Court reasoned that
31. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 238.
32. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
33. At issue in Davis was a municipal ordinance providing that "No person
shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address ... except in
accordance with a permit from the mayor." Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 46-47.
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because Boston "owned" the Common and could therefore
"absolutely exclude all right to use," it necessarily also re-
tained the power "to determine under what circumstances
such use may be availed," including circumstances abridging
speech, since "the greater power contains the lesser."36
The municipality in Hague, relying on Davis, had made a
similar argument, contending that "the city's ownership of
streets and parks is as absolute as one's ownership of his
home, with consequent power altogether to exclude citizens
from the use thereof. . . ."37 Justice Roberts' assertion that
streets and parks had "immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public" was meant to deny the minor premise
of this argument, that the city was the proprietor of its
streets. This explains Roberts' odd conjunction of common
law property rights and constitutional principle. What is
particularly interesting about Roberts' opinion, however, is
that it did not seek to deny the major premise of the munici-
pality's argument. It did not dispute that government could
abridge speech were it to act in a proprietary capacity; it
merely held that the government's power over the streets
and parks was not proprietary in nature.
Viewed in this light, the thrust of Justice Roberts' fa-
mous opinion in Hague is not that speech in streets and parks
is especially important or unique, but rather that the govern-
ment could not exercise proprietary control over such
places. Even though the government "owned" the streets in
a technical sense, it still could not freely manage them in the
way that a property owner could manage his house. The
streets were in some sense 'external" to the government,
and consequently in regulating them the government was
subject to the ordinary constitutional restraints prohibiting
the abridgment of speech.
This interpretation of Hague is confirmed by the Court's
subsequent opinion in Jamison v. Texas,38 a decision relied
upon by Kalven. InJamison, the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of a Dallas ordinance prohibiting the distribution
36. Id. at 48.
37. 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). The statute at issue in Hague was similar to that
in Davis. It prohibited "public parades or public assembly in or upon the public
streets, highways, public parks or public buildings ofJersey City" without a permit
from "the Director of Public Safety." Id. at 502 n. I.
38. 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
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of leaflets upon the streets and sidewalks. The city relied
upon Davis in defending the ordinance, but its argument was
summarily dismissed by the Court, which said that Davis had
been repudiated by Hague. The law, said the Court, was that
"one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left
open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the
constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fash-
ion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by
handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word." 39
Jamison makes explicit the basis ofJustice Roberts' opin-
ion in Hague: Constitutional rights are not lost simply be-
cause one is on a street that happens to be "owned" by the
state. But although first amendment rights do not disappear
simply because the state claims to have proprietary control
over such places, such rights are on the other hand not par-
ticularly puissant because they are exercised in a public place.
They are simply the same as first amendment rights exer-
cised "elsewhere."
There is, in this reasoning, no "implicit" concept of a
public forum, at least insofar as the phrase is meant to sig-
nify a special geographical location or category of govern-
ment property where speech merits unusual protection.
B. The Evolution of Modern Public Forum Doctrine
Whatever the accuracy of Kalven's reconstruction of the
early precedents, his concept of a public forum was to prove
profoundly influential in the development of first amend-
ment doctrine. 40 In 1972 the Supreme Court, explicitly ac-
knowledging its debt to Kalven, began to use the phrase
"public forum" as a term of art.41 For the next few years,
the Court experimented with various definitions of the
phrase. By 1976, however, the Court was prepared to fix the
framework of public forum doctrine, as we now know it.
That framework was heavily indebted to the Court's 1966
decision in Adderley v. Florida.42
39. Id. at 416.
40. Early examples of the influence of Kalven's article include: Wolin v. Port
of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968); Univ. Comm. v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).
41. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 99 & n.6 (1972).
42. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
1724 [Vol. 34:1713
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1724 1986-1987
PUBLIC FORUM
1. Adderley v. Florida: The Resurrection of the
Davis Syllogism
In Adderley, the Court was faced with a challenge to the
convictions of thirty-two students who had been arrested for
trespass on the grounds of a county jail. The students had
been protesting the jail's segregative practices, and had re-
fused to disperse at the request of the sheriff, the custodian
of the jail. The Court, speaking through Justice Black, sum-
marily rejected the students' claim that their demonstration
was protected by the first amendment:
Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents
Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general
trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sher-
iff's order to remove themselves from what amounted to
the curtilage of the jailhouse. The State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is law-
fully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the
petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right
to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objec-
tions, because this "area chosen for the peaceful civil
rights demonstration was not only 'reasonable' but also
particularly appropriate ...... Such an argument has as
its major unarticulated premise the assumption that peo-
ple who want to propagandize protests or views have a
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and
wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law
was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the
cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana [379 U.S.] at
554-555 and 563-564. We reject it again. The United
States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the
use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscrimina-
tory purpose.4
3
At first glance, the Court's argument appears inconsis-
tent with the Court's earlier precedents concerning freedom
of expression in the streets and other public places. After
all, the streets, no less than the jailhouse curtilage, are
43. 385 U.S. at 47-48 (footnote omitted). The passage has exerted great in-
fluence on the development of modern public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-801 (1985); City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 n.31 (1984);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 n.10 (1981); United States Postal Serv. v. Coun-
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
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"property under [the] control" of the state. If the state
could act like "a private owner of property" with respect to
the curtilage, then why not also with respect to the streets?
It might be thought that Adderley can be distinguished
because the early precedents, in the words of Jamison, only
applied to "one who is rightfully on a street which the state
has left open to the public." In Adderley, however, Florida's
trespass law prohibited the students from being "rightfully"
on thejailhouse grounds. This distinction, however, cannot
be sustained. Under an ordinance like that at issue in Hague,
citizens who are "rightfully" on the streets cannot demon-
strate unless they first receive approval from the Director of
Public Safety. Under a statute like that at issue in Adderley,
students can rightfully assemble and demonstrate on the
jailhouse grounds until ordered to disperse by the sheriff.44
In both cases the legality of the demonstration depends
upon the approval of a state official. In both cases this
power of approval is discretionary and unconstrained by ar-
ticulated guidelines. 45 In Hague, the Court held that the first
amendment precluded the exercise of such power over
speech, whereas in Adderley it did not.
In Hague, however, as in Jamison, the Court was con-
cerned with determining the facial validity of ordinances that
directly regulated recognized modes of communication,
such as leafletting, parading, and assembling.46 In Adderley,
on the other hand, the statute at issue was a general trespass
statute that addressed conduct, rather than a medium of
44. The statute at issue provided:
Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a mali-
cious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not spe-
cially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not
exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars.
385 U.S. at 40 n. 1. Since the curtilage of the jailhouse was not marked with "No
Trespassing" signs, and since the public was not generally excluded from the
grounds, id. at 52 (Douglas, J., dissenting), the students' demonstration only be-
came an illegal "trespass" upon the disapproval of the sheriff.
45. Neither the statute in Adderley nor the ordinance in Hague contained guide-
lines for determining when demonstrations should be permitted. If it is argued
that the discretion of the sheriff in Adderley was implicitly constrained by his con-
cern for the orderly operation of the jail, it could with equal plausibility be argued
that the Director's discretion in Hague was implicitly constrained by a similar con-
cern to preserve the orderly flow of traffic in the streets.
46. See supra note 37.
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communication. 47 Just as the prohibition against murder can
be applied without constitutional difficulty to the terrorist
who uses assassination as a mode of political expression, so
a general proscription against trespass can be applied even
to those who trespass in order to communicate. 48 Read in
this light, Adderley is a very narrow decision, concerned not
so much with the government's power to control speech, as
with its ability to enact and enforce general regulations of
conduct. 49
47. In his 1965 article on the public forum, Kalven had attacked Justice
Goldberg's opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965), for distinguish-
ing between "pure speech," and speech mixed with "conduct such as patrolling,
marching, and picketing." Kalven, supra note 11, at 22. Kalven's point was that all
speech necessarily involves physical action, whether it be noise, litter, or gestures,
and that the mere presence of such action cannot therefore be by itself the ground
for diminishing the first amendment protection that the speech would otherwise
merit. Id. at 23. Kalven's point is sound, but even if it is accepted it does not
follow, as the Court recognized in 1968, that there is no constitutional difference
between a statute addressed directly to expression or to a recognized medium of
expression, and a statute addressed to conduct that indirectly impacts on particu-
lar acts of expression. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393
U.S. 900 (1968). In recent years the Court seems to have lost its grip on this
important distinction. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468
U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
48. Distinct constitutional problems may arise, however, if a neutral statute
addressed to conduct is enacted or enforced for the primary reason of sup-
pressing speech. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 598 (1978); Stone, supra note 7, at 55-56; Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227 (1983). Although it is argua-
ble that in Adderley the sheriff transformed the demonstration into an illegal tres-
pass primarily in order to silence the protesting students, Justice Black did not
address the important issues arising from this interpretation of the facts. He
noted simply that there was "not a shred of evidence in this record" that the sher-
iff had evicted the demonstrators because he "objected to what was being sung or
said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the objectives of their
protest." 385 U.S. at. 47.
49. If Adderley is narrowly interpreted in this manner, its true descendents in
the area of public forum doctrine are decisions like United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675 (1985), which dealt with the applicability of general and neutral statutes
addressed to conduct. Most public forum cases, however, concern regulations
directly applicable to speech or to recognized media of communication. See, e.g.,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 647 n.10 (1981); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981);Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976). Many of these cases cite and rely upon Adderley. See supra
note 43.
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Subsequent cases, however, have not read Adderley in so
narrow a fashion.50 The reason lies in Adderley's discussion
of Edwards v. South Carolina,5' a case decided several years
earlier in which the Court had vacated the convictions of
black protestors who had demonstrated on the grounds of
the South Carolina State House. The protestors had been
charged with the common law crime of breach of the peace,
which, like the trespass statute at issue in Adderley, appeared
to be a neutral regulation of conduct rather than of speech.
Black distinguished Edwards on a number of grounds. One
was that the common law crime at issue in Edwards was "so
broad and all-embracing as to jeopardize speech, press, as-
sembly and petition . "..."52 But a second and ultimately
more influential ground of distinction was that the demon-
strators in Edwards "went to the South Carolina State Capitol
grounds to protest," whereas the demonstrators in Adderley
"went to thejail." 53 This difference was constitutionally sig-
nificant because "[t]raditionally, state capitol grounds are
open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are
not."5
4
Justice Black's reliance on "traditional" usage was no
doubt meant to echo Justice Roberts' reference to the "im-
memorial" use of the streets for "purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions." Black's language implied that even if a
general trespass statute could not be applied to prevent
demonstrations in the streets or on the grounds of a state
capitol, 55 they could be so applied on the grounds of the jail-
house because there was no history of communicative behav-
ior associated with the jail. But this implication made sense
only if Justice Black, like Justice Roberts in Hague, was writ-
ing within the confines of the Davis syllogism. From this per-
50. See supra notes 43 & 49.
51. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
52. 385 U.S. at 42.
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id.
55. Six months before its decision in Adderle-V the Court had specifically re-
served judgment on a distinct but related question, stating in Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965): "We have no occasion in this case to consider the con-
stitutionality of the uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory application of a
statute forbidding all access to streets and other public facilities for parades and
meetings." Kalven's 1965 article on the public forum was in part a response to the
challenge posed by this reservation.
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spective, Black's forceful analogy of the government to a
"private owner of property" seemed to reassert the major
premise of the syllogism, that the government could directly
abridge speech when acting in a proprietary manner. And
his reference to the absence of a tradition of public access to
the jail seemed to refer to the minor premise and to imply
that the jail was in fact under the government's proprietary
control. And so Adderley's conclusion, that Florida officials
could use their discretion under the trespass statute to
abridge speech within thejailhouse curtilage, seemed to flow
naturally from an application of the Davis syllogism.
56
Adderley's actual grounds of decision are ambiguous.
But subsequent opinions of the Court which have developed
the theory of the public forum, and which have on the whole
been concerned with the regulation of speech rather than of
conduct,57 have interpreted Adderley as resurrecting and rely-
ing upon the Davis syllogism. The irony of this interpreta-
tion is that at the time of Adderley the syllogism was fast
becoming untenable because of the crumbling of the rights-
privilege distinction.58 But it was upon this foundation that
the Court would later choose to erect the edifice of modern
public forum doctrine.
2. The Moment of Ambivalence: Grayned, Mosley, and the
Categorization of Public Property
For the decade after Adderley, the Court remained uncer-
tain about the status of the Davis syllogism. 59 In 1972, the
56. Justice Black did stress that the sheriff's enforcement of the trespass stat-
ute was "even-handed," and that the students were not evicted from the jail be-
cause "the sheriff objected to what was being sung or said .... 385 U.S. at 47;
see supra note 48. This focus implied that Black was perhaps prepared in appropri-
ate circumstances to modify the Davis syllogism by forbidding viewpoint discrimi-
nation even in situations where the government was exercising proprietary
control.
57. See supra note 49.
58. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Linde, Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Wlelfare State, 40 WASH. L.
REV. 10 (1965); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: WlIelfare Benefits with Strings At-
tached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
59. InAdderley itself, Justice Douglas, speaking for four members of the Court,
strongly objected to the syllogism, arguing that all public property should be pre-
sumptively open to public speech unless that speech were "anomalous" or incon-
sistent "with other necessary purposes of public property." 385 U.S. at 53-54.
Three years later, in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
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Court appeared ready to reject it outright. In that year the
Court decided Grayned v. City of Rockford,6 ° in which it upheld
a municipal ordinance prohibiting "the making of any noise
or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order" of a school class while "on public or private
grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any
class thereof is in session." 6 ' Faced with a statute that regu-
lated speech in a manner that did not differentiate among
private property, streets, or schoolgrounds, the Court,
speaking through Justice Marshall, used the occasion to re-
pudiate the major premise of the Davis syllogism. The Court
stated flatly that "[t]he right to use a public place for expres-
sive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons." 62
This was a blunt rejection of the notion that there were cer-
tain kinds of public property on which the government, like
the owner of a private home, could abridge speech simply
by virtue of its proprietary interest.
In place of the Davis syllogism, the Court proposed that
speech on all public property be subject to "reasonable
'time, place and manner' regulations" which were "neces-
sary to further significant governmental interests." 63 In de-
termining whether such regulations were reasonable, the
"crucial question" was to be
whether the manner of expression is basically incompati-
ble with the normal activity of a particular place at a par-
ticular time. Our cases make clear that in assessing the
reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily
the fact that communication is involved; the regulation
U.S. 503 (1969), the Court, in striking down a school regulation prohibiting the
wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, specifically held that the
minor premise of the Davis syllogism should not apply to a school. The Court
said:
[A] school is not like a hospital or a jail enclosure. Cf. Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). It is
a public place, and its dedication to specific uses does not imply that
the constitutional rights of persons entitled to be there are to be
gauged as if the premises were purely private property. Cf. Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966).
393 U.S. at 512 n.6.
60. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
61. Id. at 107-08.
62. Id. at 115.
63. Id.
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must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate
interest.
64
Whereas the major premise of the Davis syllogism
divides public property into two kinds, proprietary and
non-proprietary, Grayned took the opposite tack, concluding
that all public property be subject to a single unified first
amendment test. Whereas the Davis syllogism classifies
public property without reference to first amendment princi-
ples, Grayned set forth a regime of constitutional regulation
explicitly designed to serve the first amendment value of
maximizing social communication. In this focus on the
constitutional value of public discussion, Grayned exem-
plified the spirit of Kalven's 1965 article, which it duly
acknowledged.
65
For this reason Grayned has remained a touchstone case
for many commentators. 66 It is important to stress, how-
ever, that the Court in Grayned did not use or adopt Kalven's
phrase "public forum." Grayned was concerned to reject the
perspective that divided public property into constitutionally
distinct classifications, and the concept of the "public fo-
rum" implied the contrary conclusion, that some public
property was subject to unique, especially restrictive first
amendment regulation. But in a decision issued on the same
day as Grayned and also authored by Justice Marshall, the
Court did adopt the phrase, once again explicitly acknowl-
edging its debt to Kalven.
That decision was Police Departme nt of Chicago v. Mosley. 67
At issue in Mosley was a Chicago ordinance prohibiting pick-
eting or demonstrating "on a public way" within 150 feet of
any primary or secondary school building while the school
was in session. The ordinance exempted "peaceful picket-
ing of any school involved in a labor dispute." 68 Noting that
64, Id. at 116-17. The Court reinterpreted Adderley to stand for the proposi-
tion that "demonstrators could be barred from jailhouse grounds not ordinarily
open to the public, at least where the demonstration obstructed the jail driveway
and interfered with the functioning of thejail." Id. at 121 n.49. In factAdderley had
contained no showing that the student demonstration had actually "interfered"
with the functioning of the jail.
65. Id. at 116 n.34.
66. See note 213 infra.
67. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). For the references to Kalven see id. at 95 n.3, 99 n.6.
68. Id. at 93.
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the statute distinguished legal from illegal picketing based
upon "the message on a picket sign," 69 the Court held that:
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend
to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not
be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone. 70
The reasoning of the Court was far from clear, but it seemed
to turn on the distinction between a public forum and other
government property. 71 The Chicago ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, the Court ruled, because it attempted to exclude
speech from a public forum "based on content alone," and
that "is never permitted." 72 The negative inference was that
such an exclusion would have been permissible had it oc-
curred in a nonpublic forum, 73 and that public and nonpub-
lic forums were therefore controlled by different first
amendment rules. Thus Grayned's effort to subject all public
property to a single, unified regime of first amendment reg-
ulation was undercut on the very day it was issued.
Mosley was not explicit about how government property
assumed the status of a public forum, but it implied that this
transformation occurred when the state "opened up" the
property "to assembly or speaking by some groups." 74 The
exact nature of this "opening-up" process was left ambigu-
ous. It was not clear whether the "public ways" at issue in
Mosley were public forums because the Chicago ordinance
opened them up for use in peaceful labor picketing, or be-
cause Chicago permitted them to be used for other, non-
69. Id. at 95.
70. Id. at 96. The Court used the phrase "public forum" a second time. Id. at
99.
71. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 n.9
(1983).
72. 408 U.S. at 99.
73. In the absence of such an inference Moslev's reiterated references to the
presence of a public forum would become puzzling and meaningless. But the in-
ference is itself problematic because it appears to contradict the hints in Adderlev
that viewpoint discrimination in a nonpublic forum would be unconstitutional.
Mosley's difficulties ultimately turn on its desire to define for the public forum a
"special position in terms of First Amendment protection," United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983), and they were only the first such difficulties that
the Court would experience in its long and frustrating quest to define this "spe-
cial" position.
74. Alosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
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picketing forms of communication. In either case, the public
forum status of the property was not triggered by traditional
usage, but rather by government decisions concerning the
deployment of its property. The concept of the public fo-
rum advanced in Mosley was designed to force these deci-
sions to be made in a non-discriminatory way, so that the
government could not "select which issues are worth dis-
cussing or debating in public facilities." 75 In this sense Mos-
ley, like Grayned, did not accept the major premise of the
Davis syllogism, for Mosley implied that if the government
opened up its property to members of the public for com-
municative use, the government's power to abridge speech
was subject to constitutional limitations, even if the property
was under the government's proprietary control.
Despite this similarity, however, the two cases were in
tension as to the question of whether government property
could be divided into distinct categories that were governed
by distinct regimes of first amendment regulation. The ten-
sion reflects a similar strain in Kalven's article. Kalven
wanted simultaneously to stress the general value of facilitat-
ing "robust" public discussion and to stress the particular
value of speech in public places. Grayned is responsive to the
first concern; Mosley to the second. Modern public forum
doctrine developed from Mosley, not Grayned.76
3. The Period of Experimentation: Lehman and Conrad
After Mosley, the concept of the public forum moved to
the forefront of the Court's attention. For the next three
years the Court explored possible meanings for the concept,
as well as various first amendment rules that might be at-
tached to it. Underlying this experimentation was the
Court's effort to vindicate Kalven's perception that the pub-
lic forum should enjoy an especially protected first amend-
ment status. But this perception distorted the Court's
earlier precedents, and the Court's attempts to vindicate it
during the early 1970s proved unsuccessful, leading the
Court to propose harsh and unrealistic constitutional rules
for the public forum.
75. Id.
76. Hence the irony of Geoffrey Stone's enthusiastic appraisal that in Grayned
"the right to a public forum came of age." Stone, supra note 31, at 251; see Stone,
supra note 7, at 89 n.171.
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In 1974, two years after Mosley, the Court decided Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights. 77 Lehman adopted from Mosley
the phrase "public forum," and for the first time the Justices
gave the phrase serious and divisive doctrinal attention. In
Lehman, a political candidate challenged the policy of a mu-
nicipal rapid transit system which sold space on car cards to
commercial advertisers, but which refused to permit the
cards to be used for paid political advertisements. On its
face the case seemed to be squarely controlled by Mosley, for
the rapid transit system had opened up the cards to the pub-
lic for communicative use, and yet was making distinctions
based upon "the message on [the] . . . sign." The Court
nevertheless upheld the policy, although it was unable to
unite behind a majority opinion.
Justice Blackmun,joined by three otherJustices, wrote a
plurality opinion rejecting the claim that the car cards were a
"public forum" as to which the first amendment created "a
guarantee of nondiscriminatory access. "78 First amendment
restraints on government regulation of public property,
Blackmun wrote, depend upon "the nature of the forum and
the conflicting interests involved .... Here we have no open
spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public
thoroughfare." 79 Instead the car cards were part of a "com-
mercial venture," and the municipality controlled them "in a
proprietary capacity." 80 The municipality had "discretion"
to make "managerial decision[s]," including decisions as to
the messages permitted to be displayed on the cards. 8' The
Constitution required only that these decisions not be "arbi-
trary, capricious, or invidious."82
In essence, Blackmun's opinion reached back behind
Mosley to Davis. It seemed to hold that the government's ex-
ercise of proprietary control empowers it to abridge
speech. 83 Blackmun made no effort to justify this holding.
77. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
78. Id. at 301. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist.
79. Id. at 302-03.
80. Id. at 303-04.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 303.
83. Blackmun slightly modified the Davis syllogism by imposing on proprie-
tary control the weak constraint that it not be "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious."
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His conclusion that the municipality's control over car cards
was proprietary in nature rested entirely upon a perceived
analogy between the rapid transit system and a private com-
mercial enterprise, so that the system could select which ad-
vertising to display "[i]n much the same way that a
newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or television
station."8 4
If Blackmun's opinion was inconsistent with Mosley, it
was even more so with Grayned. Blackmun's opinion as-
sumed that government property which was a public forum
was subject to distinct first amendment rules. Grayned, on
the other hand, had attempted to subject all government
property to a single uniform scheme of first amendment reg-
ulation. Grayned had also concluded that public claims to
speak on government property be determined by an in-
dependent judicial examination of "whether the manner of
expression [was] basically incompatible with the normal ac-
tivity of a particular place at a particular time." But the im-
port of Blackmun's opinion in Lehman was that in situations
of proprietary control the first amendment delegated au-
thority to determine such claims to the discretion of govern-
ment officials.
The fifth vote for the Court's holding came from Justice
Douglas, who wrote an idiosyncratic opinion based upon the
view that the car cards violated "the right of the commuters
to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy."85 The
views of the remaining fourJustices were expressed in a dis-
sent by Justice Brennan, 6 which turned explicitly on a the-
ory of the public forum. Citing Kalven's 1965 article,
Brennan began his argument with the observation that
"[t]he determination of whether a particular type of public
property or facility constitutes a 'public forum' requires the
Court to strike a balance between the competing interests of
the government, on the one hand, and the speaker and his
audience, on the other." 87 Once government property is
84. Id.
85. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
86. Joining Justice Brennan were Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell.
87. 418 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Hence, "the Court must assess
the importance of the primary use to which the public property or facility is com-
mitted and the extent to which that use will be disrupted if access for free expres-
sion is permitted." Id.
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designated a "public forum," the Constitution requires that
it "be made available... for the exercise of first amendment
rights" and that government regulation of the forum not dis-
criminate "based solely upon subject matter or content.
'" 88
Citing Hague and Edwards, Brennan argued that the Court
had designated "public streets and parks" and state capitol
grounds as public forums. 89
For Brennan there was simply no question but that the
car cards at issue in Lehman were a public forum, since by
making the cards available for commercial advertising the
municipality had "effectively waived any argument that ad-
vertising in its transit cars is incompatible with the rapid
transit system's primary function of providing transporta-
tion." 90 He therefore concluded that the system's policy of
discriminating among messages based upon their content
was constitutionally invalid.
Brennan's dissent was the first effort to set forth a sys-
tematic doctrine of the public forum. 91 It was a curious mix-
ture of Mosley and Grayned. Like Mosley, it divided
government property into public and nonpublic forums, and
imposed strict first amendment regulations on the former.
But it rejected Mosley's criterion for distinguishing the two
kinds of government property, using instead a variant of
Grayned's "basic incompatibility" test as the means of divid-
ing public from nonpublic forums. In Brennan's hands,
however, the Grayned test was subtly and fundamentally
transformed. Whereas Grayned had used the test as a means
of subjecting all public property to a single, unified regime
of first amendment regulation, Brennan used the test to sep-
88. Id. at 313-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan continued:
To insure that subject matter or content is not the sole basis for
discrimination among forum users, all selective exclusions from a
public forum must be closely scrutinized and countenanced only in
cases where the government makes a clear showing that its action
was taken pursuant to neutral 'time, place and manner' regulations,
narrowly tailored to protect the government's substantial interest in
preserving the viability and utility of the forum itself.
Id. at 316-17.
89. Id. at 312-13.
90. Id. at 314.
91. Many of the ideas in Brennan's dissent had first been expressed the previ-
ous year, in somewhat more inchoate form, in his dissent in Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 192-201 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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arate kinds of government property. Property classified as a
public forum was subject to stringent first amendment rules,
regardless of whether such rules were in any particular in-
stance compatible with the ordinary use of the property. In
effect Brennan shifted the focus of analysis from the circum-
stances of particular speech to the general characteristics of
the property at issue.
This shift in focus was integral to Brennan's larger pro-
ject, which was to distinguish two generic kinds of govern-
ment property: public and nonpublic forums. The whole
point of this project lay in the fact that these two kinds of
property were to be subject to distinct regimes of first
amendment regulation. When Brennan came to define the
first amendment rules applicable to a public forum, he cited
Mosley for the proposition that in such places content dis-
crimination was strictly forbidden. 92 Although the tenor of
Brennan's dissent was that public forums were subject to
unique and particularly stringent first amendment scrutiny,
in fact the prohibition on content discrimination did not dis-
tinguish such scrutiny from that applicable to private places
like public utility billing envelopes or drive-in movie thea-
tres. 93 There was a sharp tension in Brennan's dissent be-
tween a desire to endow the public forum with a "special
position in terms of first amendment protection,"94 and an
inability to coherently define that protection except in terms
of ordinary first amendment principles. The Court contin-
ues to struggle with the same tension to this very day.
Nine months after Lehman the Court attempted again to
define the nature of the public forum. In Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad9 5 Justice Blackmun, writing for five Jus-
tices, held that because municipal auditoriums were "public
forums," their directors could not be given the "discretion"
to accept or reject proposed theatrical performances without
complying with the procedural safeguards that Freedman v.
Maryland9 6 had imposed on prior restraints.9 7 It held that
92. 418 U.S. at 315-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537-40 (1980); Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1975). In
fact in Adderley the Court had strongly hinted that viewpoint discrimination would
be forbidden even in a nonpublic forum. See supra note 56.
94. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
95. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
96. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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the auditoriums were public forums because, like the car
cards in Lehman, they were "designed for and dedicated to
expressive activities." 98 Despite its procedural focus, the un-
derlying message of Conrad was that in a public forum con-
tent discrimination was constitutionally invalid. In his
dissent Justice Rehnquist asked if this meant that municipal
opera houses had to show rock musicals, or indeed had to
open their doors to "any potential producer on a first come,
first served basis."
9
The question went unanswered, but its sting was palpa-
ble, harshly illuminating the unsteady foundations of "the all
or nothing approach to content regulation in the public fo-
rum." 100 That public forum doctrine should have arrived at
such a rigid view in only three years is a testament to its ex-
traordinarily rapid development. The doctrine had not only
identified a special kind of government property, the public
forum, but it had imposed on that property stringent first
amendment regulations that seemed unrelated to the prop-
erty's actual uses. By 1975, the Court could describe the
issue in Lehman as "whether the city had created a 'public
forum' and thereby obligated itself to accept all
advertising."1 01
The reach and power of this reasoning is formidable. If
government facilities designed and employed for expressive
activities are thereby disabled from making distinctions
based upon content, then the ordinary and daily use of a
great many government facilities is simply unconstitutional.
97. 420 U.S. at 553-59. In Conrad, the directors of the Chattanooga Memorial
Auditorium had refused an application to present the musical "Hair" on the
grounds that it "would not be 'in the best interest of the community.' " Id. at 548.
The Court held that the Constitution required that discretionary decisions to
lease municipal auditoriums be subject to the following procedural requirements:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving
that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified
brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo.
Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.
Id. at 560.
98. Id. at 555. Blackmun distinguished Lehman on the uncertain grounds that
in Conrad there was no "captive audience" analogous to the commuters on the
rapid transit system. Id. at 556.
99. Id. at 572-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Karst, supra note 7, at 252.
101. Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 n.5 (1975) (emphasis
added).
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Government facilities routinely draw distinctions based
upon content. Consider, for example, such facilities as a
high school classroom, a prison auditorium, a lecture room
in a military compound, a meeting room in a government
bureaucracy, or a high school newspaper. Public forum doc-
trine had developed so rapidly that the Court apparently had
not had the opportunity to think through these implications.
But by the following year a majority of the Court had come
to the conclusion that they were unacceptable; in 1976, they
abandoned the liberal promise of Conrad and Mosley and de-
cided a case that definitively fixed the framework of modern
public forum doctrine.
4. Establishing the Basic Doctrinal Framework:
Greer v. Spock
The pivotal decision was Greer v. Spock, 10 2 which con-
cerned requests by candidates for national office from fringe
political parties for permission to enter the public areas of
the Fort Dix Military Reservation for the purpose of distrib-
uting campaign literature and holding a meeting to discuss
national political issues with U.S. Army personnel and their
dependents. These public areas were open to the public
without restriction at all times of the day and night. 03 They
were crossed by ten paved roads, including a major state
highway. 0 4 Nevertheless the commanding officer of the
Reservation denied the candidates' request, citing two Fort
Dix regulations. The first, Fort Dix Reg. 210-26, prohibited
"[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, polit-
ical speeches and similar activities .. .on the Fort Dix Mili-
tary Reservation."'' 0 5 The second, Fort Dix Reg. 210-27,
prohibited the distribution of political leaflets on the Reser-
vation "without prior written approval of the" base com-
mander. 0 6  The commander refused to approve the
102. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
103. Id. at 830, 851 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The main entrances to the Res-
ervation were not normally guarded, and at least one entrance contained the sign
"Visitors Welcome." Id. at 830.
104. Id. at 851 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 831.
106. Id. Approval could be withheld only if it appeared "that the dissemination
of [the] publication presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of
troops at [the] installation .... Army Reg. 210-10, Par. 5-5(c) (1970), cited in 424
U.S. at 431 n.2.
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distribution of leaflets because "[P]olitical campaigning on
Fort Dix cannot help but interfere with our training and
other military missions." 107
The Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, upheld
the decision of the base commander. The Court's reasoning
was simple, powerful, and immensely influential. It appro-
priated the terminology of the public forum which the Court
had developed during the preceding four years, but infused
it with a new focus on traditional public usage for first
amendment activities. Citing Justice Roberts' "familiar
words" in Hague, the Court identified public forums as areas
that "have traditionally served as a place for free public as-
sembly and communication of thoughts by private citi-
zens."'' 0 8 In such places, the Court said, "there cannot be a
blanket exclusion of first amendment activity." 10 9 Since it
was "historically and constitutionally false" that "federal
military installations" have traditionally been characterized
by such first amendment activity, it followed that Fort Dix
was not a public forum.1t °
Underlying Greer's approach was an emphatic repudia-
tion of Mosley's definition of a public forum. Mosley had held
that government property becomes a public forum if it is
"opened up to assembly or speaking." Greer specifically
held, however, that "[t]he fact that other civilian speakers
and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at
Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a
public forum.""' Greer also rejected "the principle that
107. 424 U.S. at 833 n.3. The commanding officer also cited the danger of
giving "the appearance that you or your campaign is supported by me in my offi-
cial capacity." Id.
108. Id. at 835, 838.
109. Id. at 835. In 1965, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, the Court had
reserved judgment on this question. See supra note 55. Three years later, in Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968), the Court addressed the question in dicta: "[SItreets, sidewalks, parks
and other similar public places are so historically associated 'with the exercise of
First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such
rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." Id. at 315; see
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 559 (1972). The Court's statement in Greer-
was essentially a recapitulation of this dicta.
110. 424 U.S. at 838.
111. Id. at 838 n.10. The Court explained:
The decision of the military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug
abuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or
a rock musical concert would be supportive of the military mission of
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whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit
a place owned or operated by the Government, then that
place becomes a 'public forum' for purposes of the first
amendment.""12
In place of Mosley's approach, Greer defined a public fo-
rum as government property which had "traditionally
served" as a locus for first amendment activities. Although
this definition would within eight short years ascend to the
canonical status of "a fundamental principle of First Amend-
ment doctrine,"'"l 3 the Court in Greer was silent as to its jus-
tification. Justice Roberts had focused on a tradition of
public access because in the 1930s the government's claim
to proprietary control could plausibly be grounded on com-
mon law property rights, and hence it made sense to express
the limitations on that control in the language of adverse
possession and public trust. But by 1976 this reasoning was
untenable. In what would later become an unfortunate pat-
tern, however, the Court in Greer made no effort to articulate
any connection between its definition of a public forum and
a theory of the first amendment.
Greer's incorporation of Justice Roberts' approach in
Hague fundamentally buried Grayned's inquiry into whether a
"manner of expression" is "basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."
Greer shifted the focus of analysis away from the impact on a
specific institution's ability to function if members of the
public were granted a constitutional right of access for com-
municative purposes. In fact Greer did not focus on particu-
lar institutions or property at all, but instead inquired into
the general characteristics of generic kinds of government
institutions and property. Thus Greer did not examine the
particular attributes of Fort Dix, but rather inquired into the
abstract properties of military installations. Its conclusion
was therefore generic: a "military installation like Fort Dix"
was not a public forum." 14
Fort Dix surely did not leave the authorities powerless thereafter to
prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject
whatever.
Id.
112. Id. at 836.
113. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
280 (1984).
114. 424 U.S. at 838.
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In the Court's view the distinctive characteristics of Fort
Dix were relevant only to the issue of whether the public ar-
eas of the Fort were in fact part of a military installation. The
Court formulated this issue as a question of whether the mil-
itary had "abandoned any claim of special interest in regu-
lating the distribution of unauthorized leaflets or the
delivery of campaign speeches for political candidates within
the confines of the military reservation."' 15 For the Court
the existence and enforcement of Regulations 210-26 and
210-27 were sufficient to negate any inference of
abandonment. 1 16
Having concluded that the public areas of Fort Dix were
not a public forum, the Court relied heavily on Adderley to
describe the powers of the government in a nonpublic
forum:
The guarantees of the first amendment have never meant
"that people who want to propagandize protests or views
have a constitutional right to do so whenever and how-
ever and wherever they please." Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39, 48. "The State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id.,
at 47.17
Greer was prepared to rely on Adderley for the proposition
that the government could regulate speech within the public
areas of the Fort as though the government were "a private
115. Id. at 837.
116. This reasoning was inconsistent with Flower v. United States, 407 U.S.
197 (1972), in which the Court had summarily reversed the conviction of a civilian
for distributing leaflets while on a street in the public area of a military reserva-
tion. Flower turned on the Court's conclusion that the military had "abandoned
any claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on
the avenue." Id. at 198. The inference of abandonment was explicitly based upon
the Court's perception that the public made extensive use of the avenue, and that
it was like "any public street." Id. Flower thus connected the issue of abandon-
ment to the specific and objective characteristics of the property at issue, and in
this respect was consistent with Grayned, which was decided two weeks later.
For the Court in Greer, on the other hand, the actual usage of the public areas
of Fort Dix was constitutionally irrelevant to the question of abandonment. Aban-
donment was instead understood to be determined by the subjective intentions of
the military, and hence the lack of abandonment could be conclusively inferred
from the military's decision to enforce Regulations 210-26 and 210-27. By this
measure, however, the military in Flower had also not abandoned a claim of special
regulatory interest, since it had chosen to arrest and prosecute the defendant for
reentering the military reservation after having been previously barred from the
post.
117. 424 U.S. at 836.
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owner of property." This was reading Adderley broadly, as
though the opinion rested upon a resurrection of the Davis
syllogism, rather than upon a narrow interpretation of the
government's power to regulate conduct." 8 And Greer was
prepared to ride the Davis syllogism for all it was worth. It
held that in a nonpublic forum the government could flatly
.prohibit first amendment activities, as illustrated by Regula-
tion 210-26, which barred all "demonstrations, . . . political
speeches, and similar activities." It held that in a nonpublic
forum the government could subject speech to a system of
prior restraint, as illustrated by Regulation 210-27, which
banned the distribution of "any publication ... without the
prior written approval of the Adjutant General."11 9 It also
held that in a nonpublic forum the government could au-
thorize discretionary suppression of speech, subject only to
the limitation that in actually exercising its discretion the
government did not act "irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrar-
ily." 12 0 "Invidious" discrimination was prohibited, but dis-
tinctions based upon content were not.
1 2'
Greer's resurrection of the major premise of the Davis
syllogism was decisive for the future development of public
forum doctrine, although the Court made no effort constitu-
tionally to explain or justify its use of the premise. It simply
assumed that in situations of proprietary control the govern-
ment was empowered to abridge speech.
Although Justice Powell joined the Court's opinion, he
also wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that
the issue before the Court should have been resolved by ref-
erence to Grayned's "basic incompatibility" test. He recog-
nized the tension between this test and the concept of the
"public forum," noting that under the incompatibility test
the first amendment question could not be decided simply
because "the area in which the right of expression is sought
to be exercised [is] dedicated to some purpose other than
use as a 'public forum.' "122 Powell concluded, however,
118. Adderley narrowly interpreted could have no relevance to Greer, because
the regulations at issue in the latter case were addressed specifically to speech. See
supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
119. 424 U.S. at 831, 865-66.
120. Id. at 840.
121. See supra note 111; 424 U.S. at 838 n.10, 868 n.16 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
122. 424 U.S. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring).
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that the regulations at issue met the Grayned test because
there was a "functional and symbolic incompatibility" be-
tween the need for the military to remain a "specialized soci-
ety separate from civilian society"'' 23 and ordinary political
electioneering.
If Powell's opinion evinced unease with Greer's use of
public forum doctrine, Justice Brennan's dissent registered
outright disgust. 12 4 In fact Brennan virtually disowned the
concept of the public forum, a concept which his own opin-
ion in Lehman had been instrumental in advancing. "It bears
special note," Brennan wrote, "that the notion of 'public fo-
rum' has never been the touchstone of public expression, for
a contrary approach blinds the Court to any possible accom-
modation of first amendment values in this case."'' 2 5 Bren-
nan reviewed precedents like Edwards, which he had once
claimed established the existence of public forums, 2 6 and
now concluded that the presence or absence of a public fo-
rum was irrelevant to their resolution: 27
Those cases permitting public expression without charac-
terizing the locale involved as a public forum, together
with those cases recognizing the existence of a public fo-
rum, albeit qualifiedly, evidence the desirability of a flexi-
ble approach to determining when public expression
should be protected. Realizing that the permissibility of
a certain form of public expression at a given locale may
differ depending on whether it is asked if the locale is a
public forum or if the form of expression is compatible
with the activities occurring at the locale, it becomes ap-
parent that there is need for a flexible approach. Other-
wise, with the rigid characterization of a given locale as
not a public forum, there is the danger that certain forms
of public speech at the locale may be suppressed, even
though they are basically compatible with the activities
otherwise occurring at the locale. 128
Brennan had come to realize the profound tension be-
tween public forum doctrine and the Court's approach in
Grayned. The distinction between public and nonpublic fo-
rums necessarily implied distinct regimes of first amendment
123. Id. at 844.
124. Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice Marshall.
125. 424 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 313 (1974) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
127. 424 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 859-60.
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regulation. If the Court in Conrad had imposed unduly strict
first amendment rules on public forums, the Court in Greer
had redressed the balance by virtually eliminating first
amendment restraints from the management of nonpublic
forums. The result was that public and nonpublic forums
were divided by a constitutional gulf of enormous and inex-
plicable proportions, a gulf that was completely inimical to
the spirit and purpose of Grayned. The authority and irresis-
tible attraction of Hague, an attraction that had even seduced
Kalven, all but ensured that this gulf would run along the
fault line of traditional usage, a line that would assuredly ex-
clude most government facilities from the public forum
category.
All this became evident to Brennan in Greer, and he re-
sponded by attempting to rehabilitate Grayned. He pointed
to cases like Tinker v. Des Moines School District,129 in which the
Court had set aside school regulations barring speech with-
out being in the least concerned with the question of
whether the school was a "public forum." But by then it was
too late. The public forum juggernaut had been launched.
C. The Birth and Death of the "Limited Public Forum"
The lasting legacy of Greer has been a public forum doc-
trine that sharply distinguishes public from nonpublic fo-
rums, and that cedes to the government virtual immunity
from independent judicial scrutiny regarding the control of
public access to the latter for communicative purposes. This
immunity was founded upon Greer's use of Adderley to reap-
propriate the major premise of the Davis syllogism,1 30 which
gives to the government special prerogatives as a proprietor
of its property. But since these prerogatives are indefensible
to modern sensibilities,' 3' the Court has been torn between
loyalty to the major premise of the Davis syllogism and re-
pugnance at regulations of public access to nonpublic fo-
rums that are to contemporary eyes simply intolerable. The
sad and fascinating story of the birth and death of the "lim-
ited public forum" is an account of how the Court has at-
tempted ineffectually to limit these intolerable regulations
129. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
131. See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
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and yet to leave intact to the greatest extent possible the im-
munity conferred by Greer upon government control of ac-
cess to the nonpublic forum.
In order to appreciate the doctrinal tension which led to
the creation of the limited public forum, it must be under-
stood that underlying Greer were really two distinct inquiries:
whether the government could deny access to its property to
individuals desiring to use the property for the purpose of
engaging in communicative activity, and whether the gov-
ernment could condition such access upon criteria that dis-
criminated on the basis of persons or the content of speech. 132
Greer collapsed these two questions. It held that if the gov-
ernment property at issue was not a public forum, access
could either be denied wholesale or else granted on a case-
by-case basis, so long as such discriminatory access was not
granted "irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily."1 33 Con-
versely, if the property were deemed a public forum, "there
cannot be a blanket exclusion of first amendment activity
. "... 134 Although Greer did not explicitly state that access to
a public forum could not be granted in a discriminatory fash-
ion, this was by 1976 already firmly accepted doctrine.13 5
For Greer, then, the determination of the public forum status
of government property simultaneously answered the ques-
tions of both access and equal access.
Greer's conceptualization of these questions flowed to a
significant degree from the internal logic of the major prem-
ise of the Davis syllogism. It should be recalled that the
premise invested government with the power to impose dis-
criminatory criteria of access to the nonpublic forum because
of its power to invoke the proprietary prerogative of closing
off public access to the forum altogether. 36 From this per-
spective the only possible constitutional distinction between
nonpublic and public forums was that in the latter the gov-
ernment lacked this proprietary power to impose "a blanket
exclusion of first amendment activity."'' 37 Thus from the
132. For an illuminating discussion of the distinction between issues of access
and issues of discrimination, see Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Ac-
cess, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
133. 424 U.S. at 840, 838 & n.10.
134. Id. at 835.
135. See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 n.5 (1975).
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. 424 U.S. at 835.
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major premise of the Davis syllogism it followed that in the
nonpublic forum the government could both preclude ac-
cess altogether and create conditions of discriminatory ac-
cess, and that in the public forum it could not completely
prohibit access. The rule against imposing discriminatory
criteria of access to the public forum stemmed from the
Court's decisions in Mosley and Conrad.
The problem with collapsing questions of access and of
equal access, however, is that it creates tools of analysis that
for modern purposes are simply too crude to be of any use.
This became apparent within six months of Greer. In Decem-
ber of 1976 the Court decided City of Madison Joint School Dis-
trict No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,' 38 in
which the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
had issued an order prohibiting a local school board from
allowing employee teachers, other than those chosen by the
union that was the exclusive collective bargaining represen-
tative of the district's teachers, from speaking at the board's
open meetings about matters subject to collective bargain-
ing between the union and the board. Under Greer's ap-
proach, the fundamental question in Madison Joint School
District was whether the board's meetings should be catego-
rized as a public forum. If so, then not only would the Com-
mission's order be unconstitutional, but in addition the
board would be constitutionally prohibited from holding
private meetings by completely excluding the public. If the
board's meetings were classified as a nonpublic forum, on
the other hand, then not only were private meetings permis-
sible, but the board could also impose discriminatory criteria
of access to its meetings and the Commission's order would
pass constitutional muster.
To modern eyes, however, it seems simply bizarre to
bind together in this manner the question of the constitu-
tionality of the Commission's order and the question of the
board's ability to hold private meetings. To the Court in
Madison Joint School District, as to any contemporary constitu-
tional observer, it made good sense to prohibit certain kinds
of discriminatory access, even though access to the relevant
forum might in some circumstances be altogether elimi-
nated. Although this insight flatly contracts the major prem-
138. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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ise of the Davis syllogism, the Court nevertheless, without so
much as acknowledging the public forum doctrine just an-
nounced in Greer, held both that the board could "hold non-
public sessions to transact business," and that the
Commission's order was unconstitutional because at public
meetings the board "may not be required to discriminate be-
tween speakers on the basis of their employment, or the con-
tent of their speech."'' 39 In an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court characterized the Commission's order as
"the antithesis of constitutional guarantees." 1 40
Madison Joint School District carried radical implications
for the doctrinal framework created by Greer, for it appeared
to open up the nonpublic forum to forms of constitutional
scrutiny that were inconsistent with the major premise of the
Davis syllogism. But the Court ignored these implications
for five years, acting as if the dichotomous categories created
by Greer's appropriation of the premise were still un-
problematic.141 The tension between Greer and Madison Joint
School District finally came to the surface in 1981, however,
when the Court decided Widmar v. Vincent. 142 In Widmar, the
University of Missouri had made its facilities generally avail-
able for use by registered student groups, but had refused to
do so for a registered student group seeking to use the facili-
ties for religious worship and discussion. The Court used
public forum doctrine to analyze the case. It held that by
generally opening up its facilities to student groups, the
university had created a "public forum," and that therefore
it could not discriminatorily exclude student groups from
the forum unless the exclusion was "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . [was] narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."
1 43
139. Id. at 176, 175 n.8. The Court also held that the board could confine its
meetings "to specified subject matter." Id. at 175 n.8. It was not clear how this
could be reconciled with the Court's pronouncement that the board could not be
required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of "the content of their
speech." Id. at 176.
140. Id. at 175-76.
141. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 130-33 & n.7 (1981).
142. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
143. Id. at 270. When measured by this stringent standard, the university's
exclusion of the religious students was clearly unconstitutional.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Powell, refused to be bound by the concept of the
public forum set forth in Greer. Citing Madison Joint School
District, the Court specifically held that the university could
be prohibited from discriminating "even if it was not re-
quired to create the forum in the first place."' 1 4 4 The Court
went even further and intimated in dicta that there could be
distinctions among different kinds of public forums. It
stated that:
A university differs in significant respects from public fo-
rums such as streets or parks or even municipal theatres.
A university's mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied a university's authority to im-
pose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not
held, for example, that a campus must make all of its fa-
cilities equally available to students and nonstudents
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of
its grounds or buildings. 145
If Madison Joint School District had fractured the simple
dichotomous categories created by Greer, the approach pro-
posed by Widmar threatened to demolish them entirely.
Widmar postulated a kind of public forum in which the gov-
ernment could exclude the public altogether, and it inti-
mated that there was a spectrum of different kinds of
government institutions as to which first amendment ques-
tions of access and equal access would be individually deter-
mined depending upon an analysis of each institution's
special "mission" or purpose. In such a context Greer's di-
chotomous categories of public and nonpublic forums would
cease to have meaning, and independent judicial inquiry
into institutional mission would threaten the claims of pro-
prietary prerogative to be immune from judicial scrutiny.
Justice Powell, who had been uncomfortable with Greer's de-
parture from Grayned, was apparently using his opinion in
Widmar to undermine public forum doctrine from within, re-
turning it to the case-by-case flexibility and independent ju-
dicial scrutiny characteristic of the Grayned approach.
But fourteen months later the Court forcefully checked
any further movement in this direction by proposing the
new concept of the "limited" public forum. In Perry Educa-
144. Id. at 268.
145. Id. at 268 n.5.
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tion Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,'46 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, decisively reaffirmed
the categorical framework of Greer. Perry reviewed prior
precedents, including Widmar and Madison Joint School District,
and announced that for constitutional purposes there were
now three distinct kinds of government property. There
was, to begin with, the "traditional," or "quintessential"
public forum, which consists of localities that had "by long
tradition or by government fiat ... been devoted to assem-
bly and debate."' 47 Exemplary were the "streets and parks"
identified by Hague v. CIO. In such public forums the gov-
ernment "may not prohibit all communicative activity," and
it can "enforce a content-based exclusion" only if it can
demonstrate that it is "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'
48
The traditional public forum, in short, was the public forum
described by.Greer, in which the questions of access and
equal access are tied together and each is constitutionally
guaranteed.
At the other end of the spectrum was the nonpublic fo-
rum, which Perry also viewed in essentially the same light as
Greer. Quoting from Greer and Adderley, Perry reaffirmed that
in the nonpublic forum "'" '[t]he State, no less than a pri-
vate owner of property, has power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated.' ".149 Hence for Perry "the right to make distinc-
tions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
identity" is "[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic fo-
rum."' 150 Regulation of public access for communicative
purposes to a nonpublic forum must only be "reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view."'
5'
Like Greer, therefore, Perry permitted the government to
impose conditions on public access to the nonpublic forum
that discriminated on the basis of content. But whereas Greer
146. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
150. Id. at 49.
151. Id. at 46.
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had drawn the line at "invidious" discrimination,152 Perry
sought to prohibit "viewpoint discrimination."1 53 Although
the Court's opinion in Perry made no effort to clarify the dis-
tinction between "content" and "viewpoint" discrimination,
Justice Brennan's dissent characterized "content neutrality"
as pertaining to the government's ability to choose "the sub-
jects that are appropriate for public discussion,"'' 54 whereas
viewpoint neutrality relates to discrimination "among view-
points on those subjects ... i.55
Although Perry's account of the nonpublic and tradi-
tional public forum were minor variations of the categories
proposed by Greer, Perry still had to account for the circum-
stances encountered by the Court in cases like Widmar and
Madison Joint School District. These circumstances did not fit
easily into the dichotomous categories of Greer, and Perry at-
tempted to encompass them within a category creating yet a
third kind of government property, which it called a "limited
public forum."'' 56 In a formulation echoing that of Mosley,
Perry held that a limited public forum is created when the
"State has opened" public property "for use by the public as
a place for expressive activity."'' 57 But whereas the govern-
ment cannot preclude public access to a traditional public
forum, 58 Perry was explicit that the government is required
152. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
153. 460 U.S. at 49-50 n.9. In 1981, the Court had reached a somewhat differ-
ent conclusion, stating in United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7, that government control of access to a nonpub-
lic forum "must be content-neutral."
154. 460 U.S. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 61. The cogency of this distinction can be questioned. For exam-
ple, it is not clear whether it is content or viewpoint discrimination if a citizen who
wants to argue that a proper auditorium can only be financed through the imposi-
tion of a new and disagreeable property tax is ruled out of order by a school board
which concludes that citizens can discuss the subject of building a new audito-
rium, but not the subject of property taxes. Justice Brennan's formulation, how-
ever, remains the best that is available. Cf. Stephan, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 218 (1982) (defining viewpoint discrimi-
nation as "discrimination between competing viewpoints over a particular issue").
156. 460 U.S. at 47-48. The Court has also called this kind of public forum a
"public forum by designation." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985); cf, Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus,
107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987).
157. 460 U.S. at 45. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
158. After Greer the Court had continued to emphasize this point. See, e.g.,
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
133 (1981) ("Congress ... may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public forum'
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neither to create nor to maintain public access to a limited
public forum.' 59 So long as the State does permit access,
however, it "is bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohi-
bition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest." 
60
On the surface the concept of the limited public forum
appeared to be an attempt to respond to the kinds of anoma-
lous circumstances that could not be analyzed in the coarse
terms offered by Greer's dichotomous categories. It seemed
to rest on the simple maneuver of disaggregating the ques-
tions of access and equal access. Beneath the surface, how-
ever, the concept ruptured the connections between public
forum doctrine and the major premise of the Davis syllo-
gism. The logic underlying the premise was that the govern-
ment could impose discriminatory criteria of access to its
property if (and because) it could completely shut off such
access. In the limited public forum, however, the govern-
ment can completely block public access, and yet it is consti-
tutionally prohibited from imposing discriminatory criteria
of access. But if the Constitution prohibits this discrimina-
tion, why does it not also prohibit the government from im-
posing discriminatory criteria of access to the nonpublic
forum? If the prerogatives of proprietary control are not
respected in the limited public forum, why should they be
respected in the nonpublic forum?
Perry contains no answers to these questions. What is
striking about the opinion, however, is its obvious determi-
nation to preserve undiminished the government's freedom
to regulate public access to its proprietary property, even at
the price of obvious and fundamental doctrinal incoherence.
This determination is evident both in the first amendment
rules which Perry chooses to impose on the limited public
forum, and in the manner in, which Perry chooses to distin-
guish limited from nonpublic forums.
status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums ...."). One
month after Perry the point would again be strongly emphasized. See United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (quoting Greenbuigh, 453 U.S. at 133).
159. "[A] State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility .... 460 U.S. at 46.
160. Id. at 46.
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Consider, first, Perry's puzzling assertion that the gov-
ernment's ability to regulate public access to the limited
public forum is "bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum." The assertion is manifestly con-
trary to the very precedents used by Perry to create the con-
cept of the limited public forum. In Madison Joint School
District, for example, the Court had specifically held that the
school board could limit public discussion to certain sub-
jects,1 61 and in Widmar the Court had permitted the univer-
sity to limit its facilities to one class of speakers, namely
students. 62 In a traditional public forum, however, as Perry
was the first to admit, "the State must demonstrate compel-
ling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speak-
ers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject."' 163  Neither
Widmar nor Madison Joint School District was willing to accept
the imposition of such a harsh first amendment standard.
And it appears that Perry itself had difficulties with the stan-
dard, for in a strange footnote it asserted that "[a] public
forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups .. .or for the discussion of certain subjects
"164
In the context of the doctrinal structure created by
Perry, the footnote eviscerates the rule that in regulating
public access to the limited public forum the government is
bound by the same first amendment standards as bind the
government's ability to regulate access to the traditional
public forum. For Perry imposes no first amendment con-
straints whatever on the government's ability to build dis-
criminatory criteria into the very definition or purpose of the
limited public forum, and thus as a practical matter the gov-
ernment remains as free to limit public access to a limited
public forum as to a nonpublic forum. This can be seen in
161. See supra note 139.
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163. 460 U.S. at 55.
164. 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted). This same internal contradiction
persists in the Court's most recent attempt to explicate the theory of the limited
public forum. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985), the Court says both that in a limited public forum "speakers cannot be
excluded without a compelling governmental interest", id. at 800, and that a lim-
ited public forum "may be created by government designation of a place or chan-
nel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for
use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects." Id. at 802.
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the facts of the Perry case itself. At issue in Perry was an inter-
school mail system that the Metropolitan School District of
Perry Township had made available to the union which was
the exclusive bargaining agent of the district's teachers
(PEA), but not to a rival union (PLEA). The district had
granted access to the system to outside groups like the Cub
Scouts, the YMCA, and other civic and church organiza-
tions.' 65 The Court ultimately ruled that the system was a
nonpublic forum and that PLEA's exclusion was "reason-
able." 66 But the Court went out of its way to conclude that
even if it were assumed arguendo that the access granted to
the system had "opened it up" into a limited public forum,
"the constitutional right of access would in any event extend
only to other entities of similar character":
While the school mail facilities thus might be a forum
generally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys'
club, and other organizations that engage in activities of
interest and educational relevance to students, they
would not as a consequence be open to an organization
such as PLEA, which is concerned with the terms and
conditions of teacher employment.1
67
In the end, therefore, it made no difference to the out-
come of the case whether the mail facilities were categorized
as a limited or nonpublic forum. In either case the school
system remained free to build discriminatory criteria of ac-
cess into the very definition of its mail system. The doctrinal
structure created by Perry ultimately renders illusory the
harsh first amendment constraints formally made applicable
to the limited public forum. In Widmar and Madison Joint
School District, on the other hand, less stringent first amend-
ment constraints were used so as actually to limit the gov-
ernment's freedom to control access to the nonpublic
forum.
The chimerical quality of the limited public forum is
also evident in the manner by which Perry chooses to distin-
guish, or rather not to distinguish, limited public forums
from nonpublic forums. It had been black letter law since
Greer that "a place owned or operated by the Government"
does not become "a 'public forum' for purposes of the first
165. 460 U.S. at 47.
166. Id. at 48-50.
167. Id. at 48.
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amendment" simply because "members of the public are
permitted freely to visit" it.168 The origin of the rule lay in
Greer's forceful rejection of the view expressed in Mosley that
once the government had "opened up" its property for ex-
pressive use by the public, it was thereafter disabled from
regulating that use by imposing distinctions between per-
sons and subjects. Greer had itself specifically held that the
mere fact that "civilian speakers and entertainers had some-
times been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself
serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum . -."169 In
subsequent cases the Court adamantly reiterated this rule,' 70
and Perry went out of its way to reaffirm it, explicitly holding
that the fact that the school district had provided "selective
access" to its mail facilities to certain outside organizations
like the YMCA and the Cub Scouts "does not transform gov-
ernment property into a public forum."''
The problem, of course, is that the rule lies squarely
athwart Perry's own definition of a limited public forum,
which is keyed primarily to the opening up of government
property to the public for expressive use. According to Perry
both limited and nonpublic forums are characterized by a
"selective" or discriminatory degree of access to proprietary
government property. The question, then, is what criteria
distinguish one from the other. Perry offers no such criteria;
it gives no hint as to how the "opening up" that creates a
limited public forum differs from the "opening up" that
leaves a forum nonpublic.' 72 The unavoidable inference is
that Perry chose to let the distinction remain ambiguous so as
168. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
169. Id. at 838 n.10. Even before Greer, the Court had held in Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974), that the car cards of a municipal
rapid transit system were not a public forum even though they had been opened
up to commercial advertisements. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text;
Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6
(1981);Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977).
171. 460U.S. at47.
172. In fact, Perry evidenced some uncertainty as to whether the school's mail
system was a nonpublic or limited public forum. On this question it said only that
the school district had not "by policy or practice .. .opened its mail system for
indiscriminate use by the general public ...." 460 U.S. at 47. The problem, of
course, is that "indiscriminate use by the general public" is quite beside the point,
since Perry conceded that a limited public forum could, like a nonpublic forum, be
created on the basis of "selective access." Id.
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to leave the government ample room to continue to charac-
terize its property as a nonpublic forum.
The most plausible interpretation of Perry, then, is that
the Court had come to recognize the inadequacy of Greer's
dichotomous categories, but that it was unprepared to mod-
ify them in any way that would seriously undermine the gov-
ernment's freedom to control public access to property that
was not a traditional public forum. Under these circum-
stances the concept of the limited public forum was doomed
from the start. The coup degrdce was delivered in 1985 when
the Court in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund held that the distinction between limited and nonpublic
forums turns on the government's intent in opening up the
forum:
The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse. [Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's
Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 46]. Accordingly, the Court has looked
to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum. [460 U.S.
at 47]. The Court has also examined the nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity to
discern the government's intent.'
73
Cornelius' focus on intent solved a good many problems.
It explained why the government did not have to create the
limited public forum in the first place, and why it could shut
it down at will. It rendered intelligible the fact that the gov-
ernment could restrict a limited public forum to particular
subjects or speakers. Most important, however, is that the
focus on intent had the virtue of candor, for it tactfully with-
drew the concept of the limited public forum as a meaning-
ful category of constitutional analysis. If a limited public
forum is neither more nor less than what the government
intends it to be, then a first amendment right of access to the
forum is nothing more than the claim that the government
173. 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). The opinion for the Court in Cornelius was writ-
ten by Justice O'Connor, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices
White and Rehnquist. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Jus-
tices Marshall and Powell did not participate in the case. For a summary of the
facts of Cornelius, see infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text.
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should be required to do what it already intends to do in any
event.
Cornelius shrinks the limited public forum to such insig-
nificance that it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff could
ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a
forum. 74 If the reach of the forum is determined by the in-
tent of the government, and if the exclusion of the plaintiff is
the best evidence of that intent, then the plaintiff loses in
every case. There is only one way out of this vicious circle,
and it is not very satisfactory. It would require the Court to
distinguish between the intent to include the class of speak-
ers or subjects of which the plaintiff is the representative,
and the intent to exclude the plaintiff. One problem with
this distinction is that it is precious and in practice unwork-
able. Another problem is that it is inconsistent with the very
precedents which had initially prompted Perry to propose the
concept of the limited public forum. In Madison Joint School
District, the Commission's order explicitly intended to ex-
clude a class of school employees from speaking about mat-
ters that were subject to collective bargaining, and yet the
Court found in effect that such an intent was unconstitu-
tional. In Widmar, the university explicitly intended to ex-
clude the class of students seeking to use campus facilities
for religious purposes, and yet the Court found that intent
to be unconstitutional.
The central insight of both Widmar and Madison Joint
School District was that even if government property were a
nontraditional public forum, objective circumstances re-
specting the use of the property can have serious constitu-
tional consequences for a first amendment right of access,
government intent notwithstanding. Cornelius flatly rejected
this insight, and in the process essentially transformed the
limited public forum into an empty category. As a result the
Court is now left with a public forum doctrine that ties to-
gether questions of access and equal access, and that offers
no principles of review with respect to the large number of
circumstances in which discriminatory access is constitution-
ally suspect although the access need never have originally
174. From this perspective, the limited public forum has simply become "a
nontraditional forum" which the government has chosen to open "for public dis-
course." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The terms and conditions of that choice are
for all practical purposes insulated from constitutional review.
19871 1757
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1757 1986-1987
UCLA LA W REVIEW
been granted. In short, the Court has taken a long step
backwards toward the dichotomous framework of Greer.
II. THE PRESENT CONDITION OF PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
Public forum doctrine has for this reason come to re-
volve with increasing intensity around the line separating
the traditional public forum from the nonpublic forum. The
placement and rationale of that line is therefore a matter of
some importance, but the Court appears to have given it lit-
tle or no consideration. Cornelius is typical when it defines
traditional public forums as "those places which 'by long tra-
dition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly
and debate.' "175
The definition, however, will simply not do. The refer-
ence to "government fiat" is ill-considered. It echoes Corne-
lius' own definition of a limited public forum or a public
forum by designation, 76 and implies that if government fiat
can create a traditional public forum, then it can also termi-
nate it. This would dissolve the traditional public forum into
the same vicious circle as that which dissolved the limited
public forum. At least since Greer, however, the Court has
been continuously clear that the state, whatever its intent,
cannot cut off access to the traditional public forum by a
"blanket exclusion of first amendment activity." 177
The reference to "long tradition," by contrast, directly
continues a line of analysis that stems back to Greer, and
before that to Hague. The standard seems to be that if gov-
ernment property has "immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind .... been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions,"' 78 then the prop-
erty should be deemed a traditional public forum.
The question is why such a tradition should acquire
constitutional immunity from alteration by the state. It
would seem insufficient to answer this question simply by
reference to the historical fact of the tradition, since it is the
peculiar constitutional status of this fact which needs to be
175. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
176. 473 U.S. at 803; see id. at 825-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. See supra notes 134 & 158.
178. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 US. 496, 515 (1939)).
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explained. For Hague, of course, the passage of time signi-
fied a change in ownership, so that a long tradition of public
usage meant that the government could no longer claim to
be the proprietor of the property in question. Thus the
presence of tradition was meaningful because of the minor
premise of the Davis syllogism. But in our own time, when
the major premise of that syllogism carries such scant consti-
tutional weight, this meaning is largely beside the point.' 79
We do not now view the technicalities of property ownership
as determinative. 180 The Court moved decisively away from
these technicalities in Greer when it determined the nonpub-
lic forum status of Fort Dix by focussing on the generic char-
acteristics of military installations. 18 1 Technical issues of
easement or adverse possession, however, would have had
to have been resolved by examining the particular circum-
stances of the Fort.'
82
The question therefore remains as to why a tradition of
public usage should provide the point of distinction be-
tween public and nonpublic forums. Unless the Court can
articulate why tradition matters,18 3 contemporary doctrine
will be left to focus dully on the brute passage of historical
time. This is a recipe for crude and arbitrary results. 8 4 Air-
179. Indeed Cornelius does not even attempt to offer a property oriented inter-
pretation of public forum doctrine. Instead Cornelius states that "the Court has
adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's in-
terest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the
interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes." Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 800; see Board of Airport Comm'rs v.Jews forJesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571
(1987). The problem, however, is that Cornelius' image of balancing renders in-
comprehensible its definition of a traditional public forum. If the Court were truly
balancing, the existence of a tradition of public use could at most be probative of
the interests to be weighed; the tradition could not possibly be always determina-
tive of the outcome of that balancing, as it is under the Court's present definition
of a traditional public forum.
180. This is well illustrated by United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), in which the Court decided that a private
citizen's mailbox was a nonpublic forum, even though it was not "owned" by the
government.
181. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
182. For a recent example of the influence of Greer's generic focus, see City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984).
183. See generally Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAw & PHIL. 237, 251-54 (1986).
184. The Court has recognized this fact in other areas. For example, when the
Court was attempting to determine if federal regulation impaired the ability of the
states 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions,'" it held that "what is 'traditional' " could not be determined by "looking
only to the past," since that would "impose a static historical view." United
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ports, railroad terminals, and parks, for example, share
many characteristics that are seemingly pertinent to the as-
sessment of traditional public forum status, 85 but they differ
in respect of chronological age, and, in that limited sense,
have correspondingly different "traditions." If the Court
were to differentiate among these forums on this basis alone,
the result, as the Court recently perceived in a related con-
text, would constitute "linedrawing of the most arbitrary
sort."1 8 6 Even if the Court's present emphasis on tradition
is accepted, therefore, it remains unfounded and
incomplete.
The line dividing public and nonpublic forums, how-
ever arbitrary, marks the boundary between deeply diver-
gent regimes of constitutional regulation. With respect to
the traditional public forum, which the Court has repeatedly
stressed "occupies a special position in terms of first amend-
ment protection,"'' 8 7 the Court has developed a scheme of
constitutional rules that it says applies specifically "[i]n such
places": 88
[T]he government may enforce reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations as long as the restrictions "are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication." Additional restrictions
such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of
expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to ac-
complish a compelling governmental interest.' 89
Despite the Court's tendency to speak of traditional
public forums as unique locations, the constitutional rules
promulgated by the Court for their governance are identical
to the first amendment rules which it has imposed on gov-
ernment action generally. The Court has said that govern-
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684, 686 (1982) (quoting Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)). The Court recognized, in
other words, that for legal purposes a tradition must have. meaning and that it
cannot be reduced simply to the passage of time.
185. For a discussion of these examples, see Note, Public Forum Analysis, supra
note 7, at 556-58 (1986). The Court recently dodged the question of whether an
airport was a public forum in Board of Airport Comm'rs v.Jews for Jesus, 107 S.
Ct. 2568 (1987).
186. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985).
187. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983); see City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813 (1984).
188. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
189. Id. (citations omitted).
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ment action ranging from zoning ordinances to the
prohibition of certain kinds of insertions in public utility bill-
ing envelopes can be justified as time, place, and manner
regulations.190 And the Court has also specifically held that
any government restriction on "the speech of a private per-
son" can be "sustained" if "the government can show that
the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a com-
pelling state interest."' 91
During the 1930s and 1940s the Court did not view
public streets and parks as constitutionally unique, but
rather concluded that government regulation in such areas
was subject to the same kind of constitutional review as gov-
ernment action generally. Decisions of the modern Court
have been drawn willy-nilly toward this conclusion, and the
modern Court's constant efforts to locate and apply special
first amendment rules to the public forum have, with one
exception, met with continual frustration. The exception in
fact aptly illustrates the misguided nature of the Court's ef-
forts, for it is analytically indefensible.
The exception is the rule, continually reiterated since
Greer, that there can not be a blanket exclusion of first
amendment activities from a public forum.19 2 Recently in
United States v. Grace the Court said that "destruction of pub-
lic forum status" is "presumptively impermissible."'' 93 This
rule attempts to establish "the special position in terms of
first amendment protection"' 194 of the public forum by
equating restrictions on access with restrictions on speech.
But this equation is false, for it fails to distinguish between
the regulation of expression and the regulation of conduct,
and hence cannot distinguish between an ordinance banning
all political demonstrations and an ordinance authorizing
190. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986); Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 914 (1986);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74-76 (1981). The Court self-
consciously generalized time, place, and manner analysis from the early public
forum decisions. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
191. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540
(1980).
192. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568,
2571 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835 (1976).
193. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
194. Id.
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the construction of a nonpublic forum office building on
land that previously underlay a public street. It simply
makes no sense to say that the latter is "presumptively im-
permissible," even if it results in a blanket exclusion of first
amendment activities in what was previously a public forum.
Ordinary principles of first amendment jurisprudence would
have no special difficulty in evaluating the differential impact
of these two ordinances on constitutional rights. But in its
eagerness to establish some special and ultimately illusory
first amendment status for the public forum, the Court has
brushed aside these principles, and as a consequence has
backed itself into an untenable position.
If the first amendment standards imposed on the public
forum have tended to be unduly strict, those imposed on the
nonpublic forum have, to the contrary, tended to be unduly
lax. Putting to one side for the moment the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination, 95 government restrictions on ac-
cess to the nonpublic forum need only be "reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum."' 196 The Court has
never precisely defined what it means by this "reasonable-
ness" standard, but at a minimum it is clear that it is
designed to provide the government the utmost flexibility in
managing the nonpublic forum. As the Court said in Corne-
lius, the "Government, as an employer, must have wide dis-
cretion and control over the management of its personnel
and internal affairs."' 1
97
Language like this prompted Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent in Cornelius, to denigrate the "reasonableness" stan-
dard as "nothing more than a rational-basis require-
ment," ' 98 which is the genuinely toothless restraint that the
due process clause and the equal protection clause impose
on all government action.' 99 If Justice Blackmun is correct,
then the reasonableness standard is simply a doctrinal re-
195. The prohibition is discussed in detail in Section VI. See infra notes 387-94
and accompanying text.
196. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49 (regulation of public's access to nonpublic forum must be
"reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves").
197. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 U.S. 134, 168
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
198. Id. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
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statement of the major premise of the Davis syllogism. If the
standard creates no constitutional restrictions, that are not
already generally imposed on the state by the due process
and equal protection clauses, then the standard offers no ad-
ditional first amendment protection for speech. If the major
premise of the Davis syllogism is incorrect, however, then
the fact that the government is regulating speech is constitu-
tionally pertinent, and the "reasonableness" standard
should not be reduced to a rational basis test.
The latter conclusion seems to me inescapable. 200 The
fourteenth amendment imposes constitutional restrictions
upon the "States" as such, not upon the States acting in
some capacities and not others. And of course the federal
government is in all of its capacities the creation of and
therefore bound by the provisions of the Constitution, in-
cluding the first amendment. Almost twenty years ago a
noted commentator could conclude that "the point is now
plain: the state'is the state, bound by uniform constitutional
constraints regardless of the capacity in which it purports to
act." 20 1 Thus the fact that the government is acting as an
employer or a proprietor will not exempt it from the distinct
requirements of the equal protection clause,20 2 or the due
process clause,203 or the commerce clause, 20 4 or the privi-
leges and immunities clause of article IV.205 And, as the
Court has plainly recognized in other contexts, there is no
good reason why that fact should exempt the government
from the requirements of the first amendment. 206 The
Court has in effect acknowledged the unavoidable logic of
this position by imposing a first amendment prohibition on
200. The case against the major premise of the Davis syllogism is succinctly set
forth in Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1315-24 (1984).
201. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the
Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 UCLA L. REV. 751, 754 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
202. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S.
350 (1962).
203. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
204. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
205. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
206. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at
597-98; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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viewpoint discrimination even upon the government acting
in its proprietary capacity.
While no one on the modern Court has explicitly de-
fended the extreme perspective associated with the major
premise of the Davis syllogism, there has been support for
the milder position that "the role of government as sover-
eign is subject to more stringent limitations than is the role
of government as employer, property owner, or educa-
tor."20 7 This position, understood generously, holds that
although the government acting in a proprietary capacity is
subject to the constraints of the first amendment, these re-
straints should be substantively interpreted with the needs
of a government proprietor in mind.208 The consequence of
such a position would be a reasonableness standard that
identified and enforced pertinent first amendment concerns,
but which tailored such concerns to the context of proprie-
tary government action.
As a matter of simple internal consistency, this is the
kind of reasonableness standard which the Court must have
meant to adopt in Peny. But as such the standard is a failure.
It identifies neither the particular proprietary prerogatives
that need to be protected nor the specific first amendment
concerns by which the exercise of these prerogatives are to
be evaluated. For all practical purposes, public forum doc-
trine is presently a blank check for government control of
public access to the nonpublic forum for communicative
purposes. 20 9 To date, the Court has been willing to hold
that the first amendment prohibits restrictions on such ac-
cess only if such restrictions can be justified by "no conceiv-
able governmental interest." 21 0
207. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); see Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2902 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissenting);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290-91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law,
12 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1976).
208. See Van Alstyne, supra note 201, at 769-71; Wells & Hellerstein, The Gov-
ernmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1116
(1980).
209. "The reasonableness standard of judicial review used in [nonpublic fo-
rum] cases is essentially no review at all." Dienes, supra note 7, at 117.
210. Board of Airport Comm'rs v.Jews forJesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2572 (1987).
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III. TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF PUBLIC
FORUM DOCTRINE
When Melville Nimmer came to analyze public forum
doctrine, he saw within it two competing lines of cases. The
first, which is associated with the public forum theory that
has triumphed in the Court's recent opinions, "assumes that
whether or not publicly owned premises are to be regarded
as 'public forums' and hence open to the public for commu-
nication purposes turns upon factors divorced from the pro-
posed speech itself."211 The second line of cases, which
springs from Grayned, "is not concerned with whether the
public premises are dedicated to uses which would include
the speech activities in issue. Instead, the question put is
whether the speech activities would be incompatible with the
use to which the premises are dedicated or primarily de-
voted."2 1 2 What has truly bewildered most commentators
about modern public forum doctrine is that the Court has
continually repudiated the second line of cases, despite what
commentators view as its obvious superiority. 21 3
211. M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D], at 4-70.
212. Id., § 4.09[D], at 4-72.
213. By far the great majority of commentators have advocated that some vari-
ant of the Grayned approach be adopted. See M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D],
at 4-73-4-74; L. TRIBE, supra note 48, at 690-92; Cass, supra note 7, at 1317-18;
Karst, supra note 7, at 261-62; Stone, supra note 7, at 93-94; Werhan, supra note 7,
at 378-84, 423-24; Note, supra note 132, at 138; Note, A Unitary Approach, supra
note 7, at 143-51. There are some signs that the Court itself might be moving in
that direction. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cornelius leaned toward a Grayned type
approach. In an opinion joined by Justice Brennan, he stated that a proper under-
standing of public forum doctrine "requires that we balance the First Amendment
interests of those who seek access for expressive activity against the interests of
the other users of the property and the interests served by reserving the property
for its intended uses." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 822 (1985)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He then criticized the Court be-
cause, "[r]ather than recognize that a nonpublic forum is a place where expressive
activity would be incompatible with the purposes the property is intended to
serve," it had instead acted as if "a nonpublic forum is a place where we need not
even be concerned about whether expressive activity is incompatible with the pur-
poses of the property." Id. at 820-21. In its use of the Grayned incompatibility
test, Blackmun's opinion seems reminiscent of Justice Brennan's dissent in Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). See supra note 91 and accom-
panying text. Justice Stevens dissented separately in Cornelius to express
skepticism "about the value" of the "analytical approach" implicit in public forum
theory. 473 U.S. at 833. Although Justices Marshall and Powell did not participate
in Cornelius, their sympathy for a Grayned type approach is well known. See, e.g.,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 842
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1765 1986-1987
UCLA LA W REVIEW
The attraction of Grayned is not difficult to appreciate.
Its logic begins from the constitutionally congenial premise
that the state should not suppress speech unless there is a
good reason to do so. The reason for discouraging speech
on government property is that it may interfere with the use
of that property. If such interference occurs, the state may
justifiably prohibit speech; conversely, the absence of inter-
ference indicates that the state may lack sufficient grounds to
abridge speech. The doctrine proposed by Grayned thus in-
vites courts to focus precisely on the relationship between
speech and the reasons for its regulation, and it is designed
to maximize the speech which the government is constitu-
tionally required to tolerate, consistent with the appropriate
and needful use of its property. This design flows naturally
from the first amendment's central objective of ensuring
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate. 21 4
Contemporary public forum doctrine, on the other
hand, begins from the constitutionally questionable premise
that the government is in effect constitutionally uncon-
strained in its use of certain kinds of state property. It thus
does not focus on speech and the justifications for its sup-
pression, but rather on the kind of government property at
issue. If the property does not bear a tradition of public us-
age for expressive activity, first amendment rights can be ef-
fectively prohibited, even if the exercise of these rights
would be compatible with the ordinary use of the property.
The doctrine thus appears to invite the superfluous suppres-
sion of speech.
Why, then, has the Court stood by public forum doc-
trine with such formidable determination? The history of
public forum doctrine recounted in Section I provides a
clue. In contrast to Grayned, public forum doctrine divides
government property into distinct schemes of first amend-
ment regulation. From the moment of the doctrine's first
contemporary appearance in Greer, the Court has consist-
ently used it to demarcate a class of government property in
which the first amendment claims of the public are radically
devalued and immune from independent judicial scrutiny.
The Court has relentlessly pursued this goal despite such
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
214. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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obstacles as the threat of obvious doctrinal incoherence and
the absence of underlying constitutional justification.
Thus the history of the doctrine suggests that if it is to
be supported by a defensible constitutional theory, it must
be one capable of explaining and justifying this strange
realm of first amendment devaluation. In this section of the
Article, I will sketch the outline of such a theory, and then
test its implications against the actual pattern of the Court's
public forum decisions. The theory will in turn lead to a
radical reformulation of the object and structure of public
forum doctrine.
A. The Management of Speech Within Government Institutions
The devaluation of first amendment rights characteristic
of the nonpublic forum cases is strikingly similar to that de-
veloped by the Court in a closely related line of cases deal-
ing with the first amendment claims of individuals who are
members of a government institution.21 5 In these cases the
Court has concluded that first amendment claims must be
subordinated to the authority necessary to administer state
organizations.
The constitutional rationale for this conclusion is quite
straightforward. Government institutions, like most organi-
zations, have a "hierarchy of formal authority" by which re-
sources are coordinated and manipulated so as to achieve
institutional ends. 21 6 This authority extends to persons as
well as to things, and it extends to the speech of persons as
well as to their actions. 21 7 The exercise of this authority is
215. The cases are discussed in Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and
Rights, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 169, 196-201.
216. J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 194 (1958). In an organization:
Authority-that is, institutionalized control-is expected to extend
downward through the various echelons of organization, enabling
leadership to determine the consequences which ultimately flow
from their decisions. While current theories of organization rarely
assume this strict and rigid pattern to be fully maintained in practice,
hierarchical structure is clearly seen as a standard against which de-
viations may be judged; the burden of proof seems to lie with excep-
tions to this rule.
R. DENHARDT, IN THE SHADOW OF ORGANIZATION 19-20 (1981); cf. 0. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 206-239 (1985).
217. To bring a few illustrations to mind, consider, for example, how a school
system controls the speech of students and teachers in a classroom, or how a
judge manages the speech of lawyers, witnesses, parties and spectators in a court-
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inconsistent with what most judges and scholars would rec-
ognize as a first amendment right. This can be seen by ana-
lyzing a simple case, one that must occur on a daily basis
throughout the country. In a government bureaucracy an
official says to her subordinate:
Tomorrow is the big staff meeting on Project X. I want
you to draft a position paper taking Position A, and I
want you to have it on my desk first thing tomorrow
morning for review. After I make the changes I think
necessary, I want you to attend the staff meeting and
present the paper.
The situation, common though it be, is a first amend-
ment nightmare. The subordinate's presentation to the staff
meeting is expression that is subject to the prior restraint of
his superior, and such prior restraints are "the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on first amendment
rights."218 The superior is able to dictate whether her
subordinate will take Position A, rather than Position B, and
hence to subject her subordinate's speech to viewpoint dis-
crimination, despite the fundamental constitutional princi-
ple that "the first amendment forbids the government to
regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas
at the expense of others."2 1 9 And the subordinate's speech
is subject to the discretionary control of his superior, despite
the "long line" of decisions striking down as "unconstitu-
tional censorship" those statutes making the exercise of first
amendment rights "contingent" upon the "discretion" of a
public official. 220
It is clear, therefore, that if the most common forms of
organizational authority are to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny, they must be analyzed in a very different fashion than
that appropriate when government regulates the speech of a
member of the general public. The superior's control over
room, or how a military officer manipulates the speech of a new recruit ("Yes,
what?" "Yes, Sir!"). For an illustration of the "constant struggle to suppress...
dissent" within government bureaucracies, see J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF
POWER 60 (1983).
218. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1971); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
219. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984).
220. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); see City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 797-98 & n. 15.
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the speech of her subordinate is somehow constitutionally
different from the mayor's control over speech in the Boston
Common. It is tempting to wish away this constitutional
anomaly by arguing that the subordinate has "waived" his
first amendment rights by "consenting" to the terms and
conditions of government employment. But this argument
will not offer a satisfactory explanation of the way that
speech is ordinarily managed within government institu-
tions. First, it is well established that " 'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental con-
stitutional rights and . . . we 'do not presume acquiescense
in the loss of fundamental rights.' "221 A government em-
ployee may be taken to have consented to employment, but
not, except in some patently fictional sense, to every viola-
tion of constitutional rights that a government employer
may perpetuate. Second, waiver must be voluntary, but the
constant threat of loss of employment and other sanctions
within an organizational context makes deeply problematic
any determination that constitutional rights have been vol-
untarily waived.
Third, and most important, the government's need to
manage speech within its institutions is the same whether or
not an institution's members have voluntarily agreed to par-
ticipate within it. Government institutions, like most organi-
zations, can be viewed as "formally established for the
explicit purpose of achieving certain goals." 22 2 The goal of
the school system is education; the goal of the judicial sys-
tem is the just and efficient adjudication of cases and contro-
versies; and so on. Managerial authority over speech is
necessary for an institution to achieve these goals. A gov-
ernment institution's interest in internally regulating speech
221. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Han-
nedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
222. P. BLAu & W.R. ScoTr, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 5 (1962). As Richard El-
more points out, viewing organizations as hierarchically arranged for the achieve-
ment of explicit goals is only one of several models of organizational behavior.
Elmore, Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation, 26 PUBLIC POLICY 185
(1978). It is chiefly a "normative" model, rather than a descriptive one, telling us
"how organizations ought to function, not necessarily how they actually do." Id. at
198. It is a model that is necessary for first amendment analysis, however, be-
cause the explicit and socially recognized goals attributed to a government organ-
ization provide the only constitutional justification for its suppression of speech.
See generally M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986).
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is therefore its interest in the attainment of the very pur-
poses for which it has been established, and this interest re-
mains the same whether or not its members consent to the
exercise of government authority.
As a result the Court has not in fact determined the con-
stitutional validity of a government institution's internal reg-
ulation of speech by reference to concepts of waiver, but
rather by asking whether the regulation is necessary in order
to achieve the institution's legitimate objectives. Prisoners,
for example, do not voluntarily agree to enter confinement,
yet the Court has explicitly held that their first amendment
rights are subordinate to the attainment of "the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." 223 Ele-
mentary and high school students are compelled to attend
school, yet the Court has held that student speech, "in class
or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts class-
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech." 2 24 Military draftees
are forced to enter the armed forces, and yet the Court has
held that "[s]peech likely to interfere with.., vital prerequi-
sites for military effectiveness . . . can be excluded from a
military base." 225 Government employees, on the other
hand, voluntarily agree to work for the government, and yet
the Court has not used the doctrine of waiver to dismiss em-
ployee claims of first amendment freedom, but has instead
analyzed these claims on their merits.22 6 The Court has held
that employee speech may be regulated so as to promote
"the efficiency of the public services [the government] per-
223. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
224. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969). In Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Court held that a state univer-
sity need not tolerate "[alssociational activities ... where they infringe reasonable
campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportuity of
other students to obtain an education." Id. at 189.
225. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980).
226. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-44 (1983); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968). The one recent exception, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980) (per curiam), is subject to criticism for precisely this reason.
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forms through its employees." 227 The Court has also held
that the fair and expeditious administration of the judicial
system justifies subjecting the pretrial speech of litigants to
prior restraints issued at the discretion of a trial judge, and
that such judicial authority extends equally to plaintiffs, who
have voluntarily submitted to a court's jurisdiction, and to
defendants, who have not.
228
The constitutional question in each case is whether the
authority to regulate speech is necessary for the achievement
of legitimate institutional objectives.229 This question, how-
ever, has rather subtle implications for the concept of in-
dependent judicial review. Suppose, in the bureaucratic
example which I have sketched, that the subordinate com-
plains in court that he has a first amendment right to present
at the staff meeting Position B, in which he personally be-
lieves, instead of Position A, which his superior has required
him to present. In assessing his claim, the court will have to
evaluate two distinct kinds of potential damage to the bu-
reaucracy. The first concerns the possible negative impact
of presenting Position B, instead of A. This damage de-
pends upon the consequences of the particular speech at is-
sue; it turns on whether Position B or the manner of its
presentation is incompatible with the attainment of institu-
tional goals.
The second kind of potential damage, however, is quite
different. It concerns the possible undermining of the supe-
rior's managerial authority should the court countermand
her directive. It is evident that if the court were to engage in
the practice of second-guessing her managerial authority re-
227. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. at 568); see infra note 351.
228. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). The judge's control
over speech in a courtroom is of course even more extensive, and extends indif-
ferently to parties, witnesses, and spectators. The "trial judge," as the Court re-
cently emphasized, "has the responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with
the nature of the proceeding; 'thejudge is not a mere moderator, but is the gover-
nor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct.' " United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985)(quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469
(1933)).
229. This question is controlling, of course, only when the government is en-
gaged in the management of speech within its own institutions. The fact that the
speech of a member of the general public adversely affects the ability of a govern-
ment institution to achieve its goals is not ordinarily viewed as constitutionally
determinative. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978).
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garding speech, that authority would pro tanto diminish. The
potential for this kind of damage implies that before engag-
ing in judicial review a court must determine whether such
review would itself diminish the authority at issue to such an
extent as to impair the ability of the bureaucracy to attain its
legitimate ends. The decision to withhold independent judi-
cial scrutiny, and hence to defer to the judgment of institu-
tional authorities, does not turn at all upon the nature or
circumstances of the particular speech at issue, but rather
upon the relationship between the practice ofjudicial review
and the nature of the managerial authority at issue.
The question of judicial deference can be concretely il-
lustrated by comparing two Supreme Court decisions. In
Brown v. Glines,2 30 the Court upheld a military regulation
prohibiting Air Force members from circulating petitions on
military bases without prior approval of their commanders.
The commanders were empowered to censor any petition
they felt would create "a clear danger to the loyalty, disci-
pline, or morale" of their troops. 23' The Court held that
"[s]peech likely to interfere with . . . vital prerequisites for
military effectiveness . . . can be excluded from a military
base." 232 But the Court did not choose to scrutinize
whether the plaintiff's particular petition would interfere
with the prerequisites for military effectiveness; instead it fo-
cused on the potential damage to military authority that
would occur if courts were to engage in the practice of inde-
pendently reviewing military commands. The Court as-
serted that the "military mission" requires the maintenance
of a form of authority founded on "instinctive obedi-
ence,"2 33 and the Court therefore held that "[t]he rights of
military men must yield somewhat 'to meet certain overrid-
ing demands of discipline and duty .... ' -234 These de-
mands are incompatible with the practice of independent
judicial review "[b]ecause the right to command and the
duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned." 23 5 Hence
the Court concluded that the nature of military authority re-
230. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
231. Id. at 353.
232. Id. at 354.
233. Id. at 354, 357.
234. Id. at 354 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974)).
235. Id. at 357.
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quires that courts as a general matter defer to the judgment
of military officials on the question of whether particular pe-
titions would adversely affect the loyalty, discipline, or mo-
rale of the troops. The Court was prepared to review that
authority only in the exceptional circumstance when it could
with plausibility be claimed that it had been exercised "irra-
tionally, invidiously, or arbitrarily." 236
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 2 37 on the other hand, the Court struck down a school
regulation prohibiting the wearing of black armbands to
protest the Vietnam war. The Court determined that the le-
gitimate end of the school system is not the creation of stu-
dents who are "closed-circuit recipients of only that which
the State chooses to communicate," but rather the inculca-
tion of "the independence and vigor of Americans who grow
up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society." 238 The attainment of this end did not, in the cir-
cumstances presented by the case, justify the maintenance of
a pervasive and unquestioned form of authority. The Court
held that "[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not
be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not pos-
sess absolute authority over their students. ' 239 For this rea-
son school officials, unlike military commanders, cannot
prohibit expression on the basis of an "undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance," but can only act on the ba-
sis of "facts which might reasonably have led [them] to fore-
cast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities."2" °
The constitutional standard adopted by the Court re-
quired the school to present evidence sufficient to convince
ajudge that plaintiffs' speech was incompatible with the edu-
cational process. In effect, then, the Court in Tinker held
that the constitutionality of the school's regulation would be
determined by independent judicial review of whether the
regulation was necessary for the attainment of the school's
educational objectives. The harm which such judicial review
might cause to the general authority structure of the school
236. Id. at 357 n.15 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976)).
237. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
238. Id. at 511, 509.
239. Id. at 511.
240. Id. at 508, 514.
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did not justify deference to school officials, for the nature of
educational authority was perceived as quite different from
that of military authority. 241 Because in Tinker there was no
evidence that the wearing of armbands would potentially
disrupt legitimate school activities, or that plaintiffs' speech
had actually disrupted these activities, the Court found the
school regulation unconstitutional.
By focusing on the relationship between plaintiffs' arm-
bands and the school environment, Tinker pursued a form of
analysis that was essentially congruent with that of Grayned.
It asked whether the potential consequences of plaintiffs'
proposed speech were incompatible with the normal func-
tioning of the school, and it maintained that this question
should be answered through independent judicial inquiry.
Glines, on the other hand, concentrated on the generic char-
acteristics of military authority, and held that these charac-
teristics justified the Court in generally deferring to the
judgment of military officials on the question of whether
particular speech was incompatible with the attainment of
military objectives. As a result Glines created a special realm,
similar to that delineated in the Court's nonpublic forum de-
cisions, in which first amendment rights were radically deval-
ued. In Glines this realm was not founded upon the major
241. It is important to stress the extent to which the Court's conclusion ulti-
mately rests on its own sense of the educational goals of the school system. Re-
cently the Court has begun to articulate a different perception of education,
which, rather than emphasizing "independence" and diversity, concentrates in-
stead on instilling students with a sense of "the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior." Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986).
"The role and purpose of the American public school system," the Court said in
1986, is to "prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate
the habits and manners of civility .... " Id. (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW
BASIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). From this perspective the in-
corporation of habits of obedience to authority is itself an educational goal. As
Justice Black said in his dissent in Tinker, "[s]chool discipline, like parental disci-
pline, is an integral and important part of training our children to be good citi-
zens-to be better citizens." 393 U.S. at 524. This understanding of the function
of education might well lead the Court to reconsider Tinker's refusal to defer to
school officials, for it elevates obedience to institutional authority into an in-
dependent educational objective. In the years before Tinker judicial deference to
thejudgment of school officials was in fact the rule, and the rule was dependent in
no small degree on the perception that, as the Supreme Court of Arkansas said in
an influential opinion, "respect for constituted authority, and obedience thereto,
is an essential lesson to qualify one for the duties of citizenship, and . . . the
schoolroom is an appropriate place to teach that lesson." Pugsley v. Sellmeyer,
158 Ark. 247, 253, 250 S.W. 538, 539 (1923).
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premise of the Davis syllogism, or upon any other such in-
defensible constitutional notion, but rather upon the logic of
judicial deference.
B. Public Forum Doctrine and the Management of Speech Within
Government Institutions
The constitutional theory underlying the Court's deci-
sions dealing with the internal management of speech has a
distinctive structure. When administering its own institu-
tions, the government is invested with a special form of
authority, which I shall call "managerial." Managerial au-
thority is controlled by first amendment rules different from
those which control the exercise of the authority used by the
state when it acts to govern the general public. I shall call
the latter kind of authority "governance." 242 In situations of
governance the state is bound by the ordinary principles of
first amendment jurisprudence, but when exercising mana-
gerial authority ordinary first amendment rights are
subordinated to the instrumental logic characteristic of or-
ganizations, and the state can in large measure control
speech on the basis of an organization's need to achieve its
institutional ends. This instrumental logic even extends so
far as to justify courts deferring to the judgment of institu-
tional officials respecting the need to control speech, if such
deference is itself thought necessary for the attainment of
institutional ends.
There is a striking similarity between this structure and
that revealed in modern public forum doctrine. Not only
does the theory of managerial authority fit the actual pattern
of the Court's public forum doctrine decisions, but it pro-
vides a coherent constitutional justification for those
decisions.
242. On the distinction between management and governance, see P. SELZ-
NICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 75-120 (1969). The distinction has
implications for the analysis of constitutional issues other than those raised by the
first amendment. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (search of
government employee's office and desk); NewJersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(search of high school student's purse). This Article, however, will not attempt to
assess these implications.
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1. The Theory of Managerial Authority and Public
Forum Doctrine
The Court's decisions dealing with the internal manage-
ment of speech suggest that there are two kinds of govern-
ment authority, management and governance, each
controlled by distinct kinds of first amendment rules. Public
forum doctrine has the same general structure, distinguish-
ing between public and nonpublic forums, and holding that
each is governed by a distinct regime of first amendment
rules. Although the Court has struggled to define an espe-
cially protected first amendment status for the public forum,
its efforts have proved unsuccessful, and the Court's deci-
sions have moved inevitably toward the conclusion that the
government's actions within the public forum are simply
subject to the same first amendment restraints as are gov-
ernment actions generally. Government authority over the
public forum can thus be characterized as a matter of
governance.
The Court's views concerning the kind of authority ex-
ercised by the government over nonpublic forums, however,
have been a good deal more murky. Although the Court has
said that the authority of government institutions to control
access by members of the general public to internal organi-
zational resources must be "reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum," 243 and so invested this authority
with the same instrumental logic as that which characterizes
managerial authority, it has in fact shown no inclination to
take this logic seriously. Under the spell of the major prem-
ise of the Davis syllogism, the Court has instead tended to
view the government's discretion in controlling public ac-
cess to the nonpublic forum as a matter of inherent power.
The problem with the Court's view, of course, is that no one
has yet been able to articulate a defensible constitutional jus-
tification for this power.
Decisions like Glines, however, indicate that the identical
discretion in the control of speech which the Court has
sought to protect in the nonpublic forum can be explained
and justified in terms of the logic of managerial authority
243. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985); see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
(1983).
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and judicial deference. These decisions suggest that the
Court has in its nonpublic forum cases been concerned all
along not with the attribution of substantive power, but
rather with the protection of managerial authority from the
potentially deleterious effects ofjudicial review. If this con-
clusion is accurate, the nonpublic forum cases can be recon-
ceptualized in terms of the underlying theory of Glines. Such
a reconceptualization would have the advantage of explicitly
orienting the Court toward the very values which have in fact
animated it during the history of public forum doctrine, thus
permitting the Court to begin to analyze and express those
values in a principled manner. Public forum doctrine would
be released from the disastrous influence of the major prem-
ise of the Davis syllogism, and the Court's nonpublic forum
cases and its decisions dealing with the internal management
of speech would be brought together under a single and de-
fensible doctrinal framework.
Reconceptualizing the nonpublic forum cases in terms
of the logic of Glines would also explain why the Court has
persistently rejected what has appeared to commentators to
be the ineluctable logic of Grayned. Grayned's "incompatibil-
ity" test takes into account only the specific harm incident to
a plaintiff's proposed speech; it does not recognize the ge-
neric damage to managerial authority flowing from the very
process of independent judicial review of institutional deci-
sionmaking. By focusing on this damage, the Court can be-
gin explicitly and systematically to explore the conditions
under which judicial deference is and is not appropriate.
The Court's present focus "on the character of the property
at issue ' ' 244 is a theoretical dead end, because there is no
satisfactory theory connecting the classification of govern-
ment property with the exercise of first amendment rights.
But there is great potential for a rich and principled juris-
prudence if the Court were to focus instead on the relation-
ship between judicial review and the functioning of
institutional authority.
To conceive the issue in this way, for example, is to see
at once that the very decisions which led Perry to formulate
the concept of the limited public forum involve the exercise
of managerial authority as to which the Court believed that
244. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
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deference was inappropriate. In this sense the limited public
forum cases display a strong analogy to the structure of
Tinker. The analogy is clear in Madison Joint School District No.
8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.2 45 The deci-
sion recognized that a school board is invested with a differ-
ent kind of authority in running an open school board
meeting than that involved in governing the general public.
Although ordinary first amendment principles would plainly
prohibit the state from imposing an agenda on public discus-
sion,246 Madison Joint School District understood that a board
must retain the flexible power to fix agendas for open school
board meetings.2 47
In assessing the constitutional limitations of the board's
managerial authority over such meetings, however, the
Court chose not to defer to the authoritative judgment of
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission that
teachers who were not authorized union representatives be
prohibited from speaking about matters subject to collective
bargaining. The Commission was not engaged in the day-
to-day supervision of the school board or of its meetings. Its
role was rather to oversee certain board decisions respecting
its relations with its employees, much as a court might over-
see certain decisions of an administrative agency. For this
reason the Court correctly believed that it could indepen-
dently review the merits of the Commission's decision with-
out potentially endangering a necessary structure of
managerial authority. Advancing its own conception of the
social purposes and meaning of the American institution of
open school board meetings, the Court concluded that the
Commission's decision was without merit, since there was no
"justification" for excluding teachers from the "public dis-
cussion of public business" characteristic of such
meetings .248
The structural analogy between Tinker and Widmar is
similar, although less complete. The regulation at issue in
245. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
246. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38
(1980).
247. 429 U.S. at 175 n.8.
248. Id. at 175. Indeed the Court went further and noted that "restraining
teachers' expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the
schools would seriously impair the board's ability to govern the district." Id. at
177.
1778 [Vol. 34:1713
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1778 1986-1987
PUBLIC FORUM
Widmar involved prohibiting students from using university
facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
Widmar plainly recognized that the university was invested
with managerial authority to regulate speech as necessary
for the attainment of institutional ends. The Court explicitly
noted that a "university's mission is education, and decisions
of this Court have never denied a university's authority to
impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities."249 Thus Widmar
did not require a university to "make all of its facilities
equally available to students and nonstudents alike,"250
although similar discrimination among persons in the gen-
eral public would pose an "obvious first amendment prob-
lem. ''25 1 As in Tinker, however, the Court concluded that the
"mission" of education did not depend upon the exercise of
pervasive, managerial authority: The Court stressed that
university students participate in an environment that "is pe-
culiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.' "252 For this reason the
Court addressed the merits of the university's regulation
without apparent concern for potential damage to a struc-
ture of authority necessary for the attainment of educational
objectives. 253
Unfortunately Widmar's analysis of the merits of the
case is disappointing. The natural and appropriate inquiry
for Widmar to have undertaken was whether the University's
regulation was compatible with its educational "mission."
249. 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n.5 (1981).
250. Id.; see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
n.7 (1983) ("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent (student groups)").
251. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct.
2968, 2987 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972)).
253. The Court had also refused to defer to the judgment of educational au-
thorities in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), which concerned the refusal of a
state university to recognize Students for a Democratic Society as a campus organ-
ization. One can imagine a different outcome, however, if the first amendment
claims at issue in a case touch an educational institution in its more managerial
aspects, as, for example, if students claim the right to choose the topics for discus-
sion in the classroom. In such a situation the Court may well defer to the manage-
rial discretion of the classroom teacher to control the speech of her students. It
was no doubt important to the Court's decision in Tinker that the prohibition at
issue had not been promulgated by a classroom teacher, but rather by a system-
wide meeting of the "principals of the Des Moines schools." Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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But Widmar did not follow through on its own insight.
Although it explicitly recognized that a "university differs in
significant respects from public forums such as streets or
parks," 254 it nevertheless adopted and applied, without ex-
planation or justification, the strict scrutiny test which the
Court had developed in the context of streets and parks.
The abrupt recourse to doctrinal formalism illustrates the
intellectually crippling effects of contemporary public forum
doctrine.
Taken together, Widmar and Madison Joint School District
indicate that within public forum doctrine there are circum-
stances in which the Court will invest the government with
managerial authority, and yet will not defer to the exercise
of that authority. 255 In the absence of deference, however, a
court must independently evaluate the relationship between
the regulation of speech and the attainment of institutional
goals. As Tinker illustrates, this means that a court must per-
form an analysis similar in structure and intent to the "in-
compatibility" test of Grayned. Both Grayned and Tinker held
that the government must bear the burden of demonstrating
that the consequences of particular speech claims are so un-
desirable as to justify their denial.25 6 This allocation of the
burden of proof follows from the important first amendment
principle that the state ought to tolerate the maximum possi-
ble speech, consistent with its own orderly operation. At a
minimum this principle implies that speech should not be
suppressed unless there is a good reason for doing so, and
254. 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5.
255. Consider in this light the cases in which the Court has determined that the
public has a first amendment right of access to various judicial proceedings. See,
e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986); Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980). These cases create strict rules for when a trial judge can exclude
members of the public from various proceedings, and enforce these rules by in-
dependent appellate review. The implicit premise is that appellate review of such
decisions will not impair a trial judge's managerial authority over her courtroom.
In contrast, the Court has rejected as unduly impairing managerial authority a
constitutional requirement for independent appellate review of a trial judge's de-
cisions respecting the issuance of pretrial restraining orders. See Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
256. Although the Court made no formal statements to this effect in either
Madison Joint School Dist. or Widmar, the outcome of those two cases is consistent
with this conclusion. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 184.
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this implication places the burden of persuasion squarely on
the government.
2. The Object of Public Forum Doctrine
Because of its reliance on the Davis syllogism, the Court
presently views public forum doctrine as concentrating "on
the character of the property at issue." 257 But the extraordi-
nary similarities between public forum doctrine and the
Court's decisions dealing with the internal management of
speech suggest that the thrust of public forum doctrine lies
in a different direction. Both lines of decisions involve the
government's invocation of managerial authority to control
speech. When that authority is called into question by the
first amendment claims of a member of a government insti-
tution, we tend to conceptualize the issue as one of the inter-
nal management of speech; when it is called into question by
the first amendment claims of a member of the general pub-
lic, the same issue is conceptualized as a matter of public
forum doctrine.258 Thus the core of public forum doctrine is
a concern with the nature of managerial authority, rather
than with the character of government property.
Public forum doctrine is invoked when members of the
general public bring the scope of managerial authority into
question. It is important to be clear, however, about what it
means to bring managerial authority into question. If a
newspaper editorializes that a City Council should give mu-
nicipal employees an increase in salary, the editorial may
well affect the Council's managerial relationship with its em-
ployees. But the editorial would not call the Council's man-
agerial authority into question, and we would not even be
tempted to view the editorial as raising issues of public fo-
rum doctrine. This is because the Council's authority over
the newspaper is so clearly a matter of governance rather
257. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
258. It should be stressed that the question of who is and who is not a "mem-
ber" of a government institution is itself problematic. For example, should partici-
pants in an open school board meeting be characterized as "members" of the
organization created by the meeting, or as members of the general public? The
difficulty of characterization afflicts even more formal kinds of organizations. In
Widmar, for instance, the Court viewed the organizational connection between stu-
dents and their university to be so dilute as to characterize the issue as one of
public forum doctrine, thereby implying that the students were not "members" of
the university.
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than management. The limits of managerial authority are
called into question only when those who are arguably sub-
ject to its control resist its direction, and hence render prob-
lematic its nature and reach. In public forum cases this
characteristically occurs when members of the general pub-
lic seek to use a resource over which the government claims
managerial control.
The object of public forum doctrine, then, is the consti-
tutional clarification and regulation of government authority
over particular resources. Public forum cases require courts
to decide whether a resource is subject to a kind of authority
"like" that characterized by the government's relationship to
a newspaper editorial, which is to say like that involved in
the governance of the general public, or whether it is subject
to a kind of authority "like" that characterized by the gov-
ernment's control over the internal management of its own
institutions, which is to say to the authority of management.
If the latter, the questions in a public forum case will con-
cern the legitimate objectives of the managerial authority,
the instrumental relationship between the attainment of
those objectives and the regulation of speech, and the insti-
tutional impact of judicial review.
C. Reformulating Public Forum Doctrine
The foregoing analysis suggests that public forum doc-
trine is susceptible to a simple and helpful reformulation.
From a constitutional point of view, there is a fundamental
distinction between two kinds of authority: management and
governance. Two distinct regimes of first amendment regu-
lation correspond to these forms of authority. When the
state acts to govern the speech of the general public, it is
subject to the restrictions of what we would ordinarily think
of as the "usual" principles of first amendment adjudication.
Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, as are
viewpoint discrimination, official discretion, agenda setting,
and so forth. These principles do not automatically apply,
however, when the government manages speech within its
own institutions. When acting with managerial authority, a
government institution may to a significant degree control
speech as necessary to attain its legitimate organizational
goals, as these goals are understood by a court.
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When a member of the general public seeks to use a
resource for expressive purposes and the government claims
to exercise managerial authority over the resource, the na-
ture of the government's authority must be determined. If
that authority is deemed to be a matter of governance, the
resource will be viewed as a public forum, and the govern-
ment will be constitutionally prohibited from controlling the
use of the resource for speech except in ways permitted by
ordinary first amendment principles. The great decisions of
the 1930s and 1940s, in which the Court extended the pro-
tections of the first amendment to expression in streets and
parks, should essentially be viewed as the Court's determina-
tion that despite the government's ownership of these re-
sources, its authority over them was a matter of governance,
rather than management.2 59 So interpreted, these decisions
did not establish a "special position" 260 for the public fo-
rum, but to the contrary assimilated it into the most general
framework of first amendment analysis.
If, on the other hand, it is determined that the govern-
ment may properly exercise managerial authority over the
resource in issue, the question for judicial decision is
whether the government's regulation of speech is necessary
for the achievement of its legitimate institutional ends. If a
court determines that it should decide this question, it must
engage in an investigation analogous to that proposed by
Grayned, placing upon the government the burden of demon-
strating the necessity for the regulation. But a court has an-
other option, which is to defer on this question to the
judgment of institutional authorities. The primary justifica-
tion for such deference is that the resource is subject to a
kind of managerial authority that requires insulation from
routine judicial oversight for its effective functioning.
As reformulated in this manner, public forum doctrine
does not so much determine the outcome of particular cases,
as orient courts toward the kind of reasoning whereby out-
comes should be reached. The reformulation of the doc-
trine has several important advantages. It flows from the
values and concerns which the history of public forum doc-
trine suggests have been the mainspring of the doctrine's
259. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
260. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
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development, and yet it does so in a manner that sweeps
away the Court's antiquated focus on the inherent "proprie-
tary" power of the government and that avoids the vicious
circularity of the Court's concentration on government in-
tent. It abandons the Court's fruitless and frustrating quest
to define the constitutionally "special position" of the public
forum; and with respect to the nonpublic forum it avoids the
mistake of crudely binding together questions of access and
of equal access, instead subsuming both under a sensible
and functionally oriented standard. The reformulation is
firmly rooted in the practical problems of administering gov-
ernment institutions, and yet it is also grounded in contem-
porary constitutional jurisprudence. It maximizes the
speech which government must tolerate, consistent with a
sophisticated understanding of the necessities of organiza-
tional management and an appreciation of the social mean-
ing of particular government institutions.
The reformulation will not of course magically dispel
the difficult issues that underlie public forum adjudication,
but it will orient courts toward inquiries which are defensible
and productive. In the remaining three sections of this Arti-
cle I will discuss in detail three of these inquiries: The dis-
tinction between governance and management; the
distinction between structures of managerial authority which
require judicial deference and those which do not; and the
relationship between public forum doctrine and the prohibi-
tion against viewpoint discrimination.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT
AND GOVERNANCE
At present, public forum doctrine distinguishes public
from nonpublic forums on the basis of a "long tradition" of
use for "assembly and debate." The difficulty with this ap-
proach is that the Court has been unable to explain why such
a tradition should have special constitutional consequences.
As reformulated, however, public and nonpublic forums
should be distinguished according to whether government
authority over a resource is "like" that characteristic of the
internal managment of a state institution, or instead "like"
that characteristic of the governance of the general public.
The reformulation has the advantage of wearing its justifica-
tion on its sleeve: if the state is governing the general public,
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ordinary principles of first amendment jurisprudence should
for that very reason be applicable; conversely, if the govern-
ment is managing the internal affairs of its own institutions,
general first amendment principles should be subject to the
pressure of special administrative circumstances and un-
dergo corresponding modification. The reformulation
raises the question, however, of how to determine whether
government authority over a resource is a matter of govern-
ance or of management.
A. The Question of Institutional Boundaries
This question has an immediate and almost irresistible
answer, which is that governmental authority is a matter of
management if a resource lies "within" a government organ-
ization, but that it is a matter of governance if a resource is
located "outside" of the organization's boundaries. It is in
fact quite difficult to think about the question of governmen-
tal authority without recourse to this spatial metaphor of or-
ganizational boundaries.
The problem is that the metaphor does not have any
obvious analytic content. As a matter of private ordering,
the boundaries of an organization are ordinarily understood
to be fixed by consent. I am within an organization when I
consent to recognize its authority over me.26 1 But this un-
derstanding is not helpful in fixing the boundaries of gov-
ernment institutions for public forum doctrine, because the
doctrine deals with governmental authority over resources
rather than people, and because the state has the power to
sweep resources and individuals into its organizations re-
gardless of their consent. 262
Another common way of thinking about organizational
boundaries relates to the organization's power of action. As
one study observes, "The organization is the total set of in-
terstructured activities in which it is engaged at any one time
and over which it has discretion to initiate, maintain, or end
behaviors. . . .The organization ends where its discretion
261. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 110-11 (1957).
262. See, e.g., Carlson, Environmental Constraints and Organizational Consequences:
The Public School and Its Clients, in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINIS-
TRATION: THE SIXTY-THIRD YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF
EDUCATION, pt. II, 264-68 (D. Griffiths ed. 1964).
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ends and another's begins." 263 In the case of government
organizations, however, this definition is also unhelpful,
since state institutions possess the discretion of state power,
and the extent to which this power may be exercised is pre-
cisely the constitutional issue to be determined.
Modern organization theory, moreover, has come to
view "organizations as open systems," whose "boundaries
must necessarily be sieves, not shells, admitting the desira-
ble flows and excluding the inappropriate or deleterious ele-
ments." 264 As a consequence boundaries "are very difficult
to delineate in social systems, such as organizations." 265 De-
pending upon one's perspective, one can view "suppliers,
customers, inmates, and other types of persons" as "mem-
bers" within "the organization's domain." 266 The problem
is further complicated by the fact that the dependence of or-
ganizations on their environment gives them incentives to
reach out and extend their "control" over important exter-
nal resources, 267 thus pushing their already open boundaries
into a state of constant motion.
The indeterminate boundaries characteristic of govern-
ment institutions is well illustrated by United States Postal Ser-
vice v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,268 in which a civic
association challenged the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute prohibiting the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter"
in the mailboxes 269 of private individuals. The Court ap-
proached the case by concluding that the mailboxes were a
nonpublic forum, and opining that:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of any reason why this Court
should treat a letterbox differently for first amendment
263. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 32 (1978).
264. W.R. SCOTr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 180
(1981); see Freeman, The Unit of Analysis in Organizational Research, in ENVIRONMENTS
AND ORGANIZATIONS 336-38 (M. Meyer & Associates eds. 1978).
265. Kast & Rosenzweig, General Systems Theory: Applications for Organization and
Management, 15 ACAD. MGMT. J. 447, 450 (1972).
266. Aldrich, Organizational Boundaries and Inter-organizational Conflict, 24 HUM.
REL. 279, 286 (1971); see C. BARNARD, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1948).
267. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 263, at 113; see J. THOMPSON, ORGA-
NIZATIONS IN ACTION 39-44 (1967); cf. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
268. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
269. Mailboxes were defined as letter boxes "established, approved, or ac-
cepted by the Postal Service for the receipt or delivery of mail matter on any mail
route." 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1982).
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access purposes than it has in the past treated the military
base in Greer v. Spock .... the jail or prison in Adderley v.
Florida, . . . and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union....
or the advertising space made available in city rapid
transit cars in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights .... In all
these cases, this Court recognized that the first amend-
ment does not guarantee access to property simply be-
cause it is owned or controlled by the government. In
Greer v. Spock, . . . the Court cited approvingly from its
earlier opinion in Adderley v. Florida .... wherein it ex-
plained that " '[t]he State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.' ",270
The passage relies on precedents in which the government
was exercising managerial authority over property which it
unambiguously owned. The major premise of the Davis syl-
logism, whatever its intrinsic merits, was thus applicable to
the facts of these precedents.
What is striking about the passage, however, is Green-
burgh's effort to appropriate and rely on the premise. Since
the mailboxes at issue in Greenburgh were purchased and
owned by private individuals, this effort is plainly misguided.
The government cannot seriously be said to have a proprie-
tary relationship to privately owned mailboxes. But the real
thrust of the Greenburgh opinion is not that the government is
the proprietor of the mailboxes, but rather that the mail-
boxes should be viewed as part of the internal organization
of the Postal Service. The opinion is quite explicit on this
point, stating that the mailboxes are "an essential part of the
Postal Service's nationwide system for the delivery and re-
ceipt of mail," 27' and that they must be "under the direction
and control of the Postal Service" 272 if the Service is "to op-
erate as efficiently as possible a system for the delivery of
mail."2 73 In effect, therefore, Greenburgh perceived the
boundaries of the Postal Service as expanding outward to
embrace the privately owned mailboxes of individuals, and
hence concluded that the Service's regulation of access to
these mailboxes should be regarded for constitutional pur-
poses as a matter of managerial authority.
270. 453 U.S. at 129-30 (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 128-29
272. Id. at 126.
273. Id. at 133.
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Although Greenburgh's conclusion is clear enough, it is
far from obvious how the conclusion may be rationally as-
sessed. The usual markers of organizational boundaries -
consent and power - offer virtually no guidance in evaluat-
ing Greenburgh's expansive perception of the institutional
boundaries of the Postal Service.
B. Criteria for Distinguishing Management from Governance
The Court's decisions addressing the internal manage-
ment of speech have uniformly concluded that within a gov-
ernment organization expression may be controlled so as to
achieve institutional ends.2 74 This conclusion reflects the
perception that in our culture the domain of an organization
is one of "instrumental orientation,"2 75 in which "organiza-
tion goals" are taken as "value premises.- 276 The function
of an organization is to implement these premises, not to
question them, and within its boundaries people and re-
sources are arranged so as to attain this objective. Outside
of this organizational domain, however, lies a public realm
in which the attainment of institutional ends is taken to be a
relevant, but not controlling consideration. In the public
realm, assertions of value are not accepted as "premises,"
but rather are recognized as claims subject to evaluation
and assessment. In "public life ... we jointly, as a commu-
nity, exercise the human capacity 'to think what we are do-
ing,' and take charge of the history in which we are all
constantly engaged by drift and inadvertence." 277 In a de-
mocracy like our own, the public realm coincides with the
arena in which common values are forged through public
discussion and exchange.
274. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
275. R. DENHARDT, supra note 216, at 38. Talcott Parsons, for example, has
written that "the defining characteristic of an organization which distinguishes it
from other types of social systems" is its "primacy of orientation to the attainment of a
specific goal." Parsons, Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organiza-
tions-I, 1 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 63, 64 (1956). Or, as Charles Perrow has more simply
written, "Organizations are established to do something; they perform work di-
rected toward some end." C. PERROW, ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL VIEW 133 (1970).
276. H. SIMON, D. SMITHBURG & V. THOMPSON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 82
(1950).
277. Pitkin, Justice.- On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 344
(1981).
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From a constitutional perspective, then, the distinction
between management and governance turns on the priority
accorded to proposed objectives. If government action is
viewed as a matter of internal management, the attainment
of institutional ends is taken as an unquestioned priority.
278
But if it is instead viewed as a matter of governance, the sig-
nificance and force of all potential objectives are taken as a
legitimate subject of inquiry. The facts of Greenburgh nicely
illustrate the difference. To conceptualize the mailboxes as
a nonpublic forum "within" the organization of the Postal
Service implies that they are a resource at the Service's dis-
posal, and that they can and should be instrumentally
manipulated so as most efficiently to achieve the Service's
explicit and legitimate goals. To conceptualize the mail-
boxes as a public forum "external" to the organization of
the Service, on the other hand, implies that the attainment
of these goals cannot automatically commandeer the use of
the mailboxes, and that the Service's claims must be evalu-
ated in light of other competing social interests in the mail-
boxes' use.
In our democracy the accomodation of competing val-
ues occurs through a process of public discussion, a process
which is constituted and guarded by general principles of
first amendment jurisprudence. These principles character-
istically balance or weigh institutional interests, like those as-
serted by the Postal Service in Greenburgh, against the social
value of maintaining first amendment rights and hence the
very process of public discussion. The Schneider case is an
early and explicit example of such balancing, where the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing litter was held insufficient
to justify an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of pam-
phlets. 279 The implication of such balancing, however, is
that in specific circumstances particular institutional objec-
tives can justifiably limit first amendment rights. If an insti-
tutional objective is of sufficient importance, and if the
appropriation of a public resource is sufficiently necessary to
the attainment of the objective, first amendment principles
may well permit rights of free expression respecting the re-
source to be subordinated in carefully limited kinds of
278. Of course a court can and must ultimately determine for itself the nature
of a government organization's legitimate institutional ends.
279. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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ways. 280 But first amendment principles are designed to en-
sure that this subordination will always be provisional, the
result of a hard fought clarification of competing public val-
ues, and that it will never be, so to speak, a matter of course.
This analysis of the constitutional distinction between
managment and governance is helpful in giving analytic con-
tent to the metaphor of organizational boundaries. These
boundaries partition off from a public realm a special do-
main of instrumental action. The limits of that domain are
marked by the very instrumental social practices by which
organizations are constituted. This can be seen in Sigmund
Diamond's study of the early history of Virginia, From Organi-
zation to Society: Virginia in the Seventeenth Century.281 In its
early years the Jamestown colony of Virginia had not been
established as a "colony" or "political unit," but rather as
"the property of the Virginia Company of London," whose
objective was to "return a profit to the stockholders of that
company." 282 The Company was "governed administra-
tively through a chain of command originating in the Com-
pany's General Court.-2 83 From the point of view of the
280. Greenburgh is a muddy case because the Court plainly intimated in its foot-
notes that the statute at issue would survive challenge even if analyzed under such
general first amendment principles. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6, 131 n.7 (1981). Indeed Justice
Brennan concurred separately on precisely these grounds. Id. at 134 (BrennanJ.,
concurring). In the end, therefore, it made no difference to the Court's actual
decision whether mailboxes were or were not conceptualized as a public forum.
See M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.09[D] at 4-74-4-75.
An example of the Court finding that the attainment of institutional ends
should take priority over other uses of a resource, even though the resource is
subject to the authority of governance, rather than management, can be found in
the recent decision of Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984), in which the
Court upheld restrictions on the photographic reproduction of United States cur-
rency. The restrictions were designed "to avoid creating conditions which would
'facilitate counterfeiting.' " Id. at 644. Another more venerable example is Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), in which the Court upheld against facial attack a
Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing or parading "in or near a building housing
a court of the State of Louisiana" with "intent of influencing any judge, juror,
witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty." Id. at 560. The Court
reasoned that because the statute was "precise" and "narrowly drawn," and that
because "it is of the utmost importance that the administration ofjustice be abso-
lutely fair and orderly," a "State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate
to assure that the administration ofjustice at all stages is free from outside control
and influence." Id. at 562.
281. 63 AM.J. Soc. 457 (1958).
282. Id. at 459.
283. Id. at 471-72.
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General Court, the Virginia settlers "were not citizens of a
colony; they were the occupants of a status in-to use
an anachronistic term-the Company's table of organ-
ization.."284
The regulation of social life in Jamestown was designed
solely to achieve the Company's objective, and it conse-
quently "stripped from people all attributes save the one
that really counted in the relationship which the Company
sought to impose on them - their status in the organiza-
tion."28 5 But as the social life ofJamestown grew more pop-
ulous and complex, and as individuals began to recognize in
each other statuses outside of those instrumentally imposed
by the Company, 286 institutional roles became less impor-
tant to the settlers.287 As a consequence the settlers "were
no longer willing to accept the legitimacy of their organiza-
tional superiors," 288 and "the burden of achieving order and
discipline ... became the responsibility not of an organiza-
tion but of a society. ' 289 The emergence of this society was
marked by the development of an "authentic political sys-
tem" in which the diverging values and objectives of the col-
onists were resolved. 290
284. Id. at 462.
285. Id. at 468.
286. Diamond notes:
At one time in Virginia, the single relationship that existed be-
tween persons rested upon the positions they occupied in the Com-
pany's table of organization. As a result of the efforts made by the
Company to get persons to accept that relationship, however, each
person in Virginia had become the occupant of several statuses, for
now there were rich and poor in Virginia, landowners and renters,
masters and servants, old residents and newcomers, married and sin-
gle, men and women; and the simultaneous possession of these sta-
tuses involved the holder in a network of relationships, some
congruent and some incompatible, with his organizational
relationship.
Id. at 471.
287. Diamond concludes that:
The ultimate stage in the transition of Virginia from organiza-
tion to society was reached when the settlers came to feel that the
new relationships in which they were now involved were of greater
importance than the Company relationship, when their statuses
outside the organization came largely to dictate their behavior.
Id. at 473.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 474.
290. Id. at 472.
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What is most interesting about Diamond's work is the
suggestion that the transition from organization to society
was constituted by a change in social practices. The settlers
of Jamestown who lived within an organization had their
roles and statuses functionally defined by the Virginia Com-
pany; the settlers who participated in a society enjoyed a
wide variety of divergent roles and statuses that could not be
said to be instrumentally arranged. The emergence of a
political system depended upon the growth of a social sys-
tem that was sufficiently complex as to engender in its mem-
bers diverse roles, values and expectations. This symbiotic
relationship between diversity and a public realm illuminates
why we view that realm as an arena in which conflicting val-
ues and expectations are recognized, legitimated, and ac-
commodated. 29' The instrumental rationality of an
organization, on the other hand, is hostile toward this diver-
sity, and requires that the various roles and statuses of its
members be subordinated toward the achievement of insti-
tutional objectives. Organizations thus strive to ensure that
"their personnel should not be influenced by extra-organi-
zational factors,"2 92 and they attempt functionally to define
for their members specifically organizational roles that
291. Paradoxically, as Hannah Arendt writes, the "public realm, as the com-
mon world, gathers us together," and yet the "reality of the public realm relies on
the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the
common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or denom-
inator can ever be devised." H. ARENDT, supra note 9 at 48, 52.
292. C. PERROW, supra note 275, at 51. Of course this effort can only be par-
tially successful, since
the ideal organization does not exist. One major reason is that the
people who perform organizational tasks must be sustained by fac-
tors outside the organization. The organization is not the total
world of the individual; it is not a society. People must fulfill other
social roles; besides, society has shaped them in. ways which affect
their ability to perform organizational tasks. A man has a marital sta-
tus, ethnic identification, religious affiliations, a distinctive personal-
ity, friends, to name only a few. Today it is customary to call
management's attention to the fact that they are dealing with whole
persons, rather than with automatons, and that therefore they
should be sensitive to human relations. It is less often acknowl-
edged, however, that a great deal of organizational effort is exerted
to control the effects of extra-organizational influences upon person-
nel. Daily, people come contaminated into the organization.
Id. at 52.
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predominate over the multiple roles and statuses character-
istic of the general society.2 93
This analysis suggests that for constitutional purposes
an organization's boundaries can be recognized by the pre-
dominance of functionally defined organizational roles. If a
resource is embedded in social practices that are constituted
by such organizational roles, the resource can be said to lie
within an organization. It is a nonpublic forum and subject
to the exercise of managerial authority. On the other hand,
if a resource is used by individuals occupying widely differ-
ent roles and statuses, with correspondingly divergent val-
ues and expectations, the resource lies in the public realm,
and the state's authority over it is a matter of governance.
The resource is a public forum.
C. Four Examples
This way of understanding the distinction between pub-
lic and nonpublic forums may seem a bit abstract, but it in
fact yields concrete and useful results, as can be seen by the
analysis of four examples. Consider, first, what underlies
the Court's perception of the public forum status of streets
and parks. Streets and parks are part of the experience of all
citizens. We ordinarily use streets and parks in a wide vari-
ety of roles and statuses, and hence we subject them to an
enormous diversity of competing demands and uses. No
one of these uses has automatic priority. 294 Officials who
regulate streets, for example, are normally torn between fa-
cilitating efficient vehicle traffic and accommodating the con-
cededly legitimate demands of those who want to conduct
parades, funerals, block parties, or festivals.29 5 It is this fact,
293. See, e.g., H. SIMON, D. SMITHBURG & V. THOMPSON, supra note 276, at
79-82.
294. The very exceptions to this rule illustrate the basic point. Some federal
parks, for example, are dedicated to the primary goal of wilderness preservation.
If these parks are not in fact subject to competing demands and uses, they are not
public forums, despite the Court's generalizations about "streets and parks."
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). For
this reason speech within such parks may be managed in ways necessary for the
attainment of the goal of wilderness preservation, as for instance by prohibiting
political demonstrations.
295. See, e.g., Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time,
Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937, 954-56 (1983). To the extent
that public behavior with respect to any particular street is oriented toward a sin-
gle, paramount goal, however, the street is not a public forum. California free-
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and not a tradition of public usage for expressive purposes,
which underlies the Court's firm and correct conclusion that
streets should be seen as public forums.2 96 The accommoda-
tion of the conflicting objectives to which we subject our
streets is a matter of public governance, and hence must be
evaluated according to the constitutional principles appro-
priate for such governance. It is especially fitting that streets
have traditionally been used for the conduct of that public
discussion and exchange by which public governance is ulti-
mately constituted, but this use, like any other, cannot re-
ceive unquestioned priority.
The multiplicity of competing roles and expectations
characteristic of streets and parks should be contrasted to
the social practices surrounding the advertising cards at is-
sue in Lehman. There was never any reasonable expectation
that the cards were to be made available to the public on any
grounds other than those financially or otherwise useful to
the rapid transit system. The only role in which the advertis-
ing space could be purchased was that of a consumer, and
that role was in all pertinent respects functionally defined by
the transit system. For this reason the Court was correct in
concluding that the cards were not a public forum.
Greenburgh presents a theoretically more interesting de-
cision, for in that case the federal government had at-
tempted by the enactment of a criminal statute to change the
social practices associated with mailboxes. Anyone who has
unthinkingly dropped a note in a friend's mailbox knows,
however, that in everyday life mailboxes are subject to uses
other than simply the deposit of stamped mailable matter,
which is but another way of saying that we use mailboxes all
the time in roles other than those specifically defined by the
Postal Service. The government's effort to alter these prac-
tices has not been successful. For this reason the Court's
decision in Greenburgh was incorrect: the mailboxes should
have been regarded as a public forum, and the constitution-
ways, for example, are designed and used for the explicit objective of facilitating
rapid vehicle traffic. The freeways are therefore not a public forum, and claims to
use the freeways for expressive purposes-for demonstrations or for leafletting on
their shoulders-should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the freeways'
objective.
296. Of course a tradition of public use for expressive purposes can be highly
probative of the conclusion that streets and parks are legitimately subject to a
variety of competing uses.
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ality of the government's effort to restrict access to them
evaluated as if it were a restriction on the speech of the gen-
eral public.29
7
The analysis of a fourth and final example will illustrate
the complexities of distinguishing between management and
governance. In Greer, members of a political party sought
access to the "areas of Fort Dix open to the general pub-
lic" 298 for the purpose of holding demonstrations and hand-
ing out leaflets. Civilians "without any prior authorization"
were not only "regular visitors" to these "unrestricted ar-
eas," but they also "regularly pass[ed] through" them
"either by foot or by auto, at all times of the day and
night."2 99 Although the record is not perfectly clear, if these
areas were, from a civilian's point of view, like "any public
street," 300 and so subject to conflicting uses and roles, then
the areas should have been regarded as a public forum, and
the government's attempt to restrict speech within them
evaluated according to ordinary first amendment principles.
The military could no more convert them into a managerial
domain by simple fiat than could the Postal Service trans-
form private mailboxes into nonpublic forums by simple
decree.
What complicates the situation in Greer, however, is that
the plaintiffs in the case had sought access to the areas in
order to meet "with service personnel."3 0 1 The issue posed
by Greer is thus not merely the nature of the military's au-
thority over the open areas of Fort Dix, but also the nature
of the military's control over its own service personnel.
Whether or not this control should be viewed for first
amendment purposes as managerial in nature does not de-
pend at all upon the distinction between public and nonpub-
lic forums, or upon the social practices of members of the
general public, but rather upon a substantive analysis of
297. It does not follow, of course, that the Court's judgment upholding the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1725 is incorrect, since the statute could plausibly
be upheld even under ordinary principles of first amendment jurisprudence. See
supra note 280.
298. 424 U.S. 828, 834 (1976).
299. Id. at 851 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972); see Greer, 424 U.S. at
850-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301. 424 U.S. at 832.
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the prerogatives of military authority vis-A-vis military
personnel.
The relationship between a government institution and
its members is not a question that we have so far discussed
in any detail, but in Pickering v. Board of Education30 2 the
Court held that this relationship can at a certain point cease
to be managerial in nature. In that case the Court ruled that
in some circumstances the interest of a school board in con-
trolling a teacher's written communication with a newspaper
was "not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a
similar contribution by any member of the general public,"
and hence that the constitutionality of the sanctions imposed
on the teacher should be evaluated according to ordinary
first amendment principles.303 Pickering suggests that the
question of whether the restrictions on speech imposed in
Greer should be viewed as a matter of management or of gov-
ernance turns on whether the military's interest in control-
ling access to servicemen in the open areas of the Fort is so
attenuated as to be not "significantly greater than its inter-
est" in controlling the speech of members of the general
public in those areas.30 4
Whether or not Pickering's approach is ultimately
adopted, the lesson of Greer is that not every first amend-
ment claim by members of the general public which calls
managerial authority into question turns on questions of
public forum doctrine. While it is true that the Court should
have concluded that the military's authority over the open
areas of the Fort involved matters of governance, rather
than management, the ultimate ability of the military to con-
trol the plaintiffs' access to those areas depended upon the
302. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
303. Id. at 573. The Court held that "in a case such as the present one, in
which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in
the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude
that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he
seeks to be." Id. at 574. For this reason the Court adopted the test created in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for application to the general
public, and held that the teacher could not be punished "absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him." 391 U.S. at 574.
304. On this question the Court in Greer tells us only that "members of the
Armed Forces stationed at Fort Dix are wholly free as individuals to attend polit-
ical rallies, out of uniform and off base. But the military as such is insulated from
both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan polit-
ical causes or candidates." 424 U.S. at 839.
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quite different nature of the military's authority over its own
personnel. The final irony of Greer is that the decision which
established the framework of contemporary public forum
doctrine did not itself ultimately depend upon the distinc-
tion between public and nonpublic forums, but rather on the
reach of government's managerial authority over the mem-
bers of its own institutions.
D. The Meaning of "Public" in Public Forum Doctrine
Public forum doctrine is conventionally, although inac-
curately, understood to be pertinent only when the public
seeks to use government property for expressive pur-
poses.30 5 This focus on property has disoriented the Court's
conceptualization of public forum doctrine, for it has led the
Court to conceive the public forum in terms of the opposi-
tion between the public and the private, rather than in terms
of the opposition between the public and the specifically
instrumental.
Property is traditionally associated with a sphere of per-
sonal and private freedom, in which the individual, "as
against the Government,"30 6 has the right to be "let
alone" 30 7 to enjoy "personal security, personal liberty and
private property." 30 8 "One of the main rights attaching to
property is the right to exclude others, . . . and one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
305. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568,
2571 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
814-15 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Minnesota State Bd. for Community
Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280 (1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-14 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983); Cass, supra note 7, at 1287-88; Werhan,
supra note 7, at 338; Note, Public Forum Analysis, supra note 7, at 545.
Despite the received wisdom, cases like Greenburgh illustrate that public forum
doctrine can be applied to resources which the government does not in fact own.
Cornelius has recently attempted to capture this insight by observing that public
forum theory is pertinent whenever a "speaker" seeks "access to public property
or to private property dedicated to public use." 473 U.S. at 801. The traditional
focus on ownership, however, is evidence of the extreme suspicion with which
government claims to manage the speech of the general public are regarded. It is
a sign that such claims will not even be entertained unless the government can
demonstrate some special and close relationship with a resource that members of
the general public wish to use for expressive activity.
306. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 474-75.
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likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue
of this right to exclude." 30 9 From its inception public forum
doctrine has associated the "nonpublic" with this image of
specifically "private" freedom. Davis analogized the gov-
ernment to "the owner of a private house, " 310 and Adderley,
in language that has been continually repeated, compared
the state to "a private owner of property." 31' It is simply
self-contradictory, however, to claim for the government the
prerogatives of a sphere of personal privacy, because the
government cannot intelligibly claim that it should be "let
alone" from its own processes.
It makes sense, on the other hand, to conclude that
there are situations in which government can and must or-
ganize itself to act through institutions in an instrumental
fashion. Such action proceeds toward the attainment of par-
tial ends determined by the value premises of a particular
institution, in contrast to the achievement of public ends de-
termined by the community "as a whole." 31 2 In the context
of public forum doctrine, then, the opposite of the "public"
is not the "private," but rather the specifically instru-
mental. 31 3
Public forum doctrine rests on the distinction between a
public realm, in which social values and ends are consti-
tuted, and organizational domains, in which these values are
taken as premises and implemented. The distinction calls to
309. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).
310. 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
311. 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178
(1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983);
United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30
(1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). In Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, Justice Blackmun evoked the metaphor of a private "commercial ven-
ture," like any other "newspaper or periodical, or even ... radio or television
station." 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974). On the influence of the metaphor of private
property on public forum doctrine, see Stone, supra note 7, at 87.
312. F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 71 (1985).
313. There is, however, a variant usage of the phrase "public forum" in which
it does make sense to contrast the public forum with a sphere of personal privacy.
In that usage the phrase designates private property which has become so embued
with public functions as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 538-43 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 134 (1973) (StewartJ., concurring); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 573
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1798 [Vol. 34:1713
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1798 1986-1987
PUBLIC FORUM
mind the difference between what Jiirgen Habermas has
called a social framework of "symbolic interaction," and a
social framework "of purposive-rational action." 314 The lat-
ter is aimed at the realization of "defined goals under given
conditions"; the former at the creation of "consensual
norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behav-
ior."3 15 The analogy cannot be pressed too far, however,
and that for two reasons.
First, government action in the public realm must at
times also be instrumental,316 and so the ordinary principles
of first amendment jurisprudence which govern the public
realm must both facilitate such action and yet simultane-
ously cabin it so that it will not impede the more fundamen-
tal processes of symbolic interaction. Second, government
action within organizational domains is at times designed for
the specific purpose of facilitating symbolic interaction, as
occurs, for example, in courtrooms and universities.
Habermas' distinction is helpful, however, because it re-
minds us that the public realm must retain the ability to fos-
ter symbolic interaction and cannot be dedicated entirely to
purposive-rational action. And, conversely, it forces us to
recognize that when organizational domains foster symbolic
interaction, they do so for a purpose that frames and limits
such interaction. Paradigmatic of such limitations are the re-
strictive rules of evidence and speech characteristic of a
court. One can expect these limitations to be more severe
when organizational purposes are narrow and specific, and
to be more generous when organizational purposes are
broad and diffuse.
The most analytically interesting example of an institu-
tion designed to foster symbolic interaction is the town
meeting, whose very purpose is the creation of a forum for
public discourse and decisionmaking. Even that constitu-
tionally benign purpose, however, when implemented
through the authority of a moderator, has the power to limit
speech through the imposition of agendas and rules of order
and decorum. Many of these limitations are plainly contrary
to ordinary first amendment principles.
314. J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 92-93 (1971).
315. Id. at 92.
316. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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This suggests that underlying public forum doctrine lies
the notion of public discourse and decisionmaking which oc-
curs without government purpose or design. The stubborn
persistence of Justice Holmes' famous metaphor of a mar-
ketplace of ideas, despite its many deficiencies, may perhaps
be attributed to the fact that it is a precise expression of this
notion. The metaphor assumes that public opinion will be
formed through a spontaneous process of exchange and
communication. Without central planning or design, the
market evaluates the partial purposes of the organizations
that compete within it. The paradox, of course, is that the
market is itself sustained by government rules of interaction.
In the economic sphere these rules include the law of prop-
erty and contracts; in the sphere of communication they in-
clude the principles of the first amendment.
The concept of the "public" in public forum doctrine,
then, is extraordinarily complex. In part it refers to govern-
ment facilitation of symbolic interaction. This facilitation,
however, must be of a particular kind. If it is oriented to-
ward the achievement of particular purposes or goals, the
government's intervention will be perceived as creating a
nonpublic forum like a courtroom or a university. The facili-
tation must instead be passive enough to be appropriated
and used by purely private purposes. This points toward a
conclusion whose irony should not be missed: in the end the
public realm created by public forum doctrine is nothing
other than a governmentally protected space for the achieve-
ment of private ordering. The irony, of course, has a final
twist, for in a democracy like our own private ordering is the
very stuff of public will.
E. The Authority of Social Practices
The reformulation of public doctrine which I have pro-
posed characterizes a resource as a public or nonpublic fo-
rum depending upon the social practices within which it is
embedded. Social practices are thus determinative of
whether the first amendment claims of members of the gen-
eral public seeking to use the resource will be evaluated
according to the standards of governance or those of man-
agement. Ceding this kind of authority to social practices
raises two theoretical anomalies that require further
attention.
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1. The Malleability of Social Practices
The first anomaly is that social practices are themselves
partly the result of government action, so that if the state
truly wishes to exercise managerial authority over speech, it
need only alter these practices in a manner that would justify
such authority. Since it is always open to the government to
"expand" its organizational boundaries to include a particu-
lar resource, keying the definition of a public forum to social
practices must in some sense be viewed as circular.
While the descriptive accuracy of this anomaly should
be acknowledged, its force as an objection to the proposed
account of public forum doctrine depends in large measure
upon the function that one expects the doctrine to serve. As
reformulated in this Article, the doctrine permits the state to
manage speech within its own institutions, but it prohibits
the state from attempting to manage the first amendment
claims of members of the general public respecting re-
sources that lie within the public realm. Thus the doctrine
requires that the Postal Service's regulation of private mail-
boxes meet the constitutional standards associated with gov-
ernance, which is to say that it must pass muster under
ordinary principles of first amendment adjudication. For the
Postal Service legitimately to assert managerial authority
over private mailboxes, the proposed reformulation of pub-
lic forum doctrine would require the Service to do more
than simply assert such authority. The Service would have
to fundamentally alter the roles, expectations, and behavior
which envelop the use of mailboxes, as for example by plac-
ing mailboxes under lock and key controlled by Service per-
sonnel. That the doctrine does not itself prohibit the
Service from transforming conduct in this way can count as
an objection only on the assumption that public forum doc-
trine should contain within it principles for restraining the
expansion of government institutions.
A recent decision in which the Court expressed this as-
sumption is United States v. Grace,31 7 in which the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a congressional statute that
prohibited on the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court
building the ".display [of] any flag, banner, or device
designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party,
317. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
1987] 1801
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1801 1986-1987
UCLA L4 W REVIEW
organization, or movement."3 1 8 The Court held that the
sidewalks on the perimeter of its building were a public fo-
rum because they were "indistinguishable from any other
sidewalks in Washington, D.C.," and because sidewalks were
in general "public forum property." 31 9 The Court then pro-
ceeded to use a rather traditional first amendment analysis
to strike down the statute on the grounds that it did "not
sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its
justification."3 2 0 What is fascinating about the decision,
however, is that in the course of rejecting the contention
that the statute had somehow altered the public forum status
of the sidewalks, the Court said:
In United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assn 's., 453
U.S. 114, 133 (1981), we stated that "Congress .. .may
not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public forum' status
of streets and parks which have historically been public
forums.. .. " The inclusion of the public sidewalks within
the scope of § 13k's prohibition, however, results in the
destruction of public forum status that is at least pre-
sumptively impermissible. Traditional public forum
property occupies a special position in terms of first
amendment protection and will not lose its historically
recognized character for the reason that it abuts govern-
ment property that has been dedicated to a use other
than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the gov-
ernment transform the character of the property by the
expedient of including it within the statutory definition of
what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of
property. 3
2'
The Court thus appeared to include within contemporary
public forum doctrine a principle prohibiting the govern-
ment from expanding its boundaries to include resources
that were previously within the public realm.
It is important to note, however, that the Court's enun-
ciation of this principle was entirely by way of dicta. The
statute at issue in Grace could no more destroy "the public
forum status" of the Court's sidewalks than could the statute
at issue in Greenburgh destroy the public forum status of pri-
vate mailboxes. Contemporary doctrine holds that public
forum status depends upon whether a resource has "tradi-
318. See id. at 175; 40 U.S.C. § 13k (1986).
319. 461 U.S. at 179.
320. Id. at 181.
321. Id. at 180.
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tionally ... been held open to the public for expressive activ-
ities."322 Under the reformulation proposed in this Article i,
public forum status depends upon the social practices in
which a resource is embedded. In either case public forum
status is determined as of the situation prior to the at-
tempted regulation of the resource. On no account, there-
fore, would the statute at issue in Grace be determinative of
the public forum status of the Court's sidewalks.
In asserting that "the destruction of public forum sta-
tus" is "presumptively impermissible," then, the Court was
reaching out beyond the facts of the case and articulating a
principle that would prohibit the state from regulating con-
duct in such a way as to justify the future exercise of manage-
rial authority with respect to a resource presently in the
public realm. 32 3 So stated, however, the principle appears
simply unjustifiable. As a general matter, resources from the
public realm ranging from pen and ink to typewriters are in-
corporated all the time into the managerial domain of state
institutions. A principle that would make "presumptively
impermissible" the conversion of parkland into an office
building would seem implausible on its face.
Of course there are times when the destruction of pub-
lic forum status does have significant first amendment impli-
cations. Suppose, for example, that threats of terrorist attack
led the government to block off the sidewalks around the
Supreme Court and to permit entrance only with a special
pass issued by the Court. In effect the government would
have altered the roles and expectations of those using the
sidewalks in such a way as to bring the sidewalks within the
institutional boundaries of the Court building. The future
regulation of speech on the former sidewalks would thus be
evaluated by the criteria appropriate for managerial author-
ity. If it is assumed that the transformation of the sidewalks
in fact terminated significant communicative activity, includ-
ing demonstrations, picketing, parades, and the like, the
322. Id. at 179.
323. It should be emphasized that the Court's remarks were doubly dicta, since
§ 13k was not such a statute. Section 13k regulated certain limited aspects of the
speech of the public, but not its conduct, so that even if § 13k were enforced the
public would continue to use the Court's sidewalks in a wide variety of roles and
expectations, and the sidewalks would thus continue to be a public forum.
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transformation could raise important first amendment
questions.
The issue, however, is whether these questions should
be addressed through the medium of public forum doctrine.
The questions are no different than those raised whenever
government action adversely affects the exercise of first
amendment rights, and as such are similar to those ad-
dressed all the time by ordinary principles of first amend-
ment adjudication. Thus in determining the constitu-
tionality of the government's proposed transformation of
the Court's sidewalks, one can expect a court to consider the
list of factors normally brought to mind by these princi-
ples, 324 including the gravity of the terrorist threat, the ex-
tent to which that threat will be averted by the proposed
transformation, the nature and extent of the impact of the
transformation on the exercise of first amendment rights,
the availability of alternative means of exercising those
rights, and so forth. Public forum doctrine cannot contrib-
ute anything to this analysis. This is because public forum
doctrine concerns the generic characteristics of government
authority, whereas the constitutionality of the sidewalks'
transformation turns on the specific historical justifications
and implications of that transformation.
To put the point more generally, the destruction of
public forum status may or may not raise significant first
amendment questions, depending upon the specific circum-
stances of the destruction. The evaluation of these circum-
stances is a matter for determination by the ordinary
principles of first amendment adjudication. It is implausible
to assert, therefore, that public forum doctrine should con-
tain within it a general axiom that the destruction of public
forum status is "presumptively impermissible." The fact
that government action may change the social practices de-
terminative of public forum status does not so much make
public forum doctrine circular, as illustrate that it is incom-
plete. Although the state may shut down public forums, it
can only do so in ways that themselves conform to the gen-
eral requirements of the first amendment.
324. Ordinary principles of first amendment adjudication apply because by hy-
pothesis the government's proposed transformation applies to sidewalks that are,
ex ante, a public forum.
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2. Social Practices and Constitutional Principles
The second theoretical anomaly which arises from the
proposed reformulation of public forum doctrine concerns
the relationship between social practices and constitutional
principles. Although the existence and nature of constitu-
tional rights sometimes explicitly depend upon social prac-
tices, 325 it is far more common to view these practices as
themselves normatively shaped and guided by constitutional
principles. By making public forum status dependent upon
social practices, however, the proposed reformulation of
public forum doctrine removes the doctrine as a source of
such legal guidance. It does not permit a court to say, for
example, that even though a particular resource is in fact
within a state organization and so subject to managerial au-
thority, the resource should nevertheless be viewed as within
the public realm and hence regulated only according to the
standards of governance. Conversely, the doctrine prohibits
a court from concluding that the government should be able
to manage a resource that is in fact located within the public
realm. These constraints appear on their face anomalous,
particularly in the first amendment area where we commonly
view courts as having the affirmative responsibility of inde-
pendently evaluating the legitimacy of social practices.3 2
6
Whether the anomaly counts as an objection to the pro-
posed reformulation of public forum doctrine, however, de-
pends upon whether attractive alternative principles that are
not dependent upon social practices can be offered in order
to determine when members of the general public can use
institutional resources for communicative purposes. Since
there are a potentially endless number of such alternative
principles, the anomaly is not a question that can ever be put
to rest. It is instead appropriate and even necessary to con-
tinually scan the horizon for the appearance of superior
constitutional principles.
325. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982); Transportation Union v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
326. The anomaly, of course, is also present in contemporary public forum
doctrine, for that doctrine views historical social practices as authoritative criteria
for the determination of the public forum status of government property.
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The most that can be said, then, is that in light of the
alternative principles currently available, it is wisest for
courts to view social practices as authoritative. Even this
softer proposition cannot be definitively established, how-
ever, because we are enveloped by an indefinite number of
such principles. One response needs to be given to the indi-
vidual who argues that the government should be free to
manage speech whenever necessary; a different response to
the person who argues that speech should everywhere be
governed;327 and so on. There can be no general demon-
stration of the superiority of the appeal to social practices.
The strength of that appeal can be illustrated, however,
by comparing it to a plausible competitor - call it the "Free
Speech Principle" - which would hold that members of the
general public can use resources for communicative pur-
poses whenever necessary for the communicative structure
prerequisite for our democracy. 328 In the class of cases deal-
ing with the first amendment claims of those seeking to use
for communicative purposes a resource lying within a gov-
ernment organization, the Principle would have a court in-
quire into the importance of the speech for the maintenance
of public discourse; public forum doctrine, on the other
hand, would have a court ask whether the claims are compat-
ible with the achievement of organizational purposes. Thus
a major difference between the two approaches is that the
Principle would countenance disruption of the social prac-
tices by which organizations are constituted as instrumental
domains for the achievement of institutional goals.
Of course this disruption is not by itself a sufficient rea-
son to reject the Principle. It might be argued, for example,
that in Brown v. Board of Education329 the Court was willing to
countenance the disruption of a good many social practices
in order to achieve the constitutional value of racial equality.
In Brown, however, the social practices that were disrupted
were those of segregation, which was the precise evil that
was constitutionally condemned. Segregative practices were
deemed irrelevant, as a matter of constitutional law, "to the
327. See, e.g., Note, A Unitary Approach, supra note 7, at 143-47.
328. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 219-21 (1986).
329. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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achievement of any legitimate state interest."- 330 The Free
Speech Principle, on the other hand, would disrupt the very
social practices that concededly enable the state to achieve
constitutionally proper and desirable purposes. Since it
would not be credible to argue that first amendment claims
should always and in every circumstance take precedence
over the attainment of these purposes, a Free Speech Princi-
ple very quickly moves to a position of balancing, in which
the protection of expression is weighed against the state's
ability to pursue other ends.
Inherent in this balancing, however, is an acknowledg-
ment that the social practices by which organizational do-
mains are constituted have normative constitutional force.
The modification of the Principle thus moves it a fair dis-
tance in the direction of the proposed reformulation of pub-
lic forum doctrine. But proponents of the Principle would
contend that while public forum doctrine completely subor-
dinates courts to the instrumental reasoning constitutive of
organizational domains, the Principle reserves for courts the
ability to balance, and hence to retain an appropriate and
necessary independence from that reasoning. The difficulty
with the Principle becomes apparent, however, when its pro-
ponents are forced to specify the exact content of this
independence.
Suppose, for example, that the members of a political
party wish to hold a rally in support of their candidate in an
upcoming election within the office building of a govern-
ment bureaucracy. Public forum doctrine would have a court
ask whether the rally would interfere with the ability of the
bureaucracy to attain its ends. Proponents of the Free
Speech Principle would want in addition to empower a court
to engage in other inquiries. But what inquiries? Is it truly
relevant that the pertinent speech is "expression on public
issues" and hence occupies " 'the highest rung of the hierar-
chy of first amendment values?' "331 Or that the upcoming
election is close, so that the demonstration might actually
make a difference to its outcome? Or that holding the rally
in the building is the most cost-effective way of reaching
330. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
331. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
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government workers, to whom the party wishes particularly
to appeal?
These inquiries seem somehow without conviction.
They are an unexceptional example of ad hoc balancing, and
yet in this context appear to be abstract and arbitrary. The
reason turns on the distinction between the public realm and
an organizational domain. Determining first amendment
rights by ad hoc balancing seems legitimate in the public
realm because speech in that realm is the very means by
which social consensus is constituted, so that every consen-
sus in that realm must in some sense be regarded as provi-
sional. Ad hoc balancing reflects the precarious nature of
such consensus. It invites "the expression and examination
of doubts and disagreements" and "solicits future conversa-
tion, by allowing for resolution of this case without predeter-
mining so many others that one 'side' experiences large-
scale victory or defeat."
332
Within organizational domains, however, determining
first amendment rights by ad hoc balancing assumes a very
different character. This is because in such domains consen-
sus is not experienced as provisional. When we create an
organization to achieve a goal, we signify that a decision has
been reached and that it is not open for further discussion,
but is instead meant to be implemented. Within organiza-
tional domains objectives are taken as value premises. The
very existence of an organization reflects a wide and fixed
social consensus that its resources be used for instrumental
purposes. This consensus does not merely subsist in official
pronouncements, but is enacted in social practices. A gov-
ernment bureaucracy could not exist unless most everyone
concerned, including members of the general public, gov-
ernment workers, and government officials, agree to assume
organizationally defined roles when within the bureau-
cracy's domain. The instrumental subordination of speech
is simply the reflection of this enacted consensus. For courts
to disrupt this consensus concerning the priority of a func-
tional orientation would require extraordinary and system-
aticjustification. Ad hoc balancing, precisely because it is ad
332. Michelman, Foreward: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34
(1986).
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hoc, does not contain within it this kind of justification, and
so is experienced as abstract and arbitrary.
It does not follow, of course, that such balancing is al-
ways unjustified; the conclusion is rather that it is inherently
problematic and should therefore be discouraged as a mat-
ter of doctrinal arrangement. The urgent and pressing qual-
ity of first amendment adjudication, more perhaps than in
any other area of constitutional law, continually pushes
courts toward problematic decisions, and it would be foolish
flatly to rule these out in advance. It is sufficient to deprive
them of doctrinal support, and so render more visible and
vulnerable their extraordinary quality. Much of the impulse
toward independent balancing should in any event be ab-
sorbed by the elastic nature of the instrumental standard ap-
plicable to nonpublic forums. In this Article I have refrained
from speculating as to exactly how strict the means-end
nexus must be in order to warrant prohibiting public access
to a nonpublic forum, in large part because the nature of this
nexus cannot sensibly be given a general or abstract formu-
lation. The character of the nexus will largely be a matter of
common sense, and as such it will be sensitive to context and
circumstances. 3" 3 I suspect, however, that as the first
amendment concerns normally present in ad hoc balancing
become more pressing, they will be expressed in a more or
less unconscious tendency to tighten the nexus necessary to
sustain the suppression of speech. In the end I think that
this flexibility is unavoidable, and, if it does not lead courts
to treat the instrumental standard disingenuously as a proxy
for other values, it is also not inappropriate.
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY
If a court determines that a particular resource is a non-
public forum and hence belongs to the instrumental domain
of an institution, the governing principle of constitutional
law is that public use of the resource for communicative pur-
poses may be restricted if such use interferes with the effec-
tive functioning of the institution. In passing on the
333. For the reasons stated at supra note 256 and accompanying text, however,
I believe that at a minimum the nexus should be understood as placing the burden
on government to demonstrate that the adverse consequences of a particular pub-
lic use of organizational resources for communicative purposes are so undesirable
as to justify the prohibition of that use.
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constitutionality of the institution's regulation of the re-
source, a court can either make its own independent assess-
ment of the compatibility of public use with the attainment
of legitimate institutional objectives, or it can defer on this
question to the judgment of authorities within the institu-
tion. The Court's tendency to defer to institutional judg-
ment in its recent nonpublic forum cases has been the single
most controversial aspect of contemporary public forum
doctrine, and it is at the heart of the Court's rejection of
Grayned. In this section I will sketch a framework for analyz-
ing the question of deference within the context of public
forum doctrine.
A. The General Structure of'Deference Analysis
Deference analysis can be conceptualized as divided
into three stages. The first stage concerns what may be
called the preconditions of deference. Deference occurs
when courts retain control over the content of governing
constitutional principles, but decide that these principles are
best implemented by institutional officials. 334 Thus it is a
necessary precondition of deference that a court believe that
institutional authorities are aware of the constitutional prin-
ciples that should guide theirjudgment and are in good faith
attempting to enact those principles. In this sense deference
presupposes a relationship of trust between a court and in-
stitutional authorities, and is inappropriate if a court has rea-
son to suspect that institutional authorities are unaware of or
indifferent to the rule that speech should only be regulated
when necessary to attain organizational ends, or if a court
doubts that institutional authorities are applying the rule in
good faith. Courts ordinarily perceive danger signals when
they confront institutional decisions that on the merits seem,
to use the language of Lehman, "arbitrary, capricious, or in-
vidious," 335 or, to adopt the phrase of Cornelius, "unreasona-
334. Deference should thus be distinguished from what I have elsewhere called
"delegation," which occurs when courts delegate to institutional officials the
power to determine the constitutional principles by which their decisions will be
judged. See Post, supra note 215, at 215. Delegation would be consistent with the
major premise of the Davis syllogism, as would a substantive conclusion that there
were no pertinent constitutional principles to constrain the decisions of institu-
tional officials.
335. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 298, 303 (1974).
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ble. '-3 3 6 In this limited sense questions of deference and
questions of substance are interrelated.
If the preconditions of deference are satisfied, a court
can address the second stage of deference analysis, which
entails an assessment of the arguments for deference. As a
general rule, courts are required to make an "independent
constitutional judgment"3 37 in cases involving regulation of
"supremely precious"33 8 first amendment freedoms. There
must be a good reason, therefore, to suspend such judg-
ment. It is sometimes argued that one such reason is the
respect which courts should have for the "professional ex-
pertise" of government officials. 339 But this argument, if ac-
cepted, would prove too much, for the prerogatives claimed
by expertise are potentially endless, and deference based
solely upon such grounds would have no limit. As a result
the Court has quite properly been reluctant to engage in the
wholesale sacrifice of first amendment rights that automatic
deference to expertise would undoubtedly produce.340
Although the school officials in Tinker and the military com-
manders in Glines presumably shared equal endowments of
professional expertise, the Court chose to defer in the sec-
ond case, but not in the first.
The contrast between Tinker and Glines suggests an al-
ternative justification for deference. The distinction be-
tween the two cases can be interpreted as resting on
differences in the kind of institutional authority at issue, dif-
ferences which make deference arguably necessary for the
attainment of institutional ends in the second case, but not
in the first. 34 1 This distinction can be generalized into the
336. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788. 806
(1985).
337. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27
(1984); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-45
(1978); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
338. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
339. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987); Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
340. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Post, supra note 215, at 185-86. I do not want to
overstate the case, however, for it seems to me that at a certain point considera-
tions of expertise do become important. See itfra note 371.
341. See supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text
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following principle: Courts should defer if the exercise of in-
stitutional authority at issue is of the kind that requires insu-
lation from judicial review for its effective functioning. I
shall call deference which meets this standard "warranted."
The justification for warranted deference flows from the def-
inition of the very constitutional right that is at issue. The
right of access to a nonpublic forum is in essence the right of
a member of the general public to use institutional resources
for communicative purposes in a manner that is not incom-
patible with the attainment of institutional ends. It is anom-
alous to require that a court itself obstruct the attainment of
these ends in order to vindicate such a right.
The difficulty, of course, is that an institution's regula-
tion of its resources may affect constitutional values other
than simply an individual's particular right to use these re-
sources for communicative purposes. When this is the case,
a court must determine whether the presence of such other
constitutional values renders inappropriate the exercise of
even warranted deference. This determination involves the
third stage of deference analysis, which entails a balancing of
the justification for warranted deference against the poten-
tial damage to constitutional principles other than those im-
plicated in the management of the speech of particular
individuals.
The characteristics of this third stage can be illustrated
by considering decisions involving the internal management
of speech. The internal management of speech always in-
volves more than merely a particular right to speak by an
institution's member; it in addition necessarily involves the
definition of that member's larger organizational role.
There is thus an intrinsic tension between the organization's
functional definition of that role and the member's need to
maintain fidelity to external roles and statuses. 342 In partic-
ular, it is not uncommon for institutions to impose organiza-
tional roles that are so "pervasive" 343 as to prevent their
342. On the relationship between organizational roles and external status, see
supra note 292.
343. The "pervasiveness" of an organizational role is a term of art within orga-
nizational theory.
The range of pervasiveness is determined by the number of activities
in or outside the organization for which the organization sets norms.
Pervasiveness is small when such norms cover only activities directly
controlled by the organizational elites; it is larger when it extends to
[Vol. 34:17131812
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members from engaging in non-organizational roles that
have constitutional value to the larger society. For example,
the military may prohibit service personnel from observing
required religious obligations, 344 or prisons may prohibit in-
mate correspondence with a court.3 45 In such cases the issue
is not merely the right to practice a particular religious rite
or to send a specific letter to a judge, but rather the very
ability to enact the constitutionally protected roles of being a
religious person or a participant in the judicial process. The
general damage to these roles must be weighed against the
potential damage to institutional authority resulting from ju-
dicial review. 346
This tension is well illustrated by Connick v. Myers,3 47 in
which the Court concluded that great deference should be
given to the authority of government officials to regulate the
speech of their employees, holding that "government offi-
other activities carried out in social groups composed of organiza-
tional participants; for example, army officers maintain "formalities"
in their club. Finally, an organization of its participants in social
units which include nonparticipants and which are, at least in part,
governed by nonorganizational "external" elites. Schools define
"desirable" leisure-time activities of students; some churches specify
the candidates they wish their members to support in the political
arena.
A. ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 163 (1961).
344. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
345. See e.g., Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
346. Although courts are willing to protect these extrinsic constitutional values
to the extent of refusing to defer to the judgment of institutional authorities, they
are on the whole not willing to protect them to the extent of modifying the under-
lying constitutional principle that speech in such institutions may be regulated if
necessary to attain institutional ends. For reasons much like those discussed in
Section IV(E)(2), supra notes 328-33, courts will not protect speech or behavior
that by hypothesis impairs the ability of an organization to function. In this re-
gard Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), is illustrative. At issue in
the case was the refusal of the military to permit an orthodox Jewish officer to
wear a religiously required yarmulke. The Court's opinion upheld the action of
the military, holding that it must "give great deference to the professional judg-
ment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular mil-
itary interest." Id. at 1313. Four Justices dissented, writing three separate
opinions. Not one of these opinions took the position that the religious rights of
the officer should be protected if they in fact endangered the ability of the military
to perform its function. Instead each opinion rejected the claim that the Court
should defer to the judgment of military officials, and went on to independently
determine that the officer's yarmulke would work no "substantial harm to military
discipline and esprit de corps." Id. at 1326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see id. at
1318-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
347. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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cials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of
the first amendment." 348 The Court set a limit on this defer-
ence, however, strongly hinting that if an employee speaks
"as a citizen, '" 349 if his speech "substantially involve[s] mat-
ters of public concern," 350 then deference would be inappro-
priate. 35' Unlike Pickering, which concerned the boundary
348. Id. at 146.
349. Id. at 147.
350. Id. at 152.
351. At first glance Connick appears to require courts to balance the first
amendment rights of employees against the achievement of institutional goals.
Connick states that if an employee's speech touches upon a matter of public con-
cern, the employee's interests as a citizen must be balanced against the govern-
ment's interests "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); see id. at 149-50. On closer analysis, however, the
image of balancing dissolves into a purely instrumental calculation. Even if an
employee's speech involves a matter of public concern, Connick holds that "full
consideration" must be given to "the government's interest in the effective and
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public," id. at 150, and that it must
be recognized that "the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion
and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs." Id. at 151
(quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)). Connick states that:
When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public re-
sponsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's judg-
ment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for
an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disrup-
tion of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action. We caution that a stronger showing may be
necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public
concern.
Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added). The question is the nature of the "stronger
showing" which must be made in order to justify regulating employee speech that
"more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern." In light of the over-all
structure of the opinion, I think the most plausible interpretation of Connick is that
in such circumstances the government cannot depend upon judicial deference to
managerial anticipation of harm to institutional culture, but must instead bring
sufficient evidence before a court to convince it that the government's restriction
of speech is in fact necessary for the attainment of institutional goals. In that case,
of course, the court will in effect be reaching an independent, non-deferential
decision as to whether the regulation of employee speech is truly required by the
need to achieve institutional objectives.
This interpretation of Connick is supported by the Court's most recent deci-
sion, Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). In Rankin a low-level govern-
ment clerk had been fired for a private remark which the Court interpreted as
being about a matter of public concern. Although the Court in Rankin reasserted
as a general matter the Pickering balancing test, id. at 2896, the Court's holding
that the firing was unconstitutional in fact turned on its conclusion that "there is
no evidence that" the remark "interfered with the efficient functioning of the of-
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between the management and governance of employee
speech,3 52 Connick assumed that managerial authority could
be validly exercised, and hence that employee speech could
be regulated as necessary to attain institutional ends. But
Connick also recognized that the organizational role of em-
ployee could be defined so pervasively as to destroy the con-
stitutional role of citizen, and so it implied that when the
latter role was potentially endangered, independent judicial
determination of the relationship between institutional ends
and the regulation of speech was justified, notwithstanding
the potential damage to institutional authority.
This tension between organizational and constitutional
roles, which is so central to the analysis of deference in the
context of the internal regulation of speech, does not exist
in public forum doctrine. The doctrine involves members of
the general public, who by definition are not subject to the
imposition of organizational roles. At stake in public forum
doctrine is simply the right to use a particular resource for
communicative purposes, and since this right is itself defined
by the same instrumental principles as inform the determi-
nation of warranted deference, the third stage of analysis in
public forum doctrine tends as a general matter to be rather
weak.
In fact the Court has given serious recognition to only
one constitutional value that could potentially override war-
ranted deference, and that is the value involved in prohibit-
ing government institutions from making their resources
available to the public in a manner that discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint. 353 Although the Court has forcefully
fice." Id. at 2899. The Court's decision, in other words, depended not upon a
balance of two competing values, but upon a purely instrumental calculation per-
formed without deference for the judgment of institutional authorities.
352. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
353. It is sometimes said that the public's use of a particular institutional re-
source is so essential for the maintenance of public discussion that courts should
not defer to administrative judgment in its regulation. See, e.g., Adderley v. Flor-
ida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-56 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But the Court has never
accepted such an argument, preferring instead to assume that public discussion
will continue regardless of the use of any particular government resource. Of
course this assumption, like any other, must stand or fall on the strength of its
empirical foundations. A different case would be presented if the government
owned all the meeting halls in town, instead of the government's hall being only
one among many. On the related empirical question of whether the use of certain
kinds of government resources is necessary to maintain the availability of inexpen-
sive means of communication, and so to maintain an undistorted marketplace of
1987] 1815
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enunciated this value, the relationship between the prohibi-
tion of viewpoint discrimination and public forum doctrine
is rather complex. The relationship will be discussed in de-
tail in Section VI, but the upshot of that discussion is that
the constitutional values behind the prohibition can be ex-
pected to override warranted deference in only a limited
number of circumstances. 354
B. The Criteria of Warranted Deference
For this reason the Court in cases involving public fo-
rum doctrine has tended to concentrate on the question of
whether deference is warranted. If it is assumed that with
sufficient attention and evidence a court can determine as
well as a government administrator whether any particular
regulation of speech is necessary for the attainment of orga-
nizational ends, the case for warranted deference must rest
on the adverse consequences of having a court, rather than
an institutional official, make this determination. The analy-
sis of warranted deference must thus turn on the identifica-
tion and assessment of these consequences.
It is of course not possible to generate an exhaustive
catalogue of these consequences. But their nature and vari-
ety can be illustrated by examining the relationship between
courts and what the sociologist Erving Goffman has called
"total institutions, ' '3 55 for in such institutions both the need
for organizational authority and the distance from judicial
culture are at their respective maxima. Analyzing this rela-
tionship will permit us to identify three distinct kinds of such
consequences, whose relevance to other kinds of govern-
ment institutions can then be evaluated.
Total institutions, like the military to which the Court
deferred in Greer, and the prison to which the Court deferred
in Jones, are organizations that attempt to regulate "all as-
pects of life ... in the same place and under the same single
authority."3 56 Total institutions not only physically separate
ideas, compare the views of Justices Stevens and Brennan in City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 & n.30, 819-20 (1984).
354. See infra Section VI(B).
355. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PA-
TIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 4-5 (1961).
356. Id. at 6.
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their members from the larger society, 357 but they also at-
tempt to the maximum extent possible to strip away from
their members statuses associated with that society, and to
impose instead a uniform institutional identity. 358 To ac-
complish this task total institutions characteristically have
pervasive systems of authority which are rationalized in
terms of the "avowed goals" of the institution and which are
expressed in "a language of explanation that the staff, and
sometimes the inmates, can bring to every crevice of action
in the institution.-
359
Judicial review of administrative decisions in the context
of total institutions poses the possibility of three distinct
kinds of adverse consequences to managerial authority. The
first concerns the contamination of the institution. Courts
represent the values and expectations of the larger society,
and if they override managerial authority in a total institu-
tion they import these values and expectations and threaten
the institution's isolation. Of course the extent to which this
isolation should be preserved is itself an independent and
substantive question of constitutional law. In Greer, the
Court was quite concerned that the military be "insulated
from both the reality and the appearance" of being con-
nected with civilian political life.360 In the case of prisons,
however, the recent demise of the "hands-off" doctrine in-
dicates a desire to subject prisons at least to some significant
extent to the constitutional values of the larger society.
36 1
Judicial review of managerial authority in total institu-
tions can cause a second kind of adverse consequence. Be-
cause total institutions are physically separated from society,
authority in these institutions must control literally every as-
pect of their members' behavior. Hence such authority is
357. Goffman notes that "[t]heir encompassing or total character is symbolized
by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often
built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire,
cliffs, water, forests, or moors." Id. at 4.
358. Id. at 119-21.
359. Id. at 83.
360. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 828, 839 (1976).
361. On the demise of the "hands-off" doctrine, see Calhoun, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q
219 (1977); Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, 2
CRIME &JUST.: ANN. REV. RES. 429 (1980). For an example of the Court's ambiva-
lence regarding the importance of isolating prisons from the general society's first
amendment values, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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not a matter of discrete and specific rules, but rather of con-
stituting an entire way of life, one which causes the members
of these institutions "to self-direct themselves in a managea-
ble way . . "362 Judicial tampering with particular institu-
tional rules will therefore affect not merely the behavior
specifically governed by these rules, but also the institu-
tional culture or way of life which the authority structure as a
whole is designed to create. Thus, judicial review of military
orders may well undermine that "instinctive obedience"
thought necessary for the achievement of the "military mis-
sion." 363 Similarly, it is claimed that judicial imposition of
specific due process regulations on prisons has had the un-
anticipated consequence of transforming the general institu-
tional culture by altering the manner in which inmates
regard guards, and has thereby caused unexpected problems
of inmate violence and security. 364
Such unanticipated consequences to organizational cul-
ture are difficult enough to deal with when a court has as-
sumed more or less comprehensive authority for the
administering of an institution through the issuance of a
structural injunction. They are much more troublesome,
however, when, as is characteristically the case in decisions
involving public forum doctrine, they arise from judicial re-
view of discrete rules or regulations. In such circumstances
a court does not accept responsibility for running an institu-
tion, and yet its decisions may set off a chain of unforesee-
able effects that have adverse consequences for those who
have accepted this responsibility.
The third kind of adverse consequences threatened by
judicial review concerns the relationship between rules and
unpredictable task environments. Because officials of total
institutions manage every aspect of the lives of their mem-
bers, they must often attempt to exercise their authority in
the face of unique and unforeseeable circumstances. Strict
rules, however, are unsuitable "where the action to be con-
trolled is non-recurring" and in situations involving "per-
362. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 355, at 87.
363. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354, 357 (1980).
364. J. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 136 (1977);
Marquart & Crouch,Judicial Reform and Prisoner Control The Impact of Ruiz v. Estelle
on a Texas Penitentiary, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 557 (1985).
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sonalised, individual application.- 365 In such cases it is
desirable that managers exercise discretion. 366 To the ex-
tent that judicial review entails the imposition of rules, it can
thwart this discretion and hence alter and impair the kind of
flexible authority structure necessary for the attainment of
institutional ends.
367
In the context of total institutions, therefore, the very
process ofjudicial review poses three distinct kinds of poten-
tially adverse consequences to organizational authority: con-
tamination, destruction of organizational culture, and the
loss of needed flexibility. These consequences are illustra-
tive of the criteria that a court should consider in deciding
whether deference is warranted. The pertinence and weight
of these criteria will vary depending upon the specific kind of
decision, authority, and institution that is at issue, and hence
the decision whether to engage in warranted deference must
be made on a case-by-case basis. This can be illustrated by
contrasting the question of warranted deference in two deci-
sions, Lehman and Perry, both of which involve decisionmak-
ing by ordinary government bureaucracies.
In Lehman, the issue before the Court Was whether a mu-
nicipal rapid transit system could refuse to sell advertising
space on car cards to those who wished to purchase the
space for political advertisements. Although Justice Black-
mun correctly concluded that the cards were a nonpublic fo-
rum,3 68 he incorrectly assumed that this conclusion required
the Court to defer to all managerial decisions respecting the
use of the cards. But if Blackmun had instead analyzed the
specific management decision at issue to determine whether
deference was actually warranted, he would have seen that
the Court should in fact have made its own independent
365. Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, 1973 PUB. L. 178, 202.
366. J. THOMPSON, supra note 267, at 117-21. Discretion, of course, is not a
blank check. We commonly speak of discretionary decisions as to which the con-
sideration of specific factors is either prohibited or required. See Post, supra note
215, at 219.
367. See Glazer, ShouldJudges Administer Social Seruices?, 50 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
64, 75-77 (1978). Judicial intervention in the administration of one prison, for
example, had the effect of depriving guards of discretion and fostering a "bureau-
cratic-legal order." Marquart & Crouch, supra note 364, at 581-84. As a conse-
quence guards felt they could "no longer maintain control and order within the
penitentiary," and there was a sharply increasing "rate of serious disciplinary in-
fractions." Id. at 580. SeeJacobs, supra note 361, at 458-63.
368. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
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determination of whether the acceptance of political ad-
vertising was incompatible with the system's effective
functioning. 369
The municipal transit system was, after all, a govern-
ment bureaucracy immersed in the larger society, so there
could be no contention that judicial review would illicitly
''contaminate" management authority with general social
values. Moreover, the decision to restrict the cards to com-
mercial advertising was addressed to members of the gen-
eral public who were potential customers for the purchase of
advertising space; it did not affect or involve the relationship
between the transit system and its own employees. The rela-
tionship between the system and its potential customers was
a contractual one negotiated at arms-length, and hence the
system could not have expected to influence its potential
customers through the creation of a specifically organiza-
tional culture. Thus, the decision to refuse political adver-
tising could not have been said to be part of a general
system of authority designed to inculcate an organizational
way of life, and judicial review of the merits of the decision
would have been unlikely to have unanticipated effects on
the structure of internal authority within the transit system.
Nor could a very plausible argument be made that the deci-
sion inhabited an unpredictable environment, so that the
transit system would have to retain a continual flexibility to
alter the rule against political advertising. Indeed the rule
had been in place and unchanged for twenty-six years. 370
Deciding whether the acceptance of political advertising
would have been incompatible with the ends of the transit
system might have involved complex and difficult matters of
business judgment, but as to these questions of judgment
369. Justice Blackmun hypothesized a number of possible justifications for the
refusal to accept political advertising:
Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be
jeopardized by a requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-ori-
ented advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurk-
ing doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems
might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974). He did not, how-
ever, independently scrutinize any of these reasons.
370. Id. at 300-01.
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there was no particular reason to believe that a court could
not have reached as accurate a decision as a transit official.
For all these reasons, deference in Lehman was not war-
ranted. 37' The circumstances of Perry, on the other hand,
create a demonstrably stronger case for judicial deference.
Perry concerned a school board's management of an internal
371. A rather different case would be presented if the transit system had never
allowed any advertising cards on their cars. One can imagine a political candidate
bringing a lawsuit in such circumstances, arguing that the transit system should be
required to install advertising cards for political announcements and that such
cards were compatible with the attainment of the system's goals as evidenced by
the practices of other jurisdictions. If the transit system replied that it had never
provided such cards, and had neither the administrative nor economic ability to
do so now, my instinct is that a court would defer to the system's judgment with-
out making an independent determination as to the merits of the case.
Such deference, of course, would have to be justified by reference to different
principles than those examined in the text. Two such principles come to mind.
The first turns on notions of relative competence. As courts are asked to leapfrog
over existing practices, rather than marginally to alter those practices, problems
of information and unanticipated consequences grow geometrically more difficult.
The distinction might be conceptualized as that between a court making policy
and a court overseeing the implementation of an existing policy: the former obvi-
ously demands far greater expertise. The distinction suggests a second way in
which judicial deference in these circumstances might be understood. To make
policy is to fundamentally define the nature and goals of an organization.
Although this task is implicit in much public forum doctrine, courts might well
believe that the task also has its limits.
Both these principles of deference are matters of degree, and both seem rele-
vant primarily when a plaintiff asks a court to transcend the common sense bound-
aries of its proper function. That is why these principles emerge from hypothetical
illustrations rather than from actual cases. That these principles of deference ex-
press a generally shared sense of appropriate limitations on judicial decisionmak-
ing is evidenced by the fact that public forum suits asking for courts actually to
create official resources for private expressive use are quite rare.
Such suits are closely related, however, to a more common kind of litigation,
which concerns the "opening-up" of government institutions to public view. See,
e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978). This kind of litigation does not so
much involve claims by members of the general public to commandeer govern-
ment resources for their own first amendment purposes, as claims that the interior
of a government institution should be made accountable and visible to the general
public. They thus involve complicated questions not only of the reach of the gov-
ernment's managerial authority over its own resources and personnel, but also of
the affirmative structural requirements of the first amendment for the facilitation
of public discourse. This is not the place for a full investigation of these ques-
tions, but only for the limited observation that the Court's decisions in this area
appear to have been deeply influenced by considerations of deference much like
those just discussed. Hence it is no surprise that the one institution which the
Court has been most aggressive about opening up to the public is the judicial
system. See supra note 255. Not only does the Court possess expertise in the area
of judicial management, but it also can speak confidently about the nature and
goals of courts. Thus the ordinary barriers to using constitutional law to set orga-
nizational policy are greatly diminished with respect to the judicial system.
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mail system whose "primary function" was "to transmit offi-
cial messages among the teachers and between the teachers
and the school administration." 372 The Court characterized
the system as a nonpublic forum, 373 and proceeded in effect
to defer to the decision of the school board to exclude a mi-
nority union (PLEA) from access to its system. The Court
assumed that PLEA should be treated as a member of the
general public, and hence characterized the case as one in-
volving public forum doctrine.3 74
Whereas in Lehman the decision to refuse political ad-
vertising did not affect the relationship between the bureau-
cracy and its employees, in Perry the decision to exclude
372. Perry Edtic. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983).
373. Support in the record for this conclusion is somewhat ambiguous. The
Court stated:
Local parochial schools, church groups; YMCA's, and Cub
Scout units have used the system. The record does not indicate
whether any requests for use have been denied, nor does it reveal
whether permission must separately be sought for every message
that a group wishes delivered to the teachers.
Id. at 39 n.2. It is possible, but not likely, that the mail system might have been
regarded locally as a form of public resource to be used by private community
groups to communicate with teachers and school children. These groups might
thus have perceived the school board to have abandoned any claim to organiza-
tional dominance in the use of the system, and acted as though the system were a
form of public mail available for use for a wide variety of private and personal
purposes. The Court, however, rejected this view of the evidence, stating:
If by policy or by practice the Perry School District has opened its
mail system for indiscriminate use by the general public, then PLEA
could justifiably argue a public forum has been created. This, how-
ever, is not the case. As the case comes before us, there is no indica-
tion in the record that the school mailboxes and interschool delivery
system are open for use by the general public. Permission to use the
system to communicate with teachers must be secured from the indi-
vidual building principal. There is no court finding or evidence in
the record which demonstrates that this permission has been
granted as a matter of course to all who seek to distribute material.
Id. at 47. The Court's characterization of the mail system as a nonpublic forum, in
other words, was dependent upon its not unreasonable perception that in the ab-
sence of strong contrary evidence it was most likely that all concerned understood
that their use of the system was conditioned upon their being of service to the
school's purposes, so that the system remained within the organizational domain
of the board.
374. One of the fascinating aspects of Pen' is the problematic character of this
assumption. See supra note 258. It is not clear, however, that the assumption
makes any actual difference to the outcome of the case. Even if PLEA were viewed
as an internal employee of the school board, and thus Perry were characterized as a
decision involving the internal management of speech, deference would still be
appropriate unless it could be demonstrated that the school board's regulation
had actually endangered an independent constitutional role of PLEA.
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PLEA was directly connected to this relationship. PLEA's
exclusion was part of the labor contract negotiated between
the board and the union which had been certified as the
teachers' exclusive bargaining representative (PEA),37 5 and
the exclusion was no doubt one of PEA's demands.3 76 The
school board, like any large scale employer, no doubt wished
to use its authority as an employer to engender in its em-
ployees "not just a passive but an active attitude toward the
furtherance of the organization's objectives. . . . Active
rather than merely passive participation and cooperation is
almost essential if an organization is to attain even moderate
efficiency." 377 The decision at issue in Perry is thus part of
the larger question of the school system's organizational cul-
ture, and hence judicial review of that decision could risk
causing unanticipated adverse effects on the general rela-
tionship between the board and its employees. The decision
is also one that calls for the exercise of discretion rather than
fixed rules. The potential ability of the board to alter its de-
cision to exclude PLEA gives it leverage in negotiating with
PEA, and in other circumstances the board might well de-
cide to more generally open up the mail system.3 78 Thus the
imposition of a fixed judicial rule regarding the use of the
mail system may well impair needed flexibility.
Although both Lehman and Perry involve decisions of
large and rather ordinary government organizations, defer-
ence is warranted in the second case, but not in the first.
The contrast arises because of differences in the kinds of de-
cisions subject to review in the two cases, and illustrates that
the determination of warranted deference does not depend
upon the "type" of institution at issue, but rather upon a
reasoned application of the various criteria of warranted def-
erence to the specific facts of an actual case. Because defer-
ence involves such a serious abdication of the judicial
obligation independently to protect individual constitutional
rights, courts should be cautious in finding warranted defer-
375. 460 U.S. at 40.
376. Id. at 70 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
377. H. SIMON, D. SMITHBURG & V. THOMPSON, supra note 276, at 81.
378. Indeed until 1978, shortly before the Perry lawsuit was initiated, the school
board permitted both the minority and majority unions to use the mail system.
460 U.S. at 39; Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1287 (7th
Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983).
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ence. Needless to say, courts should exercise independent
review with respect to the decision of whether or not to
defer.
VI. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE NONPUBLIC FORUM
If there is one doctrinal rule that appears to have the
universal approval of the Justices, it is that the regulation of
speech in a nonpublic forum must be "viewpoint neu-
tral." 379 That the Court is indeed serious about this rule is
illustrated by its recent decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund,380 where it held that although the
Combined Federal Campaign [CFC], an annual charitable
fundraising drive conducted in the federal workplace, was a
nonpublic forum, the government's exclusion from the CFC
of legal defense and political advocacy organizations would
be unconstitutional were it to be based upon impermissible
"viewpoint-based discrimination."3 81
Like most forms of discrimination, viewpoint discrimi-
nation can be measured in terms of either purpose or effect.
Cornelius clearly tilts toward the former perspective. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court3 8 2 speaks of viewpoint
discrimination as regulation "based on the desire to sup-
press a particular point of view," or as founded on "a bias
against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers,"
or as "impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a
particular point of view."3 8 3 Justice Brennan's dissent in
379. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985). See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46, 49
n.9; id. at 57-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some commentators have strongly
concurred in the Court's universal prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. For
example, Geoffrey Stone has concluded that the "government can never justify a
restriction on otherwise protected expression merely because it disagrees with the
speaker's views." Stone, supra note 48, at 229. Paul Stephan has noted that the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality "seems an essential concomitant of any ra-
tional system of freedom of expression." Stephan, supra note 155, at 233.
380. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
381. Id. at 811. At issue in Cornelius was the constitutionality of Executive Or-
der No. 12,404, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1984), which specified "the purposes of the CFC"
and identified "groups whose participation would be consistent with those pur-
poses." 473 U.S. at 811.
382. See supra note 173.
383. 473 U.S. at 812-13. In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court was more ambiguous:
The general principle that has emerged ... is that the First Amend-
ment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor
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Peny,384 on the other hand, strongly focuses on the "effect"
of the discrimination at issue.385 Whichever perspective is
adopted, however, the Court's flat prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination is a confusing and inappropriate rule for the
nonpublic forum.
A. When Is Viewpoint Discrimination Impermissible?
Analysis of the relationship between public forum doc-
trine and the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination
must begin with the observation that viewpoint discrimina-
tion is a regular and unavoidable aspect of the internal man-
agement of speech. When a bureaucratic official instructs
her subordinate to present at a staff meeting position A
rather than position B, her actions have both the intent and
effect of viewpoint discrimination. The same is true when a
classroom teacher requires his students to draft papers sup-
porting, rather than attacking, the United States involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. The same is also true when an
Army general commands his staff to draft a defensive plan
relying on strategic, rather than conventional weaponry. As
these examples suggest, it is probably not too outlandish an
exaggeration to conclude that government organizations
would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to prohibit
viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of
speech.
In public forum doctrine, however, the issue is not the
internal management of the speech, but rather the control of
organizational resources vis-A-vis members of the public.
Public forum doctrine's prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination might derive from special concerns, not present
in decisions dealing only with the internal management of
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others .... [T]here is not
even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforce-
ment of this ordinance. There is no claim that the ordinance was
designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds distasteful or
that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that they
express.
Id. at 804.
384. Justice Brennan dissented in Periy on the grounds that the school board
had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by permitting PEA ac-
cess to the interschool mail system but denying such access to PLEA. His dissent
was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
385. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 64-65
(1983).
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speech, about the distortion of "the ordinary workings of the
'marketplace of ideas,' "386 or about "the principle of equal
liberty of expression ' ' 387 when applied to members of the
general public. These concerns are real and important, but
the difficulty is that they cannot realistically be captured by a
flat prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.
This is because organizations are not self-sufficient.
They have open boundaries and "must transact with other
elements in their environment to acquire needed resources
.... "388 These resources include individuals who are mem-
bers of the general public, in the form of outside experts,
independent contractors, consultants, temporary labor, vol-
unteer workers, and the like. When an organization uses
such individuals to attain its ends, it must manage their
speech in the same way that it manages the speech of its own
members. For this reason a flat prohibition against view-
point discrimination will restrict and perhaps strangle neces-
sary exchange between state institutions and their envi-
ronments.
The point can be illustrated by considering the facts of
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,38 9 in which a
nonpublic forum prison had extended access to outside or-
ganizations like "the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and
the Boy Scouts." 390 The reason was obvious: Prison officials
believed that such organizations served "a rehabilitative pur-
pose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the
prison administrators . *.". ."39 These outside organizations
apparently offered services and expertise which the prison
officials were unable to generate from within the purely in-
ternal resources of the prison. If the Court were serious
about imposing a ban on viewpoint discrimination, however,
the services and expertise of Alcoholics Anonymous could
be obtained only at the price of granting equal access to
groups promoting drunkenness or drug abuse. Such a price
386. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 101 (1978); see Stephan, supra note 155, at
233; Stone, supra note 7, at 55.
387. Karst, supra note 11, at 26; Redish, The Content Distinction in First.Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 134-35 (1981).
388. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 263, at 2.
389. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
390. Id. at 133.
391. Id. at 134.
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would of course be unacceptable, and as a result the prison
would be thrown more and more onto its own internal re-
sources at enormous cost to the attainment of legitimate pe-
nological goals.
The justification for incurring this cost would be far
from clear: if we permit prison wardens to instruct their
subordinates to give lectures on drug reform but not on the
advantages of drug use, why should we disable wardens
from bringing in outside groups to perform the identical
task? In what way is the latter any more a distortion of the
marketplace of ideas than the former? And if the principle of
equal liberty of expression protects members of the general
public from discrimination vis-A-vis one another, but is not
triggered when a warden gives lectures on drug reform to
prisoners but refuses permission to members of the public
to talk to prisoners on the advantages of drug use, why
should the principle be triggered when the warden entrusts
his task to individuals in the general public who have be-
come, for some limited purposes, equivalent to organiza-
tional members?
The situation would be quite the opposite, however, if a
warden were to permit Baptists to address inmates, but not
Methodists. In such circumstances our perception would no
doubt be that access 'to the prison was not being granted to
aid in the accomplishment of legitimate penological objec-
tives, but rather to assist the warden's favorite religious de-
nomination. We would view this as illicit, as distorting the
marketplace of ideas, or as violating the principle of equal
liberty of expression exemplified by the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination. The prohibition has bite, in other
words, when an institution permits selective access to mem-
bers of the public for reasons other than the achievement of
legitimate institutional ends.
If this were the only content of the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination, however, the prohibition would
qualify merely as a corollary to the more fundamental princi-
ple that public access to nonpublic forums cannot be regu-
lated except as necessary to attain institutional objectives.
At most the prohibition might be conceived as expressing an
independent constitutional value sufficient to override war-
ranted deference. But in fact the prohibition has greater
content than this, as can be seen by the following example.
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Suppose prison officials permit a citizens' group supporting
an initiative to issue bonds for the construction of new
prison facilities access to prison facilities for news confer-
ences and so forth, but deny such access to citizens' groups
opposing the initiative. It is clear in the example that offi-
cials are engaging in viewpoint discrimination to serve the
institutional purpose of building better prison facilities, and
that this is a legitimate institutional objective. Yet we would
nevertheless condemn the discrimination. The reason, I
think, is that the citizens' groups have not been incorporated
into the organizational domain of the prison and endowed
with specifically organizational roles, so that the regulation
of their speech is not analogous to the internal management
of speech. Unlike Alcoholics Anonymous in Jones, the citi-
zens' groups are not performing internal management func-
tions that prison officials themselves could perform had the
institution sufficient resources.
We might generalize this example by concluding that
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, insofar as
it has independent analytic content, depends upon the rela-
tionship between members of the public and the internal
functioning of an institution. If members of the public are
performing what we would characterize as specifically orga-
nizational roles, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimi-
nation is not triggered. The prohibition will bite, on the
other hand, if, as in the case of the citizens' groups advocat-
ing prison construction bonds, institutional resources are
made available for speech that is not seen as intrinsic to an
internal institutional function. Underlying the distinction is
the insight that viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally
permissible if it is sufficiently similar to the internal manage-
ment of speech.
The pertinent inquiry, then, concerns the question of
when members of the general public have assumed quasi-
organizational status so that the regulation of their speech is
"like" the internal management of speech. The Court has,
in fact, been rather generous in finding that this status has
been assumed. In Greer, for example, the commanding of-
ficer of Fort Dix testified that civilian visitors to the Fort
would be permitted to speak to soldiers depending upon
whether the content of their proposed speech furthered the
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military "mission."3 92 The Court chose to overlook this
viewpoint discrimination, evidently because it considered
the boosting of military morale to be an internal manage-
ment function.3 93 Similarly, in Perry the Court ignored obvi-
ous examples of viewpoint discrimination,3 94 apparently
because it believed that the majority union was endowed
with a quasi-organizational status. It is fair to say, however,
that the Court has been far from self-conscious about ex-
ploring the limits of such status, and that the hard work of
hammering out its precise parameters remains to be done.
B. The Prohibition Against Viewpoint Discrimination and
Warranted Deference
An important and unresolved question of public forum
doctrine is whether the prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination will override warranted deference. The ques-
tion can be divided into two inquiries: Whether courts
should defer to the judgment of institutional officials that
members of the general public have acquired quasi-organi-
zational status, and whether courts should defer to the judg-
ment of institutional officials that discriminatory criteria of
access to a nonpublic forum are necessary for the attainment
of institutional ends.
With respect to the first inquiry, it seems clear to me
that the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination should
override warranted deference. This is because the determi-
nation of the quasi-organizational status of members of the
general public is fundamentally a matter of legal characteri-
zation. There is no particular reason for institutional offi-
cials to be concerned with this determination, and hence
there is no prior institutional decision to which deference
can be due. In the final analysis, therefore, it must be up to a
court to determine whether or not institutional regulation of
the speech of members of the general public is "like" the
internal management of speech.
392. 424 U.S. 828, 868 n.16 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
393. See, e.g., id. at 838 n.10.
394. In Perry, not only was the school board's distinction between minority and
majority unions a blatant example of viewpoint discrimination, see 460 U.S. 37,
64-66 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), but so also was the fact that it permitted
its mail system to be used by "[liocal parochial schools, church groups, YMCA's,
and Cub Scout units, .... " id. at 39 n.2, rather than, for example, by groups pro-
moting alcoholism, organized crime, or bizarre religious practices.
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With respect to the second inquiry, however, institu-
tional officials are concerned with the attainment of institu-
tional ends, and hence can be expected to have made an
initial determination regarding the relationship of viewpoint
discrimination to the achievement of these ends. If defer-
ence to this determination is otherwise warranted, the defer-
ence can be overridden only if the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination reflects a constitutional value that
both transcends the particular right to speak at issue and is
of sufficient importance to outweigh the justification for def-
erence. Since the prohibition is intended in part to protect
the marketplace of ideas from distortion, and since this is a
value which transcends the question of whether any particu-
lar individual is or is not permitted to speak, the real ques-
tion facing the Court is whether this value should override
the need for warranted deference. The Court has re-
sponded ambivalently to this question. In cases like Jones,
Greer, and Perry, the Court has deferred to managerial judg-
ment regarding the functional justification for viewpoint dis-
crimination. In Cornelius, on the other hand, the Court
displayed deep uncertainty.
It was clear to the Court in Cornelius that plaintiffs'
claims for access to the CFC would affect the general climate
of employer-employee relationships within the federal gov-
ernment, and that for this reason deference was warranted
regarding managerial decisions concerning the use of the
CFC. But it was also evident to the Court that the CFC itself
was not closely related to the attainment of any specific orga-
nizational objectives, but was instead a means of affecting
the surrounding environment in ways unrelated to any par-
ticular organizational mission. Indeed the Court stated that
the CFC "was designed to lessen the Government's burden
in meeting human health and welfare needs by providing a
convenient, nondisruptive channel for Federal employees to
contribute to non-partisan agencies that directly serve those
needs."3 95 It is not obvious how such a purpose serves the
organizational mission of any particular government institu-
tion. And if the CFC were a means of channelling public
access to accomplish general, rather than specifically institu-
tional purposes, viewpoint discrimination, like that entailed
395. 473 U.S. 788, 795 (1985).
1830 [Vol. 34:1713
HeinOnline -- 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1830 1986-1987
PUBLIC FORUM
in the distinction between groups engaged in direct charita-
ble distributions and groups engaged in legal defense and
political advocacy, 396 would be unconstitutional.
The Court dealt with these conflicting imperatives in an
odd manner. In contrast to Perry, where the Court despite a
strong dissent simply refused seriously to entertain the ques-
tion of viewpoint discrimination, Cornelius chose not to defer
on this question, and instead remanded the case for what
will no doubt be an intrusive judicial examination of the sub-
jective motivation of administrative officials.3 97 But Cornelius
also explicitly deferred to and accepted "the validity and rea-
sonableness of the justifications offered by the Government
for excluding advocacy groups from the CFC," including the
contention that "controversial groups must be eliminated
from the CFC to avoid disruption" in the workplace.3 98
Thus the Court deferred to the "objective" justifications for
discriminatory access, at the same time as it independently
set off in quest of "subjective" motivations that might un-
derlie and be distinct from these justifications.
This is the kind of Solomonic solution that kills the
baby. It is a compromise that serves none of the interests of
public forum doctrine. If deference to managerial judgment
is necessary to protect a structure of institutional authority,
then surely that protection will be eviscerated by judicial in-
quiry into the subjective motivations of government officials.
If the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination is an impor-
tant constitutional principle, then surely it is not because of
the possibly impure motivations of government officials, but
rather because of the objective effects of viewpoint discrimi-
nation on the liberty of citizens and the marketplace of
396. See id. at 832-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
By devoting its resources to a particular activity, a charity ex-
presses a view about the manner in which charitable goals can best
be achieved .... Government employees may hear only from those
charities that think that charitable goals can best be achieved within
the confines of existing social policy and the status quo. The distinc-
tion is blatantly viewpoint-based ....
397. The Court said: "We decline to decide in the first instance whether the
exclusion of respondents was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a
particular point of view. Respondents are free to pursue this contention on re-
mand." Id. at 812-13.
398. Id. at 812.
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ideas.3 99 Cornelius' solution is muddled precisely because it
avoids direct confrontation with the underlying doctrinal is-
sue, which concerns whether and under what circumstances
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination can over-
ride warranted deference.
One way to approach this issue is to ask why the Court
in Cornelius was moved to acknowledge the issue of viewpoint
discrimination, while remaining content to ignore it in deci-
sions like Jones, Greer, and Perry. The cases differ because in
the latter three decisions it was intuitively obvious that insti-
tutional officials engaged in viewpoint discrimination to
achieve specifically institutional goals, whereas this intuition
was not apparent in Cornelius. The very meaning of war-
ranted deference, however, is that a court will defer to the
judgment of institutional officials regarding the instrumental
grounds for regulating speech, even if these grounds are not
intuitively apparent.400 But in Cornelius the presence of view-
point discrimination, coupled with the absence of any obvi-
ous institutional justification for the CFC, evidently tilted
the balance away from deference. One could generalize the
result in Cornelius into the principle that the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination overrides warranted defer-
ence in those cases where the relationship between the dis-
crimination and the attainment of organizational goals is not
immediately apparent.
The Court in Cornelius, however, stopped short of ac-
cepting this principle, instead settling for an unstable com-
promise judgment that is ultimately untrue to the
constitutional concerns underlying the case. At some point
or another the Court will have to abandon this compromise,
and clarify the circumstances under which viewpoint dis-
crimination will override warranted deference. When it
does so, the basic instinct of Cornelius might prove a helpful
guide.
399. Redish, supra note 387, at 131-35; Stephan, supra note 155, at 233; Stone,
supra note 386, at 101.
400. Assuming, of course, that the regulation does not appear to be so irra-
tional as to seem "arbitrary, capricious or invidious."
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CONCLUSION
"We had the experience but missed the meaning," T.S.
Eliot writes in The Dry Salvages.401 The observation illumi-
nates a great deal of the twisted and unhappy history of pub-
lic forum doctrine. The Court has sharply experienced the
necessity of protecting the administrative integrity of gov-
ernment institutions, and yet has been unable to capture the
meaning of that experience. It has instead concentrated on
questions of government property and the constitutional li-
cense of the proprietor, questions that are deservedly anom-
alous in modern first amendment jurisprudence. Fort-
unately the Court's instincts have proved truer than its doc-
trine, for underlying its actual judgments there is discernible
a more or less defensible pattern of decision.
This Article has attempted to trace that pattern. It be-
gins with the line between governance and management.
When the state acts to govern the speech of the general pub-
lic, it truncates the very process of discussion and exchange
by which public ends and public actions are determined. For
this reason, the first amendment imposes rather stringent
restrictions on such governance. When the state acts inter-
nally to manage speech within its own institutions, on the
other hand, public ends are taken as given and as socially
embodied within the form and objectives of a government
organization. First amendment restrictions on the internal
management of speech thus turn in the main on whether the
management is necessary in order to attain organizational
purposes.
The line between governance and management corre-
sponds to the distinction between the public and nonpublic
forum. If a resource is subject to managerial authority, it is a
nonpublic forum and its use for communicative purposes
can be routinely subordinated to the discretion of state offi-
cials, frozen through prior restraints, and in many circum-
stances subjected to viewpoint discrimination. All of this is
presumptively forbidden to the government when a resource
is a public forum and can only be regulated according to the
standards of governance. This is not because the public fo-
rum receives especially strict constitutional protection, but
rather because restrictions on speech within the public fo-
401. T.S. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 133 (1962).
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rum are controlled by ordinary principles of first amend-
ment adjudication.
There is no magic talisman to distinguish public from
nonpublic forums. As a society, however, we recognize
managerial domains by the presence of an instrumental ori-
entation embodied in the exclusion of roles and statuses in-
consistent with the attainment of organizational ends.
Contemporary public forum doctrine can be interpreted as
groping toward a similar recognition when it makes the dis-
tinction between public and nonpublic forums turn on a tra-
dition of public access for expressive purposes, since in most
circumstances such a tradition will be deeply incompatible
with the proscription of all but narrowly organizational roles
and statuses. 40 2 The tradition, however, is not constitutive
of the distinction between public and nonpublic forums, but
is rather probative of underlying social practices that are
themselves determinative of the authority ceded to the gov-
ernment in the regulation of speech.
When reviewing government control of access to a non-
public forum, a court must decide whether to determine in-
dependently if the control is necessary for the attainment of
legitimate institutional ends, or whether to defer on this
question to the judgment of institutional authorities. In
most cases, the distinction between the two approaches
turns on whether judicial deference is itself necessary in or-
der for a state organization to function effectively. If the
government decision at issue entails a kind of authority
which requires flexibility and discretion to function effec-
tively, or which is part of the creation of a specific organiza-
tional culture for the management of the affected institution,
there are strong justifications for judicial deference. These
justifications may be overridden, however, if the manage-
ment of the resource entails viewpoint discrimination that is
not obviously directed toward the attainment of institutional
ends.
The underlying pattern of contemporary public forum
doctrine, in short, reflects an emerging sociology of institu-
tional authority, as well as a pervasive and important strug-
402. Special environments like universities may constitute an exception to this
generalization, since in such environments the culture of academic freedom might
instrumentally connect a tradition of public access for expressive purposes with
the achievement of educational objectives.
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gle between a public realm and an organizational domain of
instrumental rationality. Seen in this light, public forum
doctrine has much to teach us about the nature and limits of
our democracy.
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